Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy In the Context of Homosexual Activity by Apasu-Gbotsu, Yao et al.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 40 Number 2 Article 4 
1-1-1986 
Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy In the Context of 
Homosexual Activity 
Yao Apasu-Gbotsu 
Robert J. Arnold 
Paul DiBella 
Kevin Dorse 
Elisa L. Fuller 
See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Yao Apasu-Gbotsu, Robert J. Arnold, Paul DiBella, Kevin Dorse, Elisa L. Fuller, Steven H. Naturman, Dung 
Hong Pham, and James B. Putney, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy In the Context of 
Homosexual Activity, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 521 (1986) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol40/iss2/4 
This Survey on the Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of 
Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy In the Context of Homosexual 
Activity 
Authors 
Yao Apasu-Gbotsu, Robert J. Arnold, Paul DiBella, Kevin Dorse, Elisa L. Fuller, Steven H. Naturman, Dung 
Hong Pham, and James B. Putney 
This survey on the law is available in University of Miami Law Review: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol40/
iss2/4 
Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy
In the Context of Homosexual Activity
Foreword ............................................................ 521
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 523
II. METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION .......................... 528
A . Introduction ..................................................... 528
B. Interpretivism .................................................... 532
C. Noninterpretivism ................................................. 538
D . Critical Responses ................................................ 548
E. Conclusion ....................................................... 552
III. THE SUPREME COURT: EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY ........... 552
A . Pre-G risw old .................................................... 553
B. Griswold and its Progeny .......................................... 555
C . Conclusion ....................................................... 563
IV. PRIVACY: A SEARCH FOR A LINCH-PIN ................................... 564
A. Privacy: A Familial Right ......................................... 567
B. Privacy: Personal Autonomy as a Principle ............................ 580
C. Conclusion: A Reconciliation ....................................... 589
V. LOWER COURT OPINIONS ................................................ 593
A. Right to Privacy Found ............................................ 593
B. No Right to Privacy Found ......................................... 604
C . Conclusion ....................................................... 609
VI. STATE INTERESTS IN THE PROHIBITION OF SODOMY ...................... 609
A. The Constitutional Test ............................................ 609
B . M orality ......................................................... 612
1. BACKGROUND .................................................... 612
2. THE STATE INTEREST IN MORALITY IN THE FACE OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS .......................................................... 617
3. NARROWNESS OF MEANS .......................................... 622
C . H ealth .......................................................... 623
1. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH ..... 623
2. AIDS: A NEW CASE FOR STATE REGULATION OF HOMOSEXUAL
CONDUCT ....................................................... 626
a. Background ............................................... 626
b. A nalysis .................................................. 630
D . Conclusion ....................................................... 635
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................. 636
Appendix ............................................................ 639
FOREWORD
This Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context
of Homosexual Activity resulted from the Supreme Court's unex-
pected grant of certiorari in Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 85-140. Hard-
wick presents a challenge by a homosexual male to the State of
Georgia's sodomy statute. When the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals first decided Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1 1th Cir.),
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
reh'g denied, 765 F.2d 1123 (1lth Cir. 1985), the facts presented an
interesting casenote topic. In that case, the court identified three
issues on appeal: one based on standing, another on summary affir-
mances in light of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901
(1976), and finally a right to privacy claim. In Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, the Supreme Court of the United States summarily affirmed
a Virginia district court decision upholding Virginia's sodomy statute.
The Note published in the University of Miami Law Review, Hardwick
v. Bowers: An Attempt to Pull the Meaning of Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney Out of the Closet, 39 U. Miami L. Rev. 973 (1985)
focused on the scope of precedential effect to be accorded the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance in Doe in the face of a homosexual's
assertion of a right to intimate privacy.
Although the precedential value of summary affirmances
presents an interesting question, it may not capture the imagination
and interest of a wide legal audience. The constitutional protections
espoused in Griswold v. Connecticut, 81 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and their possible application to homosex-
ual privacy rights, on the other hand, have not only great constitu-
tional significance, but popular interest as well. It came as a great
surprise to our staff when the Supreme Court decided to grant certio-
rari in Hardwick, particularly in light of its earlier reluctance to hear
this question in Doe and subsequent cases. With preliminary research
already in hand, we proceeded to address, in a survey format, the law
and literature on the right to privacy as it has evolved, and as it may
be applied in this most recent factual situation.
Bowers v. Hardwick presents the Court with the perfect opportu-
nity to flesh out the parameters of the due process privacy rights that
inhere from the fourteenth amendment. On August 3, 1982, Atlanta
police arrested Michael Hardwick in his own bedroom and charged
him with violating Georgia's criminal sodomy statute with another
consenting male adult. Georgia's sodomy statute provides:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another .... (b) A person convicted of
the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than one nor more than 20 years.
Ga. Code Ann. 16-6-2 (1984). Though the district attorney ultimately
dropped the charges due to a lack of evidence, Hardwick proceeded to
file suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Georgia alleging that Georgia's sodomy statute violated his consti-
tutionally protected right to privacy. He stated that he regularly
engaged in acts proscribed by the Georgia sodomy statute and that he
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would continue to do so in the future. The district court held that the
Supreme Court of the United States' summary affirmance in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney foreclosed Hardwick's suit.
The Eleventh Circuit, however, held that either Doe was not
clearly on point or, alternatively, that the Supreme Court's privacy
cases had subsequently overruled Doe. The Eleventh Circuit chose to
reach the merits of the case, holding the statute unconstitutional as
impinging upon the fundamental right to engage in private consensual
sexual activity protected under the ninth and fourteenth amendments.
The Eleventh Circuit directed that on remand, the state must prove
both a compelling interest to regulate such behavior and that the stat-
ute was narrowly drawn to serve only that interest. The Supreme
Court has granted the state's petition for certiorari, with oral argu-
ments scheduled to be heard on March 31, 1986.
For a number of reasons, the facts of Hardwick present the
"purest" right to privacy case the Supreme Court could hear on the
issue of the fourteenth amendment's constitutional right to privacy in
the context of homosexual activities. There is no fourth amendment
question to muddy the privacy issues. Neither Hardwick nor his part-
ner were minors, there was no question of compulsion on either
party's part, and the acts took place completely in private. Further-
more, Hardwick, does not present an equal protection issue because
the Georgia sodomy statute at issue applies equally to all-men and
women, married and unmarried, heterosexuals and homosexuals.
Interestingly, a married couple joined Hardwick in his district court
suit, but their claim was dismissed for lack of standing. As a result,
the focus of the Hardwick case was narrowed to the specific question
of the right to privacy of unmarried persons. Finally, the statute
involved cannot be challenged for vagueness because it explicitly sets
out what acts are prohibited.
It is our hope that what at first came as an unexpected surprise to
our editorial board will result in an opinion offering greater insight
into the proper scope of the right to privacy and its possible continued
expansion into other areas of individual freedoms. As a Survey, we
hope that our work will meaningfully contribute to legal scholarship
in this area, and that those who rely on our research and analysis will
find them both useful and complete.
I. INTRODUCTION
At common law, and at one time by statute in every state of the
United States, sodomy was a criminal act. Traditionally, states have
1986]
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considered homosexuality to be "sinful, sick and criminal."' In addi-
tion to making private gay sexual conduct a crime "not fit to be
named," 2 states have denied homosexuals custody of their children,a
the opportunity for public employment,4 and even the right to express
their political views.' Not until the rise of the gay rights movement
have some courts decided that the constitutional right to privacy, as
set forth in Griswold v. Connecticut,6 limits state authority to discrim-
inate against homosexuals.7 This process of invalidating discrimina-
tory state action because of the right to privacy has, however, been a
slow and uneven one.
8
Uneven application of the right of privacy to protect homosexu-
als is highlighted by the fact that twenty-four states and the District
of Columbia currently impose criminal penalties on consenting adults
who engage in private homosexual intercourse.9 Of these jurisdictions,
only six have specific statutes that explicitly prohibit homosexual con-
1. Rivera, Book Review, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 392 (1984) (reviewing D'EMILIO,
SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN
THE UNITED STATES (1983)).
2. Honselman v. People, 168 Ill. 172, 174-75, 48 N.E. 304, 305 (1897).
3. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Frye, 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1975); Spence v.
Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (denying child custody because mother was a lesbian),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340
(finding public knowledge of teacher's homosexual activity to impair ability to work and thus
to justify firing), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). See generally Horenstein, Homosexuals in
the Teaching Profession, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 125 (1971) (generally discussing the rights of
homosexual teachers); Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges.- The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons In the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 860-73 (1979) (general discussion of the
legal problems of homosexuals).
5. See, e.g., National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (1984), affid by
equally divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985). See generally Willson & Shannon, Homosexual
Organization and Right of Association, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1979).
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
8. See, e.g., Neville v. State, 430 A.2d 570 (Md. App. 1981) (a post-Onofre case finding no
fundamental right even for married couples to engage in oral or anal sex).
9. Private, consensual sodomy is a criminal offense in the following states: ALA. CODE
§ 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (1978); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1813 (1975); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-3052 (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 800.02 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1979); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. § 510.100 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14:89, 14:89.1 (West Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-54 (Supp. 1982); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.158, 750.338, 750.388(a)-(b) (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293
(Supp. 1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon
1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1979); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-177 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
10-1 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612
(1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403
(1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (1982).
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duct."° The other jurisdictions rely on sodomy statutes, which pro-
hibit oral and anal intercourse between any two individuals-
including heterosexuals." Traditionally, however, sodomy statutes
have been aimed primarily at homosexuals.12
Current state laws prohibiting homosexual intercourse are
ancient in origin. The earliest legal argument for outlawing homosex-
uality can be found in Plato's Laws.'3 Plato believed that homosexu-
ality had to be forbidden because it undermined the important Greek
values of masculinity and procreation."4 While accepting Plato's rea-
soning, Judeo-Christian opposition to homosexuality derives from the
legendary account in Genesis of the fire and brimstone destruction of
Sodom and Gomorrah. 5 The word sodomy is derived from Sodom.
The Mosaic Law sets forth an absolute prohibition against homosex-
ual activity: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind; it
is abomination."I 
6
Throughout the Middle Ages, ecclesiastical courts enforced the
Biblical prohibition against sodomy by prosecuting homosexuals as
heretics and burning them at the stake.' 7 The first secular legislation
forbidding sodomy was not passed until the English Reformation
when Henry VIII removed jurisdiction from the ecclesiastical courts
and granted it to the king's courts.' 8 Blackstone later restated this
10. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1974); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1982); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 201.190 (1979); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1972).
11. See supra note 7. For a compilation of statutory materials showing legislative intent in
the enactment and repeal of sodomy legislation, see the Appendix, at 639-57, attached to this
Survey.
12. See Rivera, supra note 3, at 942-44.
13. See PLATO, LAWS, Book VIII 835d-842a.
14. Id.
15. See Genesis 19:5-8, 24-26; Deuteronomy 23:17.
16. Leviticus 18:16-20, 22-23 (King James).
17. D.S. BAILEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN TRADITION 146-47
(1955).
18. The original English statute read:
For as much as there is not yet sufficient and condign punishment appointed
and limited by the due course of the Laws of this realm, for the detestable and
abominable vice of buggery committed with mankind or beast . . . it may
therefore please the King's highness, with the assent of his lords spiritual and
temporal, and the commons of this present parliament assembled ... that the
same offence be from henceforth adjudged felony .... And that the offenders
being hereof convict ... shall suffer such pains of death, and losses, and penalties
of their goods, chattels, debts, lands, tenements and hereditaments, as felons be
accustomed to do, according to the order of the common laws of this realm ....
And that justices of Peace shall have power and authority, within the limits of
their Commissions and Jurisdiction, to hear and determine the said offence, as
they do use to do in cases of other felonies ....
25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1533).
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early sodomy legislation as prohibiting an "infamous crime against
nature."19
Blackstone's characterization of sodomy, as a "crime against
nature," would serve as the basis for most American sodomy laws.2°
For example, the original North Carolina sodomy statute read: "Any
person who shall commit the abominable and detestable crime against
nature, not fit to be named among Christians, ... shall be adjudged
guilty of a felony and shall suffer death without the benefit of
clergy."' 2 1 While some states continue to use the Blackstonian lan-
guage, most jurisdictions that retain prohibitions against sodomy have
rewritten their statutes to describe with greater specificity the types of
private consensual sexual acts deemed illegal.22 This is largely to
avoid challenges to the term "unnatural" as unconstitutionally vague.
Until the early 1960's, homosexual behavior was prohibited in all
fifty states and the District of Columbia through some form of sod-
omy statute.23 Then in 1961, Illinois became the first state to adopt
the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code provision, which
decriminalized adult, consensual, private, sexual conduct. 24 In sup-
porting the decriminalization of sodomy, the American Law Institute
(ALI) noted that such nations as France, Great Britain, Canada,
Mexico, Italy, Denmark, and Sweden had repealed their sodomy stat-
utes.25 The ALI further cited scientific studies that found homosexual
conduct to be neither "unnatural" nor socially harmful.26 Despite the
ALI's support and Illinois's lead, no other state decriminalized con-
sensual sodomy until Connecticut repealed its sodomy law in 1969.27
In response to the gay rights movement, the ALI proposal gained sup-
port in the 1970's when legislators in twenty additional states acted to
decriminalize private, consensual homosexual conduct. 2  The impe-
19. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215.
20. See Note, Commonwealth v. Bonadio: Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse-A
Comparative Analysis, 43 U. Pirr. L. REV. 253, 254 (1981).
21. N.C. REV. CODE ch. 34 § 6 (1837).
22. By finding that it was clear enough to meet due process requirements, the Supreme
Court laid to rest any concerns over the vagueness of the Blackstonian definition. Rose v.
Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975).
23. See Note, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553, 554-57
(1977).
24. Criminal Code of 1961, §§ 11-2, 11-3, 1961 111. Laws 1985-2006 (codified as amended
at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-2, 11-3) (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1983). See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 comment 276, at 278 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1955).
26. Id.
27. CONN. PENAL CODE, Pub. Act. No. 828, §§ 66-91, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 1554, 1579-
85.
28. Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 219; Act of May 12, 1975, ch.
[Vol. 40:521
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tus of the gay rights movement appears to have waned in the 1980's,
however, with only Wisconsin acting to decriminalize sodomy.2 9
With state legislatures less hospitable, gay activists have mounted
constitutional challenges to sodomy statutes in state and federal
courts. These challenges have been based on the federal constitu-
tional right to privacy as the Supreme Court has articulated it in the
Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade3" line of cases. Gay rights
litigants have attempted to force the courts to expand the right to
privacy to cover private, adult, consensual sexual activity.3' The
courts have been split over whether to accept this proposition.
Essentially, the debate centers on the scope of the right to pri-
vacy. Because the Supreme Court has not squarely confronted the
problem of giving content to the right in a manner that would allow
courts to develop the law in some coherent fashion, lower courts have
floundered with the concept. This Survey attempts to analyze the
cases and literature relevant to the determination of whether the right
to privacy protects private, adult, consensual homosexual activity. As
a threshold matter, Part II initially highlights the methods of consti-
tutional interpretation by which courts have attempted to discover the
meaning of the right to privacy, arguing that the method employed is
in some sense outcome-determinative as to the scope of the right.
Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's doctrinal development of the
right to date, i.e., Griswold and its progeny. Part IV surveys the liter-
ature commenting on the Supreme Court's right to privacy cases and
attempts to reconcile the values underlying the Court's decisions.
Part V then details lower court opinions that have struggled to assess
71, §§ 4-12, 1975 Cal. Stat. 131, 133-136; Colorado Criminal Code, chs. 40-3-403, 40-3-404,
1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 388, 423; Delaware Criminal Code, ch. 497 §§ 766, 767, 58 Del. Laws
1611, 1665-66 (1972); Hawaii Penal Code, Act 9, §§ 733-735, 1972 Hawaii Sess. Laws 32, 90-
01; Act of Feb. 25, 1976, Pub. Law No. 148, ch. 4 § 2, 1976 Ind. Acts 718, 733-734; Iowa
Criminal Code, ch. 1245, §§ 901-906, 1976 Iowa Acts 549, 558-559; Maine Criminal Code, ch.
499, §§ 251-255, 1975 Me. Laws 1273, 1297-1300; Nebraska Criminal Code, L.B. 38 §§ 32-38,
1977 Neb. Laws 88, 100-102; Act of July 2, 1973, ch. 532:26, 1973 N.H. Laws 999, 1011; New
Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, ch. 95, §§ 14:1 to 14:3, 1978; N.J. Laws 482, 547-550; Act of
Apr. 3, 1975, ch. 109, 1975 Laws 265, 266-267; Act of Dec. 14, 1972, §§ 2907.01-.07, 1972
Ohio Laws 1966, 1906-1911; Oregon Criminal Code of 1971, §§ 104-120, 1971 Or. Laws 1873,
1907-1910; Crimes Code, No. 334, ch. 31, 1972 Pa. Laws 1983, 1528-31; Act of Feb. 26, 1976,
ch. 158, §§ 22-2 to -4, 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws 227, 260-261; Washington Criminal Code, ch. 260,
§ 9A.88.100, 1975 Wash. Laws 817, 858; Act of Mar. 11, 1976, ch. 43, 1976 W. Va. Acts 241;
Act of Feb. 24, 1977, ch. 70, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 228, 228-310.
29. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For
a full discussion of this line of cases, see infra Part III.
31. See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980)
(statute imposing criminal sanctions for consensual sodomy between adults violates the right
to privacy).
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the parameters of the right. Part VI next focuses on the level of judi-
cial review to which the Court subjects State legislation impinging on
a fundamental right. Included within this Part is a discussion of the
state interest in preventing the spread of acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS) as a justification for sodomy statutes.
II. METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
A . Introduction ...................................................... 528
B. Interpretivism ..................................................... 532
C. Noninterpretivism .................................................. 538
D . Critical Responses ................................................. 548
E . Conclusion ....................................................... 552
A. Introduction
The Supreme Court's 1973 abortion decision, Roe v. Wade,32 has
revitalized the debate among scholars over the proper role in constitu-
tional adjudication of the Constitution's written text and the inten-
tions of its Framers. Professor Grey was probably one of the first
commentators to note this link, and he described recent interest in the
interpretive constitutional model as in part a reaction to the Court's
identification of a libertarian right to privacy in familial and sexual
matters.33 The interpretive model essentially limits the Court's ability
to overrule the work of the political branches to those instances
clearly at odds with a specific value judgment evidenced in constitu-
tional text and documented by historical evidence of the Framers'
intent.34 The theory limits the scope of judicial review, but it does not
necessarily challenge this power.35
It is somewhat inaccurate and pedestrian to identify the develop-
ment of a constitutional theory as a specific reaction to the Court's
ruling in Roe. Indeed the interpretive model has always had a majes-
tically straightforward appeal, and the Court itself tied the legitimacy
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
34. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1-2 (1980). The interpretivist versus
noninterpretivist debate carries over to the area of statutory interpretation. See Lehman, How
to Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 489. Professor Lehman suggested that the
historical method of statutory interpretation, which defers to the legislative intent behind a
statute, is connected to the philosophy of legal positivism. Id. at 491. This theory strictly
construes separation of powers issues because judges are understood to implement their own
values when they move beyond legislative intent. Yet, Professor Lehman said judges prefer the
historical method because it actually allows them to rule on the equities without appearing to
do so. Id. at 497. See also Easterbrook, Statutes'Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983)
(arguifig that a statute's breadth should be restricted to the type of cases anticipated by its
framers unless it clearly allows the court to revise the common law).
35. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 335 (1969).
[Vol. 40:521
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of its first assertion of the power of judicial review to interpretive rea-
soning.16 Yet, as Dean Ely has acknowledged, "the controversial
abortion decision of 1973... was the clearest example of noninterpre-
tivist 'reasoning' on the part of the Court in four decades: it forced all
of us who work in the area to think about which camp we fall into
"37
Noninterpretivism is most closely associated with the notion of a
living constitution, a document that can be understood only by look-
ing beyond its text and history.a8 Some noninterpretivists argue that
their call to color the Constitution's meaning with current values is
completely consistent with the Framers' intent.39 They suggest that
the broad, open-ended language of some of the Constitution's clauses
is best understood as evidence of the Framers' intent to leave the spe-
cifics to future generations.' Others who call for contemporary val-
ues to inform constitutional adjudication deny that the specific intent
of the Framers matters at all.41 This allows them to ignore historical
36. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The Court also used interpretive
reasoning in one of its most infamous exercises of judicial review, Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). The Court held that the federal courts did not have diversity
jurisdiction under the Constitution because the Framers did not intend to include negro slaves
as state citizens. Id. at 454. The Court said that its duty was "to interpret the instrument they
have framed, with the best light we can attain of the subject, and to administer it as we find it,
according to its true intent and meaning when it was adopted." Id. at 405. The Court
definitively claimed:
[n]o one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in
relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this
country, should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more
liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the
instrument was framed and adopted .... Any other rule of construction would
abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the
popular opinion or passion of the day. This court was not created by the
Constitution for such purposes. Higher and graver trusts have been confided to
it, and it must not falter in the path of duty.
Id. at 426.
37. J. ELY, supra note 34, at 2-3.
38. Grey, supra note 33, at 703-06.
39. Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and The Supreme Court, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 769, 785 (1981).
40. The fourteenth amendment is an obvious example of the Constitution's open-ended
language:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
41. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Simon, The
Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation be Justified?, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1482 (1985).
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evidence that indicates the Framers attached crabbed and narrow
meanings to some crucial clauses.4 2 Furthermore, unlike interpre-
tivists, noninterpretivists are still free to exercise judicial review where
the historical record is either ambiguous or contradictory. Noninter-
pretivism does not deny that the Court must obey the Constitution's
specific textual commands, but it instead seeks an additional role for
the Court as an active participant in defining the more open-ended
clauses.43
Critical theorists, predictably, have launched devastating attacks
both at these camps and those who seek to occupy a middle ground.
They view these theories as hopelessly hypocritical and inconsistent
with a political liberalism that requires its judiciary to be constrained
by principle and law." Interestingly, interpretivists lay essentially
this same criticism at noninterpretivists, i.e., that noninterpretivist
judges are unconstrained. But critical theorists understand all judicial
reasoning to be inherently value-laden, and historiographic methods
to be incapable of defining the Framers' intent with sufficient clarity
to rule out alternate readings. Professor Tushnet saw the only possi-
ble synthesis as a new Burkean conservativism that does not even
require a constitutional theory. 5
It is nearly impossible to find a right to personal and sexual pri-
vacy unless one adopts a method of constitutional theorizing that
grants the Court an active and important role in interpreting the text.
A strict interpretive model by definition prohibits such a role for the
Court, and historians have yet to unearth evidence that the Framers
specifically intended individuals to be protected in their sexual pur-
suits. One must therefore turn to noninterpretivism and its intermedi-
ate variants for a theory that legitimizes finding a constitutional right
to privacy. This assumes, of course, that the type of historical analy-
sis found in Griswold v. Connecticut,46 placing the right to privacy in
42. L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); L. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE (1963); L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960); Berger, The Ninth Amendment,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1980); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the
Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Levy, The Legacy Reexamined, 37 STAN. L. REV. 767
(1985).
43. Grey, supra note 33, at 706.
44. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
45. Id. at 785-86. For a definition and discussion of Burkean conservative theory, see
Wilson, infra note 172 and accompanying text. For Professor Tushnet's own description, see
Tushnet & Jaff, infra note 153, at 1327-31.




the ninth and first amendments, is not really interpretivist at all.47
Professor Perry has become one of the most influential spokesmen for
the noninterpretivist position, but even he sought distance between his
theoretical approach and the Court's handling of some of its privacy
cases.4" He wanted the reader to remember that even if the abortion
decisions are "illegitimate on the merits, it does not follow that
noninterpretive review ... is illegitimate too."49
It is surely apparent that these issues are as difficult as they are
important. Not unexpectedly, there is a virtual cottage industry of
scholars who have approached these questions and have either sug-
gested some answers or have posited that none exist. This section of
the Survey can only attempt to present and organize the views of the
most influential scholars who have written about ways in which to
interpret the Constitution. These commentators have engaged in an
often rich, sometimes trite, and occasionally acrimonious debate.
Some articles are primarily important exchanges between particular
scholars, while others are best viewed as wide-ranging attempts to
unify constitutional theory."
47. At least Professor Berger, an ardent interpretivist, has stridently rejected Justice
Goldberg's historical proof. See Berger, supra note 42, at 1-14. Professor Berger labeled the
amendment's reference to unenumerated rights a simple reminder that the people of the states
retain the ultimate power to "add to or subtract from the rights enumerated in the
Constitution by the process of amendment ...... Id. at 14. Justice Goldberg used the
fourteenth amendment to incorporate what he said was the ninth amendment's prohibition
against infringement of fundamental rights. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493. Justice Goldberg used
a quote by James Madison to shed light upon the Framers' intent in enacting the ninth
amendment. Id. at 489. Madison described the amendment as ensuring the protection of
fundamental rights, serving essentially the same function as a bill of rights without the risk
that unenumerated rights would be overlooked. Id. Justice Goldberg definitively concluded
that "the Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be construed to exhaust the
basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the people." Id. at 490.
Justice Goldberg fails to win the interpretivist appellation because he cannot cite historical
evidence that specifically indicates that the Framers intended contraceptive use to be private.
The nonexistence of contraceptives at the time the Constitution was adopted merely highlights
the fact that the Griswold Court moved beyond the original intent of the Framers. Any
expansion beyond the Framers' particular conceptions of rights simply fails to constrain
judicial discretion in the way interpretivists demand. For a complete discussion of the
difference between concepts and conceptions, see infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
Similarly, Justice Douglas's reliance in Griswold upon the penumbral and peripheral first
amendment right of privacy definitionally fails to limit the Court's discretion. 381 U.S. at 482-
86. His decision to base the right of privacy in the first amendment leaves the right without
either textual or historical support.
48. M. PERRY, supra note 41, at 145.
49. Id. Professor Cox, who endorsed an active role for the Court in guaranteeing natural
rights, was also critical of the Court's abortion decisions. See infra notes 116-18 and
accompanying text.
50. Before turning directly to the issue of how to interpret the Constitution, it is necessary
to identify a fundamental issue in constitutional adjudication that is not addressed in this
Survey. It is important to note that the Court does not work with a clean slate. The correct
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B. Interpretivism
The most complete and competent presentation of the interpre-
tivist position can be found in Professor Berger's book, Government by
Judiciary. Professor Berger presented a powerful argument that inter-
pretive constitutional reasoning is the only method consistent with
our representative democracy. After conducting a detailed historical
analysis of the fourteenth amendment, Professor Berger concluded
that these records are especially trustworthy"' and that there is no
trace, for example, of the Framers' intent to encroach upon tradi-
tional state control of suffrage and segregation.2 He posited that the
amendment is best understood as merely "constitutionalizing" the
Civil Rights Act of 1866."3 This Act did not protect the Negro's right
to vote, thereby highlighting the narrow intent of the fourteenth
amendment. 4 The Framers did not intend the amendment to enact a
broad theory of social and political equality," and Professor Berger
described suggestions that its broad liberty and equality language was
intended to allow for different application in the future as "a specula-
tive fabric that collapses under the fact[s] .... 56 Professor Berger
did conclude, however, that the original Framers contemplated and
mix of consistency with precedent and a newly reformulated constitutional theory in the
Court's future work is an immensely important issue deserving of extensive exploration.
Perhaps, as Professor Greenawalt has said, the lack of a clear-cut answer as to how to interpret
the Constitution is precisely the reason that the Court needs to pay close attention to the way it
uses precedent. Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 982, 1014 (1978).
In a comprehensive analysis of the Court as an institution, Professor Easterbrook
suggested that inconsistency is inevitable given the constraints of voting and the case selection
process. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982). Professor
Easterbrook used the abortion and sexual privacy cases to illustrate the way that results can be
influenced by the order in which the issues reach the Court. Id. at 819, 820 n.43. Professor
Easterbrook's criticism was that it makes no sense that constitutional rights are determined by
the order that cases reach the Court. Yet, Professor Easterbrook said that inconsistency in the
Court's reasoning is inevitable when forced to decide hard cases, and that criticizing the Court
as an institution is pointless. Id. at 813. See also Abraham, Three Fallacies of Interpretation: A
Comment on Precedent and Judicial Decision, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 771 (1981). Professor
Abraham said that there is a dualistic conception of adjudication. Id. The distinction between
the "hard" and the "easy" cases is that there is no clear, on-point precedent for the former. Id.
Yet, Professor Abraham found this distinction misleading and said that reasoning from the
past to the present is a common link between both the hard and easy cases. Id. at 774. Cf.
Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1 (1979) (stating that
precedent is only an effective limit on the Court's work if the Court is committed to it as a
principle).
51. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 6 (1977).
52. Id. at 18.
53. Id. at 23.
54. Id. at 55-60.
55. Id. at 29-31.
56. Id. at 115.
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provided for judicial review of the legislative and executive
branches."
Professor Berger's defense of interpretivism as a theory is more
interesting for present purposes than is his well-researched historical
analysis. For if he is wrong that the Court must defer to the Framers'
specific value judgments, historical proof becomes superfluous. Pro-
fessor Berger premised his defense of interpretivism on a rationale
that is both conservative yet consistent with liberal political theory:
"judicial power to revise the Constitution transforms the bulwark of
our liberties into a parchment barrier.""8 This defense apparently
views interpretivism as insuring that a basic core of constitutional
defenses will be undiluted by the passage of time. It may be, as Pro-
fessor Perry suggested, that interpretivism is best understood as a
Burkean conservative theory.5 9 Although it may prevent the Court
from checking new forms of tyranny by the political branches that
were not envisioned by the Framers, interpretivism guarantees that
some checks are always in place by fixing the meaning of the Constitu-
tion.60 This guaranteed minimum, however, would not permit judicial
construction of a right to privacy solely to check a state legislature's
novel form of tyranny.
The core of Professor Berger's defense of interpretivism, how-
ever, was what one can best describe as an argument for representa-
tive democracy. Professor Berger described this as a solemn
command that the "intention of the sovereign people, whether
expressed in convention or through the amendment process, demands
... obedience. "61 His argument is bolstered by Professor Choper's
extensive analysis of the institution of judicial review and the political
61process. 2 Professor Choper acknowledged that all three branches of
our government contain undemocratic elements, but he concluded
that the judiciary is significantly more undemocratic than the
others. 63  He did not attempt, however, to articulate a principled
approach to judicial enforcement of the Constitution's open-ended
57. R. BERGER, supra note 35, at 335.
58. R. BERGER, supra note 51, at 364.
59. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional
"Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 556 n.23 (1985).
60. Dean Ely, however, said that Justice Black, "the quintessential interpretivist, [stood]
almost alone against the variety of novel threats to freedom of expression the legislators and
executives of the 1940's and 1950's were able to devise. ... J. ELY, supra note 34, at 2.
Justice Black, however, wrote a vigorous dissent to the Court's contraception decision,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
61. R. BERGER, supra note 51, at 369.
62. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
63. Id. at 5, 50.
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provisions.64 Even accepting this description of the judiciary as accu-
rate, it does not directly explain why its undemocratic character
requires it to apply the interpretivist's narrow construction of the
Framers' original intent.
Professor Dworkin perceived a subtle split among those who call
for a strict interpretation of the Constitution.65 Although his own
contribution to constitutional theory is discussed below in the
noninterpretivist section, Professor Dworkin's critique of interpre-
tivists is useful to help explain their position. He described one camp
as motivated by a moral skepticism that "attacks activism at its roots"
because activism "presupposes a certain objectivity of moral princi-
ple.' ' 66 Because all claims of moral rights are only disguised represen-
tations of the speaker's personal preferences, it is best to let a
politically accountable branch decide which value or moral right it
prefers.67 In constitutional adjudication, the Framers were the politi-
cally accountable actors. Importantly, this moral skepticism is not too
deep-rooted, for it presupposes the Court's ability to understand the
contemporary meanings of the Framers' value choices. A more criti-
cal skepticism labels even the interpretivist's enterprise subjective.
The second interpretivist camp that Professor Dworkin distinguished
does not deny the existence of moral rights. Instead it may passion-
ately demand that there are such rights, but insist that the judiciary
defer to politically accountable actors to decide which rights should
be recognized.68 When interpretivists as a group are compared with
other constitutional theorists, however, Professor Dworkin's distinc-
tion turns out not to be very important. Both of these interpretive
camps deny the existence of judicially discoverable moral principles
apart from those most clearly present in the Constitution. In addition,
neither camp would sanction judicial fabrication of a right to privacy.
Judge Bork's pre-Roe article on interpretive theory and princi-
pled constitutional adjudication supports this last conclusion.6 9
64. Id. at 79. Professor Choper does detail the inherent restrictions on the exercise of
national political power that may make such enforcement unnecessary. For a concise
summary of his argument, see Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIo
ST. L.J. 411 (1981) (comparing the political process-based theories of Professor Choper and
Dean Ely).
65. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 138 (1977).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 140.
68. Id. See also Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693
(1976) (defining and criticizing judicial activism under the banner of a living constitution).
69. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
For Judge Bork's recent reaction to the constitutional theory debate, see Bork, Styles in
Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 391-92 (1985) (reaffirming his past conclusions and
[Vol. 40:521
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Although his timing placed him ahead of those who wrote in reaction
to Roe, he was primarily concerned with exposing other examples of
the Court's noninterpretive reasoning, especially Griswold v. Connecti-
cut." Judge Bork added an element to Professor Wechsler's theory of
neutral principles."1 Judge Bork said that Professor Wechsler had
correctly identified the neutral definition and application of constitu-
tional principles as key concerns. Judge Bork noted, however, that
this approach overlooked an equally crucial element in a neutral con-
stitutional theory: the neutral derivation of constitutional principles.72
He argued that neutral derivation is impossible where the Constitu-
tion does not clearly embody a moral or ethical choice because the
Court is unfit to distinguish between forms of society's gratifications.7 3
A Court that makes rather than implements value choices cannot be
squared with democratic theory. Judge Bork described Griswold as
especially unprincipled because there was neither textual nor histori-
cal support for the Court's derivation of a right to privacy; nor was
there a principled definition of the scope of the right.7 4
Judge Bork demonstrated a basic skepticism that the judiciary
merely implements its own value choice when it prohibits a political
branch from doing an act not specifically proscribed by the Constitu-
tion. This skepticism requires that a politically accountable branch
choose among competing moral values because none is more correct
than another. Professor Dworkin challenged the assumption that the
Constitution requires that all political and moral choices be made by
politically responsible institutions.7" He suggested that any defense of
judicial deference to the political branches must be based on the the-
ory that legislatures are fairer and sounder institutions to make these
choices.7 6 Professor Dworkin denied that fairness required that the
majority decide the limits of its own power. His response to the sec-
ond justification for judicial deference is clearly more likely to con-
vince only noninterpretivists. The argument that legislatures are
sounder institutions to make value choices essentially posits that the
describing recent literature to be as difficult to read as it must be to write) [hereinafter cited as
Styles].
70. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See Bork, supra note 69, at 7-11.
71. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
72. Bork, supra note 69, at 7.
73. Id. at 21. The majority is gratified when a court does not prevent it from choosing
between competing values such as low-cost electric power versus clean air, or sexual
satisfaction versus morality. Id.
74. Id. at 9.
75. R. DWORKIN, supra note 65, at 141.
76. Id.
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organic political processes will secure genuine rights more perma-
nently without the intrusion of the courts.77 Professor Dworkin
responded that, because rights exist, the suggestion that they can be
demonstrated by process rather than principle "shows either a confu-
sion or no real concern about what rights are.'
8
Judge Bork concluded that many of the Court's decisions are
inconsistent with interpretive theory because the Court has acted far
beyond the original intent of the Framers. He said, for example, that
"substantive due process, revived by the Griswold case, is and has
been an improper doctrine.' 79 Interpretivism also "indicates that
most of substantive equal protection is also improper. ' 80 He denied,
though, that an interpretive approach would invalidate the Court's
desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education.1 Somewhat
unexpectedly for an interpretivist, however, Judge Bork did not
attempt to discover the specific intent of the fourteenth amendment's
Framers. Instead, he relied on the broad notion that the amendment
was "intended to enforce a core idea of black equality against govern-
mental discrimination. '82 Professor Berger, however, said that Brown
was invalid given that the "key to an understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment is that the North was shot through with Negrophobia
",83
Professor Grey also devoted much of his article to identifying the
Court's past work that is inconsistent with pure interpretive theory.8 4
He said that the Court's decisions requiring "fundamentally fair" pro-
cedures in criminal and civil proceedings cannot be reconciled with
interpretive theory.85 Neither can "the application of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights to [the] states ... be justified under an interpre-
tive model ...." Professor Grey also charged interpretivists with
overlooking a rather stark implication of their theory, namely, that
"the demise of substantive due process must constitutionally free the
federal government to engage in explicit racial discrimination."-87 Pro-
77. Id. at 146. Professor Dworkin is primarily critiquing Professor Bickel's concern that
the Court does serious harm to itself as an institution when it marches ahead of social value
judgments made by the political branches. See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
78. R. DWORKIN, supra note 65, at 147.
79. Bork, supra note 69, at 11.
80. Id. Eisenstadt v. Baird is an example of the way the Court has used equal protection
reasoning in the area of the right to privacy. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82. Bork, supra note 69, at 14.
83. R. BERGER, supra note 51, at 10.
84. Grey, supra note 33, at 710.





fessor Grey also said that "there is serious question how much of the
law prohibiting state racial discrimination can survive honest applica-
tion of the interpretive model."88
Judge Bork easily accepted the conclusion that "broad areas of
constitutional law ought to be reformulated. ' 89 Professor Berger,
however, suggested that reworking and overruling past precedents
would have "undesirable consequences." 9° He did not explain, how-
ever, why undesirable consequences would result if the Court were to
repudiate past cases that relied upon noninterpretive reasoning. He
considered his position defensible because "to accept thus far accom-
plished ends is not to condone the continued employment of unlawful
means." 91 Professor Berger may have been attempting to insure that
the debate over interpretivism did not become intertwined with a
debate over the legitimacy of particular past decisions. In staking out
the broader ground, he took the same approach as Professor Perry,
who sought to put distance between noninterpretivism and the abor-
tion decision. 92 Yet, interpretivism seems to place a greater value on
the consistency of constitutional interpretation, and it is not entirely
clear that it is legitimate from an interpretivist perspective to only
require that the Court's future decisions are made in an interpretive
manner.
The most obvious result of following Professor Berger's decision
not to overrule past noninterpretive decisions is a hopelessly compli-
cated, truncated, and confused body of precedent. The Court would
be forced to ignore analogies to noninterpretive cases and would have
to write opinions that simply did not square with clearly related
issues. This situation would render future opinions illegitimate from
Professor Wechsler's perspective of neutral application of past princi-
ples to new facts, even if new decisions were somehow more neutral in
the derivation of their underlying principles. Professor Berger's deci-
sion not to overrule noninterpretivist precedent is more pragmatic
and political than it is theoretical. Perhaps he hoped to lay an intel-
lectual foundation that will one day make it no longer "utterly unreal-
istic and probably impossible to undo the past . . ... 9 Professor
Berger may not, however, wish to limit previous noninterpretive deci-
sions strictly to their specific facts in a strident and unyielding man-
ner. He may allow the principles of previous decisions, including the
88. Id. at 712.
89. Bork, supra note 69, at 11.
90. R. BERGER, supra note 51, at 412.
91. Id. at 413.
92. See supra text accompanying note 49.
93. R. BERGER, supra note 51, at 412.
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right to privacy decisions, to be cautiously applied to new factual
variations.
The clearest motive for an interpretivist to apply his theory only
prospectively is to allow both the Court and constitutional adjudica-
tion to maintain legitimacy.94 Although constitutional adjudication
might be more legitimate in a representative democracy if all value
choices could be ascribed to the Framers, the Court's own prestige
would be greatly diminished were it to overrule the great body of its
past work. Any modern-day wholesale abandonment of the prece-
dents as outlined by Professors Bork and Grey would fundamentally
reshape the locus of decision-making power and leave America a very
different place, a place very few Americans would know or under-
stand.95 History has demonstrated, of course, that the Court can sur-
vive such a dramatic turn of events. 96 Yet, the Court's first complete
abandonment of substantive due process brought its work firmly
within the matrix of then-contemporary social and political theory. It
is simply incomprehensible to overrule a key noninterpretive decision
such as Brown, however, because it has come to embody a first princi-
ple of American social and political theory.97 Professor Berger's reti-
cence to dispense with all of the Court's noninterpretivist decisions is
an implicit acknowledgement of this type of problem. Such concern
for contemporary effects is out of place with a constitutional theory
that looks back only to a specific time and setting to find meaning. 98
C. Noninterpretivism
Noninterpretivism does not necessarily deny the Framers a role
in contemporary constitutional adjudication. Firstly, it does not
94. For a persuasive argument that the Court's power depends on its appearance of
legitimacy, see Cox, infra note 116, at 104-09.
95. This is implicit in Professor Perry's approach. See infra text accompanying notes 102-
06.
96. United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
97. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976) (definitively portraying the struggle, both in and
out of the courtroom, to integrate American schools).
98. Professor Schauer staked out a small part of the interpretivist camp by arguing that
certain provisions are so clear-cut that they allow only a single reading. Schauer, Easy Cases,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). Professor Schauer said that certain "unlitigated" portions of
the Constitution remain important influences on adjudication. Id. at 404. These "easy cases,"
which are rarely viewed as interesting, are the structural provisions of the first four articles of
the Constitution and key amendments that extended the franchise. Id. at 402. That the
minimum age of office requirement for elected officials presents an easy case is apparent when
compared to an alternate phrasing requiring: "an age representing sufficient maturity to
perform the duties requisite to the office." Id. at 404-05. Yet, fourteenth amendment right to
privacy issues never present easy cases.
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require the Court to ignore the Constitution's specific textual com-
mands. Secondly, some noninterpretivists argue that the Court is
actually fulfilling the Framers' intentions when it applies contempo-
rary values to the Constitution's open-ended phrases.99 Even Profes-
sor Dworkin, who called for the Court to use moral rights as a source
for constitutional interpretation, said the Framers understood that
their Constitution would be so treated. Thirdly, Dean Ely gave mean-
ing to the fourteenth amendment's broad due process and equal pro-
tection language by focusing upon the constitution's generally
procedural nature. Although these approaches make some attempt to
refer to the Constitution's text or to the broad intent of the Framers,
it is best to categorize them as noninterpretivist because they still per-
mit the Court to look beyond these two sources to solve constitutional
riddles. Perhaps the only true noninterpretivist denies that the Fram-
ers' intent has any role whatsoever in contemporary constitutional
interpretation, but this extreme position is not our working definition
of noninterpretivism.
So understood, noninterpretivism, when compared with interpre-
tivism, has at least one advantage and one disadvantage as a workable
theory. The advantage is that the interpretivist's dependence upon
the historical record seems to leave them in an inherently untenable
position. Because historical materials are the only legitimate source of
constitutional values in pure interpretivist theory, any deficiency in
those materials leaves the interpretivist without answers. Although
Professor Berger and others have said that the Framers' crystal-clear
intentions are discoverable, other historians are less sure history has
any simple and complete answers to the questions interpretivists
pose."° The disadvantage that noninterpretivists as a group labor
under is one of legitimacy. Noninterpretivists are open to the charge
99. See Wright, supra note 39, at 785.
100. See E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" ORIGIN OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1955); Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Under the
Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretive Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV.
462 (1982) (arguing that the open-ended nature of the fourteenth amendment's language
presumptively allows for a flexible construction); Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1017 (1981); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843,
891 (1978). Professor Grey investigated the historical evidence to support the proposition that
the Framers intended the Constitution to be read as a document appealing to natural rights
and higher law. He concluded that earlier appeals to natural rights in the Declaration of
Independence "give a distorted view of the political and constitutional ideas of revolutionary
Americans." Id. at 891. See also Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 119 (criticizing the Court's use of history in key reapportionment and desegregation
cases as well as in Griswold); Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's
History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979) (characterizing Professor Berger's use of historical
materials as misleading and internally inconsistent).
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that by looking beyond the Framers' specific value judgments they
merely inject their own personal predilections into constitutional
interpretation. This charge carries much weight, regardless of
whether the noninterpretivist's particular theory calls for contempo-
rary values, moral rights or the Constitution's procedural nature to
supplement the historical record.
Professor Perry is one of a select group of true noninterpre-
tivists.10l He accepted the stark historical evidence gathered by Pro-
fessor Berger and others and, indeed, enthusiastically buttressed and
supplemented it.'02 This active support seems to be something of a
debater's trick, though, as he concluded that interpretivism is discred-
ited because its implications are "so severe."' 1 3 Although Professor
Perry admitted that the ultimate source of constitutional interpreta-
tion is the judge's values, this acknowledgement does not mean that
the Court's work is entirely inconsistent with a representative democ-
racy. For example, Professor Perry said that Congress's ultimate
power to govern the jurisdiction of the federal courts is a meaningful
check on the Court's power." Professor Perry has also argued that
the Court has admirably advanced the cause of individual rights'0 5
and that, because noninterpretivism is generally salutary, it should
not be discredited simply because it is fallible.' 06 Professor Perry's
101. See also Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV
204 (1980). Professor Brest described the dominant mode of the Court's constitutional
decisionmaking as a moderate originalism. Originalism is another term for interpretivism.
Professor Brest concluded that a nonoriginalist approach better served the demands of
complex constitutional adjudication than did even a moderate originalism.
102. Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
261 (1981). Interestingly, Professor Perry released this article defending the interpretivist
position before he published his book where it was included as a chapter. See supra note 41. In
his article endorsing the interpretivist position, Professor Monaghan described Professor
Perry's defense of interpretivism as "splendid." Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 360 n.54 (1981). Professor Monaghan said that the historical origins of
the ninth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution do not justify the Court's privacy
decisions in the areas of sex and procreation. Id. at 366-67.
103. M. PERRY, supra note 41, at 66.
104. Id. at 126-27. There has been an intense debate over Congress's power to change the
federal courts' jurisdiction, especially if Congress were to act in response to disagreement over
particular Supreme Court decisions on individual rights. See generally Tushnet & Jaff, infra
note 153 (Professors Tushnet and Jaff argued that Congress's power is plenary and not subject
to judicial review because the political process is a sufficient check on Congress's discretion).
See also Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on
Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17
(1981) (arguing against enactment of jurisdiction-limiting restrictions as an attack on an
independent judicial process); Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to
Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 143 (1982)
(rejecting Professor Sager's analysis).
105. Perry, supra note 59, at 578.
106. M. PERRY, supra note 41, at 116. Professor Perry recently stated that an originalist or
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judge, then, would apparently have the discretion to actively formu-
late a constitutional right to privacy.
Professor Berger responded directly to Professor Perry's attempt
to legitimize noninterpretivism. 10 7  Professor Berger said that
although Professor Perry did not believe that the Court's justices were
"Platonic Guardians,"10 his theory forces them to assume this role
and the Court's composition makes it particularly unsuited to this
task.10 9 Professor Alexander criticized another aspect of Professor
Perry's justification for noninterpretivism, namely, Professor Perry's
assertion that the Court's noninterpretive decisions have advanced
individual rights. Professor Alexander noted that this is essentially an
empirical argument, and like all such arguments, it is "subject to reas-
sessment at any moment."" Professor Saphire said that Professor
Perry's judge actively creates the law "without even the pretense of
purporting that the 'law' antedated her decision."'' According to
Professor Saphire, Professor Perry's central failure is that the Court's
legitimacy depends much more upon the Constitution than Professor
Perry admits. The Court's abdication of this dependence would seri-
interpretivist approach to constitutional theory is viable, but that he preferred a
noninterpretivist approach. Perry, supra note 59, at 551. Professor Perry's recent article
compared the text of the Constitution in constitutional interpretation to a religious text in a
living religious tradition. Id. at 560. In a living religious tradition, "to interpret a sacred text
is ... to interpret the tradition itself, to mediate the past of the tradition with its present." Id. at
560-61. Professor Perry said that comparing constitutional interpretation to interpretion of a
religious text is preferable to an analogy with literary interpretation. This is so because
contemporary America does not turn to its literature to answer the central aspirations of its
tradition in the way that the religious community would turn to its texts. Id. at 561-62. See
Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982). See also Grey, The Constitution as
Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). For another critique of Professor Levinson, see Fish,
Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEX. L. REV. 495 (1982).
107. Berger, Michael Perry's Functional Justification for Judicial Activism, 8 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 465 (1983).
108. Judge Learned Hand was the first to criticize an aggressive form of judicial review in
this manner. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians,
even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were in
charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least
theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs.
Id. at 73.
109. Berger, supra note 107, at 479-8 1. Professor Berger noted that Supreme Court justices
are likely to be political appointees or former corporate lawyers without serious academic
credentials. Id.
110. Alexander, Painting Without Numbers: Noninterpretive Judicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 447 (1983).
111. Saphire, Making Noninterpretivism Respectable: Michael Perry's Contributions to
Constitutional Theory, 81 MIcH. L. REV. 782, 794 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Theory]. For
Professor Saphire's equally critical analysis of interpretivist Judge Bork, see Saphire, Gay
Rights and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Theory, Practice; Dronenburg v.
Zech, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 767 (1985).
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ously deplete the Court's political clout and ultimately undermine its
ability to implement the sort of policies Professor Perry favors.'
1 2
Judge Skelly Wright, like Professor Perry, saw the Court's most
important function as an expositor of basic values." 3 Judge Wright,
however, said the Framers intended the Constitution to be interpreted
as a living document." 4  Some might dismiss his theory as merely a
mechanism to justify active judicial intervention to support liberal
political causes. But Judge Wright would probably argue that his the-
ory is also rooted in conservative constitutional theory, a theory that
views a powerful judiciary as a crucial institutional deterrent to legis-
lative and executive excesses." 5 Professor Cox also subscribed to the
notion of a "living constitution" that permits the Court to look
beyond the Framers' specific directives. He said that the due process
clause was sufficient textual support to justify the Court's forays into
substantive due process." 6 Additionally, Professor Cox said that the
Court's activism "attests [to] the strength of our natural law inheri-
tance in constitutional adjudication.. .," and he thought it "unwise as
well as hopeless to resist it.""' 7 Professor Cox was critical of Roe,
however, because the Court failed to declare a principle of "sufficient
abstractness to lift the ruling above the level of a political judgment
9118
A constitutional theory that turns to moral rights or natural law
to color the meaning of the Constitution potentially gives the judge as
active a role as the "living constitution" theory. The truth of this
proposition depends on whether one accepts the concept of indepen-
dently identifiable moral rights that exist apart from the judge's own
values. Professor Dworkin's book, Taking Rights Seriously, has been
most influential in reestablishing and defending a theory of moral
rights."I9 He said that the Framers used broad, open-ended language
as an invitation to future generations to apply the moral rights indi-
viduals possess against the majority. 120 The core of Professor Dwor-
112. Theory, supra note Ill, at 795. See also Maltz, Murder in the Cathedral-The
Supreme Court as Moral Prophet, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 623 (1983) (stating that Professor
Perry's call for the Court to actively apply moral principles to the Constitution is deeply
flawed).
113. Wright, supra note 39, at 780. Judge Wright was also critical of the scholarly tradition
that attempted to limit the Court's reasoning by strict adherence to neutral principles.
114. Id. at 785.
115. Id. at 782 n.54.




119. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
120. Id. at 133.
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kin's constitutional theory is that the Framers intended the
Constitution to enact the concepts of liberty, equality and fairness,
rather than any specific conception of these values."2 ' He rejected this
latter approach "because it limits such rights to those recognized by a
limited group of people at a fixed date of history."' 2 Professor Dwor-
kin emphasized that the difference between these two approaches is
not just in the detail of the instructions given, but in the kind of
instructions the Framers gave to future generations.'23 Although
somewhat critical of Professor Dworkin's "deep conventionalism,"
Professor Moore has recently written in defense of the proposition
that there are "real morals" that give "right answers" to moral ques-
tions in constitutional interpretation.2 4
Professor Sandalow seemed to rely upon the same concepts ver-
sus conception distinction when he suggested that the "important
objects" of the Framers, not their specific intentions, should guide the
Court.'25 Yet, unlike Professor Dworkin, Professor Sandalow did not
turn to moral rights to define these important objects. Instead, Profes-
sor Sandalow said that the Constitution has not only been read in
light of contemporary values, "it has been read so that the circum-
stances and values of the present generation might be given expression
in constitutional law."'2 6 His approach is similar in temperament to
other commentators who are much more cautious in their endorse-
ment of a "living constitution," but who nonetheless reject a strict
interpretivist approach. Professors Munzer and Nickel said that, in
general, a theory of constitutional interpretation must be textually
focused, but must still allow for gradual innovation where the amend-
121. Id. at 134.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 135. See also Dworkin, The Forum Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981).
Professor Dworkin responded directly to Dean Ely's process-oriented theory of judicial review.
Professor Dworkin said that judicial policing of a particular conception of democratic
processes inevitably requires substantive political choices. Id. at 469, 500-02. He also
explained why the interpretivist goal of discerning a single original intention is inherently
unworkable. Id. at 482-95.
124. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 279 (1985). See
also Richards, Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The Promise of Change and
Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 295 (1979) (endorsing a
"jurisprudence of rights" that takes seriously the concept of basic human rights).
125. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981). Professor
Sandalow recognized that an appeal to the Framers' important objectives gave the Court much
flexibility. He said that "it must be recognized that the more general the statement of the
Framers' intentions, the weaker is the claim that those intentions circumscribe present
judgment." Id. at 1046. Yet, he argued, to acknowledge the element of choice is not to argue
that contemporary judicial discretion is unlimited. Id. at 1054.
126. Id. at 1051.
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ment process is not likely to produce needed change. 127 Professor
Fiss struck a moderate chord when he said that noninterpretivism can
be reasonably objective because disciplining rules of interpretation
derived from a broad interpretive community can adequately con-
strain judicial discretion. 2  The legal community establishes "a set of
rules that specify the relevance and weight to be assigned to the mate-
rial (e.g., words, history, intention, consequence) .... ,,129 These mod-
erate constitutional theories leave the door open for a cautious
advancement of the right to privacy to new factual situations.
Professor Brest stridently criticized Professor Fiss's attempt to
construct a constitutional theory premised on a body of disciplining
rules made by an "interpretive community."1 30 Professor Brest noted
that the demographic composition of this community raised serious
normative problems in a democratic polity.131 He said that these
interpretive rules respond directly to the interpreter's background,
and that the skewed socio-economic composition of this group refuted
Professor Fiss's claim to a somewhat objective approach to constitu-
tional theory.
132
Professor Dworkin's distinction between concepts and concep-
tions is closely related to an important philosophical school of histori-
cal inquiry, the hermeneutic tradition.133 Professor Tushnet, himself
no follower in the tradition, described and summarized hermeneutics
perhaps as comprehensibly as is possible."3 Historical knowledge is
127. Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What it Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1028, 1054-58 (1977). Professors Munzer and Nickel said that the abortion cases are
examples of the way in which the Court incorporates community values and natural rights into
constitutional decisions. Id. at 1050-52. Yet, they said that popular approval of the Court's
work does not explain many constitutional decisions, including the right to privacy. Id. at
1032.
128. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744-45 (1982). Professor
Fiss's article precipitated a belated exchange with Professor Fish. See Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984). Their debate is somewhat ironic as they both seek to bolster the
theoretical basis for a moderate form of judicial review unconstrained by the tethers of
interpretivism and free from the skepticism of critical legal theorists. Professor Fish argued
that setting down disciplining rules is not really necessary to make constitutional
interpretation legitimate or objective. Id. at 1345. Disciplining judicial subjectivity does not
depend on rules, but rather the rationality and process underlying them. Id. Professor Fiss
has recently responded to Professor Fish and has defended his disciplining rules. Fiss,
Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Conventionalism].
129. Fiss, supra note 128, at 744-45.
130. Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982).
131. Id. at 770-71.
132. Id. at 770-72.
133. The importance of this branch of historical study to constitutional interpretation is
demonstrated by its prominence at a recent symposium on constitutional interpretation. See
Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 35-275 (1985).
134. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 798-804. See also McIntosh, Legal Hermeneutics: A
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viewed as the understanding of the meanings that the actors gave
their actions. 135 In constitutional theory, of course, the Framers are
the actors of interest. "The historian must enter the minds of his or
her subjects, see the world as they saw it, and understand it in their
own terms."' 3 6 The hermeneutic historian is chiefly concerned with
discovering an actor's grand design, rather than his specific views.
Importantly, the hermeneutic approach to historical interpretation
seems as if it may answer the interpretivist's need for clarity in histori-
cal interpretation. Professor Tushnet concluded, however, that her-
meneutics lacks the "determinacy about the framers' meanings
necessary to serve its underlying goals."'
137
A still narrower role for the Court is available both in theory and
practice under Dean Ely's influential constitutional theory. In
Democracy and Distrust, Dean Ely explicated a theory that he said
bridged the distance between interpretivism and noninterpretivism. 13
Dean Ely said that his "participation-oriented, representation-rein-
forcing approach to judicial review" focused on the essentially proce-
dural structure of the Constitution itself. 39 Dean Ely justified the
link between his theory and the Framers' intent because "the only
reliable evidence of what" the ratifiers "thought they were ratifying is
the language of the provision they approved."'" Dean Ely
encouraged a quite active role for the Court in policing the political
process and insuring that access is not foreclosed to minority interest
groups. Yet, "rather than dictate substantive results it intervenes only
when ... the political market is systematically malfunctioning."4 '
Quite simply, Dean Ely strove both to give content and meaning to
the fourteenth amendment in a way that allowed for its principled
judicial enforcement, while remaining true to the Framers' objectives.
He noted that if such a principled approach to the Constitution's
open-ended provisions is impossible to formulate, "responsible com-
mentators must consider seriously the possibility that courts simply
should stay away from them."' 42
Professor Laycock, however, has directly attacked Dean Ely's
Philosophical Critique, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1982) (positing that the Constitution is a symbol
and a political philosophy, not a compression of specific answers).
135. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 798.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 799-800.
138. J. ELY, supra note 34, at 1-3.
139. Id. at 87.
140. Id. at 17.
141. Id. at 102-03.
142. Id. at 41.
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claim to comaraderie with the interpretivist camp. 143 Arguing from
an unyielding interpretivist position, Professor Laycock criticized
Dean Ely for elevating his personal conception of democracy above
the narrow commands of the Constitution."' Although not an inter-
pretivist, Professor Tushnet offered essentially the same criticism that
"participation is [not] the basic value embodied in the Constitution
.... "45 Professor Tribe also noted that deciding "what kind of par-
ticipation the Constitution demands ... requires a theory of values
and rights [that is] plainly substantive .... 146 In spite of this type of
fundamental inconsistency in process-based constitutional theories,
Professor Tribe said that their continuing intuitive appeal makes such
logical flaws seemingly "beside the point."'147  Professor Tushnet
made another telling criticism of process-based constitutional theo-
ries. The recurrent call to natural law rights in American constitu-
tional law is proof that we do not "believe in Democracy [any more]
than we do in Justice."'1 48 Professor Tushnet also said that the
Court's removal of formal barriers to democratic participation fails to
remedy equally crucial obstacles: functional obstacles, such as pov-
erty, that affect a group's political lobbying abilities.
149
Professor Gerety has identified a crucial result of adopting Dean
Ely's model of constitutional theory. 50 Professor Gerety said that
there could be no right to privacy if the Court is unable to overrule
the substantive results of a political process that is seemingly well-
functioning.' 5' The Court would be left with no power to overrule
state statutes it simply thought were too oppressive. Unfortunately,
Professor Gerety does no more than make an urgent plea for a theory
that can legitimize a constitutional right to privacy.'52
To a certain extent, process-based approaches, such as Dean
Ely's, have shifted the focus of the interpretivist versus noninterpre-
tivist debate. In some sense, these approaches may have even sup-
planted the debate, making process the debate's focus. Yet, theories
that require the Court to guard the vitality and efficacy of the political
143. Laycock, Book Review, 59 TEX. L. REV. 343 (1981).
144. Id. at 358.
145. Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1046 (1980) (emphasis added).
146. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063, 1069 (1980).
147. Id. at 1080.
148. Tushnet, supra note 145, at 1047.
149. Id. at 1050-51, 1053-57.
150. Gerety, Doing Without Privacy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 143 (1981).
151. Id. at 143.
152. Id. at 165.
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processes are not necessarily a cure-all answer to judicial review of
both state legislatures and Congress. There may indeed be validity in
the essentially empirical argument that diffuse interests and structural
limitations sufficiently check exercises of Congress's power., 53  The
consequence is that judicial review of Congress is unnecessary to
enforce the Constitution's structural provisions and assumptions,
such as federalism and separation of powers.
It is more difficult to prove the parallel argument that a suffi-
ciently wide variety of conflicting interests inherently limit a state leg-
islature's exercise of power. By deferring to state political processes,
Dean Ely apparently assumed that such limits are effective. Although
the empirical invalidity of this assumption mandates a role for federal
power to guarantee state liberties beyond process, the Supreme Court
need not necessarily act on its own. Perhaps the Court would still do
best to defer to legislative, albeit Congressional, action under the
enforcement provision of the fourteenth amendment.
In The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress, Professor Bickel
evidenced a skepticism similar to Dean Ely's about the Court's han-
dling of cases that rejected the substantive outcome of the political
process.I54 Professor Bickel was concerned about the intense hostility
of some groups in reaction to the Court's school prayer and desegre-
153. Professors Tushnet and Jaff have described two competing models of judicial review
that are substantially different from the interpretivist versus noninterpretivist dichotomy used
in this Survey. Tushnet & Jaff, Why the Debate Over Congress' Power to Restrict the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J.. 1311 (1984). They described a
"general" theory that "asserts that the courts should enforce every limitation that the
Constitution places on the exercise of national power-the first amendment, the fifth
amendment, federalism and the separation of powers." Id. at 1311. They contrasted this
model with the "political breakdown" theory of judicial review that "asserts that the courts
should enforce only those limitations as to which there are reasons to think that the political
process is an inadequate mechanism to control improvident exercises of national power." Id.
at 1311-12. Dean Ely defined and outlined this latter approach as a representation-reinforcing
model of judicial review. See J. ELY, supra note 34, at 17. Importantly, however, Professor
Tushnet's political breakdown theory is premised on an empirical argument that describes
exercises of federal power as by and large constrained by the multitude of varied interests that
operate through the national political process. This is a separation of powers theory that
rejects a role for the Supreme Court to police Congress's exercise of plenary powers such as the
commerce power and jurisdiction over the federal courts. Dean Ely's model defers to state
legislatures so long as political access is assured to all comers. For a discussion of Dean Ely's
approach, see supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. Yet, one can accept Professor
Tushnet's argument that the political process is probably an adequate check against tyranny
on the national level, without deferring to the political process to prevent liberty-threatening
legislation in state legislatures. This distinction can leave a role open for the Court to enforce
the fourteenth amendment against the states beyond merely policing access to the political
process.
154. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970). See
Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy ofPrudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985).
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gation cases. 155 Professor Bickel cautioned that it is not the business
of the Court to become the instrument for attaining the substantive
objectives of excluded groups. 15 6 The essence of Professor Bickel's
theory is that there is an inherent contradiction between the Court's
primary institutional role and the complex value judgments inevitably
involved in formulating social policy. Because, he argued, the "coher-
ent, analytically warranted, principled declaration of general norms
alone justifies the Court's function... ," there is great reason to doubt
the Court's ability to shape "durable principles" that answer specific
questions of social policy.
15 7
Professor Bickel described the Court as an institution inevitably
caught up in the complex political matrix of contemporary America.
He said that the Court was most likely to err when it made broad
pronouncements of constitutional principles that required the cooper-
ation of hostile political branches. Professor Bickel seemed vitally
concerned about the Court's loss of institutional prestige when it
becomes embroiled in social issues. Although Professor Bickel wrote
Progress before the Court's abortion decisions, he would no doubt be
critical of the Court's work as these cases raise the same deep moral
and social questions as the school prayer and desegregation cases.
Instead of actively invalidating the work of the political
branches, Professor Bickel would have the Court exercise judicial
review sparingly. He felt that judicial review should be a conservative
device, even when it is an instrument of change.' A Burkean con-
servative theory is apparent in Professor Bickel's desire to insure that
judicial review remains a powerful, if unused, weapon. If judicial
review were perceived as illegitimate, this "would remove a bulwark,
or at any rate a symbol, that might just preserve and protect the very
regime itself at some awful moment of supreme peril."15 9
D. Critical Responses
Critical theorist Professor Tushnet has rejected all of the above
approaches to constitutional interpretation as unworkable and has
suggested instead that "construction of a satisfactory constitutional
theory will be either impossible or unnecessary."' 60 Professor Tushnet
155. Id. at 91.
156. Id. at 85.
157. Id. at 96, 99.
158. Id. at 87. See also A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
159. Id. at 180-81. For a first-hand account of the "fire-storm" of public reaction when
President Nixon said he would never obey a court order directing him to produce the
Watergate tapes, see A. Cox, supra note 116, at 3-9.
160. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 786. Professor Tushnet has also criticized Professor
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posited that the only coherent way to approach the complicated issues
raised in constitutional interpretation is through the "communitarian
assumptions of conservative social thought." 161 Although he did not
attempt to fully develop the contours of these communitarian assump-
tions, he noted that they "[reject] the individualist premises that make
constitutional theory necessary" and that they "[emphasize] our
mutual dependence."'' 62 Communitarian assumptions of civic repub-
lican virtue would make constitutional theory unnecessary because
the Constitution's structural checks and balances would be self-
enforcing without federal judicial intervention. 16
3
Professor Tushnet said that Lockean liberal political theory
required that a judge's exercise of power be constrained so as to insure
that the possibility of judicial tyranny was not merely substituted for
that of legislative tyranny. 64 Professor Tushnet's description of this
compromise was premised on the threat of the abuse of power, not on
a social contract analysis that demanded that all exercises of power
eventually be ascribed to the will of the governed. He said that inter-
pretivism is essentially a vehicle to constrain a judge's exercise of
Schauer's argument that certain constitutional provisions are "easy." Tushnet, A Note on the
Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (1985). See Schauer,
supra note 98, at 399-404. Professor Tushnet said that "textualism" is an insufficient theory
because it ignores the fact that constitutional powers can conflict. Id. at 687. He also said that
this unsophisticated form of interpretivism allows contemporary political conservatives to
mistakenly view judicial review as consistent with democratic liberal theory. Id. at 690. See
also Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972). Professor
Linde criticized a legal realist tradition that he said measured the Court's "success" by its
alignment with political realities and institutional constraints. Id. at 230-32.
161. Id. at 785.
162. Id.
163. Although Professor Tushnet deferred an extensive analysis and definition of
communitarian assumptions, a later article might provide some guidance. See Tushnet & Jaff,
supra note 153, at 1327-31. He described a crucial component of the Framers' world-view: "a
collective self-understanding of the common enterprise of advancing the common good, in
which the common good was seen as something greater than the aggregate of good for
individuals." Id. at 1329. In summary, this was a world of "civic republican virtue." Id. A
crucial consequence of this conception was that there was a definite efficacy to the
Constitution's structural limitations designed to offset and counterbalance divisive
factionalizing. In consequence, "liberty-threatening legislation would never be enacted." Id.
at 1330. Yet, it is difficult to describe the import of this characterization for contemporary
constitutional interpretation. Professor Tushnet noted that this world-view of civic virtue "was
almost certainly false then, and it is clearly false now." Id. Contemporary Americans,
therefore, "do not believe in the efficacy of structural devices to protect liberty, because the
political process was supposed to implement those devices." Id. Perhaps paradoxically,
however, Professor Tushnet continued to rely upon the structural limitations of the political
process to check Congress's power to govern federal jurisdiction. Id. at 1311. The only
sensible rationalization offered by Professor Tushnet is that there simply "is not an alternative,
more satisfactory constitutionalism available." Id. at 1312.
164. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 784-85.
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power, and that it fails at that task.'65 Professor Berger, however,
defended interpretivism not merely because it constrains the Court's
exercise of power, but because the source of the constraint derives
from the Framers as representatives of the people. 66 Nonetheless,
Professor Tushnet denied that interpretivism serves as any constraint
whatsoever on judicial discretion because the interpretivist cannot
"detach the meanings that the framers gave to the words they used
from the entire complex of meanings that the framers gave to their
political vocabulary as a whole and from the larger political, eco-
nomic, and intellectual world in which they lived .... ,,167
In addition to being unable to transfer historical meaning from
the past to the present, Professor Tushnet said that interpretivism
fails to fully protect the present generation from tyranny. He refuted
the interpretivist argument that it is the best mechanism to protect
society from tyranny. The interpretive argument essentially insures
that a core of timeless barriers to legislative tyranny remains in place,
though it admits that there is some risk that novel forms of tyranny
may remain unchecked.168 Professor Tushnet is sympathetic with the
"external critique" of interpretivism-the "living constitution"
response-that the risk of novel forms of legislative tyranny is in fact
great and that interpretivism leaves these unchecked. 69 He noted by
way of footnote that one "would be hard pressed to defend the claim
that in contemporary society more tyranny is exercised by willful
judges than by willful legislatures."'
170
Professor Tushnet, however, did not fall into the noninterpre-
tivist camp. He viewed noninterpretivism as a liberal political theory
left hopelessly hypocritical unless actors are able to divorce their per-
sonal preferences from their judicial roles-something Professor
Tushnet said is impossible. 17 Professor Tushnet's reference to the
communitarian assumptions of conservative social thought leaves an
uncertain opening for a constitutional right to privacy. Burkean con-
servative thought is primarily concerned with developing a political
institutional configuration that is best suited to prevent tyranny. 172
165. Id.
166. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
167. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 797. For a recent response to the critical theorist challenge,
see Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of
an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985).
168. Id. at 787. But see J. ELY, supra note 34, at 2.
169. Id. at 787-88.
170. Id. at 788 n.19.
171. Id. at 785.
172. See Wilson, Justice Diffused: A Comparison of Edmund Burke's Conservativism with
the Views of Five Conservative/Academic Judges, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. - (1986).
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Consequently, using this definition of Burkean theory, there may be a
role for the Court to develop a right to privacy in order to police
novel legislative tyranny. Professor Tushnet, however, later defined
elected "Burkean representatives" as wise and responsible actors
motivated by the common good, not influential constituents' self-
interest. 173 Judicial construction of a right to privacy would be sus-
pect under Professor Tushnet's reasoning, however, because civic vir-
tue no longer motivates governmental actors and there is reason to
doubt that a judge's own civic virtue will temper his exercise of
power. Given that contemporary America may lack both virtuous
legislators and judges, however, the scope and appropriateness of judi-
cial review may ultimately depend upon an empirical argument
assessing both groups' propensity towards tyranny.
Feminist critic Professor Freedman has urged the Court to adopt
an explicitly normative approach to constitutional law that strives to
promote equality between the sexes.' 74 She argued that key decision-
makers, including Congress, the executive branch, the legal profession
and the media, are aware that so-called neutral principles of constitu-
tional law are inherently value-laden. 175 If people continue to desire
an anti-normative jurisprudence, she continued, it is "because the
courts have told them it is possible to have one."' 76 Professor Freed-
man's constitutional theory undoubtedly gives the Court broad dis-
cretion to rework constitutional law so that it comports with
contemporary learning and values.
Professor Polan has argued that the "whole structure of law" is
patriarchal. 177 This is a result of the legal system's "hierarchical
organization; its combative, adversarial format; and its undeviating
bias in favor of rationality over all other values."' 178 She also said that
by confining their efforts to litigation and lobbying, feminists risk los-
ing the fight for broad-based reform "in the context of broader eco-
nomic, social, and cultural change."' 179 Professor Olsen labeled this
type of criticism "very useful, although [she did] not entirely agree
173. Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 153, at 1330. For a fuller discussion of Professor Tushnet's
Burkean representatives, see supra note 163.
174. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913
(1983).
175. Id. at 964.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 84 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982).
178. Id. at 87. See also MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SoC'Y (1983).
179. Id. at 302.
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with [it]."' 8° While she did not find law to be fundamentally patriar-
chal, Professor Olsen broadly criticized the Court's work that failed
to understand that "heterosexual behavior in our society is seldom
fully voluntary . *..." 181 Professor Olsen said that feminists "should
stop trying to fit [their] goals into [constitutional] rights arguments
.... but she nonetheless accepted the proposition that constitutional
adjudication is inherently value-laden." 2
E. Conclusion
While a given method of constitutional analysis may not be
determinative of the resolution of a particular case, its impact cannot
be doubted. Yet, Professor Berger's strict interpretive model, and
Dean Ely's representation-reinforcing model, do preclude an active
role for the Supreme Court to guard a constitutional right of privacy.
Most noninterpretive theories, however, fail to provide guidance as to
the existence or scope of this right. In other words, the relationship
between the particular theory and its application to the right of pri-
vacy simply becomes too attenuated to make predictions as to the
scope of the right. Only a noninterpretivist approach could justify an
expansive right to privacy. Even ardent noninterpretivists, however,
such as Professors Perry and Cox, may be unwilling to define the
scope of the right so as to include private consensual adult homosex-
ual activity. This follows from their attempts to put distance between
their own flexible theories of constitutional interpretation and the
Supreme Court's abortion decision. Nonetheless, subtle differences
among noninterpretive theories will have some sort of influence, even
though that influence may be otherwise unidentifiable. This conclu-
sion may not seem momentous, but it does serve as a reminder that
theory impacts in an important, though unpredictable, way upon the
resolution of particular controversies.
III. THE SUPREME COURT: EVOLUTION OF
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A . Pre-G risw old ..................................................... 553
B. Griswold and its Progeny ........................................... 555
C . Conclusion ....................................................... 563
This section sets forth, in chronological order, the Supreme
Court cases which are relevant to a discussion of the right of privacy.
180. Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387,
401 (1984).
181. Id. at 428.
182. Id. at 430.
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The Court first recognized a constitutional right of privacy in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut.'8 3 In doing so, the Court cited several earlier
substantive due process cases to support the proposition that individ-
ual fundamental rights are not limited to only those rights specifically
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.' 4 Those cases are set out first, to
provide a backdrop for the Court's recognition of the right of
privacy.
A. Pre-Griswold
Despite uncertain grounds to do so, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly relied on the fourteenth amendment to strike down social
and economic legislation. One of the most infamous decisions of a
now discredited era of judicial recalcitrance was Lochner v. New
York. I"5 In Lochner, the Court overturned the conviction of an
employer under a New York law that forbade requiring or permitting
an employee to work more than 10 hours per day or more than 60
hours per week in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or confectionery.18 6
The Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment protects the individual's right to contract. "The general right to
make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the
individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution."187
The state, however, may regulate this liberty through its police
powers if necessary to protect the public's "safety, health, morals and
general welfare."' 88 The Court promulgated a "reasonableness" test
in order to choose between the individual's rights and the state's
power. Under that test, the Court must ask: "Is this a fair, reasonable
and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an
unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of
the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into ... contracts
.... "189 The Court held the New York law to be unconstitutional
because there was no connection between limiting the hours of bakery
183. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
184. Id. at 482.
185. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924);
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
186. 198 U.S. at 45, 46 n.i.
187. Id. at 53. But see West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392-93 (1937)
(freedom of contract is not an absolute right).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 56. This "reasonableness" test should not be confused with the "mere
rationality" standard which the Court now applies in cases that do not implicate a
fundamental right. The Lochner Court applied a stricter scrutiny than "mere rationality." G.
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 568-70 (1975).
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workers and safeguarding public health. The Court saw the law as
purely an attempt to interfere with a private labor contract, an illegiti-
mate end. 1 90
The Court has not only relied on the fourteenth amendment to
invalidate economic laws, but has relied on the due process clause to
invalidate social legislation as well. In Meyer v. Nebraska,191 a
teacher was convicted of violating a statute that prohibited teaching
foreign languages to children who had not yet passed the eighth
grade. 192 The Court held that the statute implicated two fourteenth
amendment liberties, namely, the right of parents to direct their chil-
dren's education and the right to contract with a teacher for that edu-
cation. 193 A statute may not interfere with such fundamental rights
unless it has a "reasonable relation to some purpose within the com-
petency of the State to effect."' 94 The state claimed that the purpose
of the statute was to foster patriotism by preventing immigrant com-
munities from instilling their children with foreign, rather than Amer-
ican, ideals. The legislature saw a direct link between learning a
language and acquiring patriotic ideals. 95 The Court, however,
rejected this purpose as insufficient to justify completely prohibiting
children from learning a foreign language. A legislative desire to cul-
tivate homogenous patriotic beliefs could not override individual
beliefs and interests. 196 The Court also rejected the notion that the
statute protected children's health by limiting their mental activities
because the statute only prohibited the teaching of foreign
languages. 197
190. Id. at 62, 64.
191. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
192. Id. at 396-97. The defendant taught reading in German. Id.
193. Id. at 400. "The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of
knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted." Id.
194. Id. In later cases, the Court began applying a strict scrutiny test. For a full discussion
of that test, see infra Section VI.
195. Id. at 401.
196. Id. at 402-03.
197. Id. at 403. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a
state statute that required children to attend public schools because it unreasonably interfered
with parents' right to direct the education of their children).
In Prince v. Massachusetts, the state convicted a woman under the child labor laws after
she allowed her daughter to distribute religious literature on a public street in violation of state
statutes. 321 U.S. 158, 159-60 (1944). The defendant appealed the conviction to the Supreme
Court claiming that the statutes violated the child's freedom of religion and her own parental
rights. Id. at 164. The Court affirmed the conviction stating that the state may restrict
parents' control over their children in order to preserve the children's well-being. Id. at 166.
The Court wrote that "[iut is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to
reach such evils [child employment] is within the state's police power, whether against the




The Court eventually abandoned the practice of applying a due
process analysis to strike down economic legislation. "We have
returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legis-
lative bodies, who are elected to pass laws."' 9 Although the Court
has allowed states to decide how best to regulate their commercial
affairs,' 99 the Justices have continued to review social legislation
despite their claim that they will not substitute their economic or
social judgments for those of the legislative branch. 2°°
B. Griswold and its Progeny
The Court began to develop the concept of a right to privacy
inherent in the Constitution in 1965. In Griswold v. Connecticut,20 1
the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Con-
necticut and a physician were convicted of prescribing contraceptive
devices for married women in violation of state law.2 °2 On appeal, the
Supreme Court refused to "sit as a super-legislature to determine the
wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems,
business affairs, or social conditions."2 3 The Court emphasized,
however, that the contraceptive statute directly affected the intimate
relationship between a married couple. 2°4  Although the Constitution
does not specificially mention a marital right, the Court held that the
Bill of Rights contains penumbral rights which are necessary to give
meaning to its specific guarantees. 20 5 For example, the freedoms to
read, study and teach are necessary to enjoy the freedoms of speech
and press.20 6 Likewise, the freedom of association is a "peripheral
198. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). The Court held that states are free to
regulate commerce, "so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal
constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law." Id. at 730-31.
199. For examples of cases where the Court refused to strike down economic legislation, see
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S.
490 (1949); Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313
U.S. 236 (1941); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
200. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In
Skinner, the Court held a statute which provided for sterilization of "habitual criminals"
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. The Court applied a strict scrutiny test to the
statute, stating that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race." Id. at 541.
201. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
202. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958).
203. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 484.
206. Id. at 482. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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First Amendment right. '20 7
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, held that the first, third,
fourth, fifth and ninth amendments created a "zone of privacy" and
that marital privacy, a right older than the Bill of Rights, fell within
that zone.20 8 "[I]t is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions. "209 Justice Douglas focused on the
fact that the statute was aimed at the use of contraceptives rather than
at their manufacture or sale. As such, the law violated the constitu-
tional right to privacy because it had the "maximum destructive
impact" on the marital relationship by directly affecting married
couples.21 0
In concurrence, Justice Goldberg stressed the importance of the
ninth amendment and its relevance to a state statute. He reviewed the
history of the ninth amendment to show that its purpose was to
emphasize that the first eight amendments did not exhaust the funda-
mental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the people.21 The
Court, he argued, would essentially render the ninth amendment use-
less if it held that the Constitution only protected specifically enumer-
ated rights. In other words, the ninth amendment supports the
argument that "fundamental" rights cannot be defined strictly by
looking to the rights specifically mentioned in the Constitution.2 2
Justice Goldberg extended the ninth amendment analysis to the states
through the fourteenth amendment 2 3 because the fourteenth amend-
ment also protects fundamental rights.21 4
Justice Goldberg suggested several ways in which courts could
determine what rights are fundamental. For example, he suggested
that courts rely on the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our
people.1 21 5  In addition, the principles of liberty and justice that
underlie our political system as well as specific constitutional guaran-
207. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
208. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86. This right of privacy is applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 481.
209. Id. at 486.
210. Id. at 485.
211. Id. at 489-90. The ninth amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. IX.
212. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493.
213. It is generally accepted that the Bill of Rights serves only to restrict the federal
government. Id.
214. Id. at 487.




tees will help define the boundaries of fundamental rights.2 16
Applying these tests, Justice Goldberg held that the decision to
use contraceptives falls within the protected realm of family life. He
agreed with the majority that the right to marital privacy is as funda-
mental as any other constitutional right. "Of this whole 'private
realm of family life' it is difficult to imagine what is more private or
more intimate than a husband and wife's marital relationship." '217
Justice Harlan also concurred in the result, but rejected any
attempt to define the fourteenth amendment's notion of liberty
through either the "letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights." '218
Instead, he reasoned that the due process clause protects "basic values
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "219
The next important opinion addressing the right to privacy was
Stanley v. Georgia.22° In Stanley, the appellant was convicted of pos-
sessing obscene films in his own home. The Court held that although
the freedoms of speech and press do not ordinarily protect pornogra-
phy, the first amendment, together with a general right to privacy,
does prevent the state from arresting a person for mere possession of
obscene materials in the privacy of his or her own home. "[The
appellant] is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases-
the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy
of his own home. '22 1 Later cases emphasized that the decision in
Stanley was based on the privacy of the home.222 "This privacy right
encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the
family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child-rearing. "223
216. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493.
217. Id. at 495. Justice Goldberg specifically commented that the decision should not be
read to forbid state regulation of "sexual promiscuity or misconduct." Id. at 498-99.
218. Id. at 499-500.
219. Id. at 500 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Justices Black
and Stewart, in dissent, rejected any notion of a right to privacy implicit in the Constitution:
The use by federal courts of such a formula or doctrine or whatnot to veto
federal or state laws simply takes away from Congress and States the power to
make laws based on their own judgment of fairness and wisdom and transfers
that power to this Court for ultimate determination-a power which was
specifically denied to federal courts by the convention that framed the
Constitution.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 513.
220. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
221. Id. at 565.
222. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (limiting the right to view
pornography to the home); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971)
(holding that Congress may prohibit the importation of pornography, even if only intended for
private use).
223. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added). See also Loving v. Virginia,
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Three years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,22 4 the Court extended
Griswold to also protect the right of unmarried persons to use contra-
ceptives. The Massachusetts law under scrutiny in Eisenstadt pro-
vided that only married persons could obtain contraceptives for the
purpose of preventing pregnancy. Single persons could only obtain
contraceptives in order to prevent the spread of disease.225 The state
convicted a lecturer under this law for dispensing vaginal foam to an
unmarried woman following a speech at a university.226 The
defendent appealed the conviction,22 7 claiming that the contraceptive
laws violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In response, the state claimed that the statutes were constitu-
tional because the state had a valid interest in deterring premarital
sex. The Court held, however, that the statutes had only a marginal
relation to the deterrence of premarital sex because single persons
could still obtain contraceptives to prevent disease. Furthermore, the
statutes allowed married persons access to contraceptives without
regard to whether they intended to use them with a single person or
with their spouse. The Court also found it unlikely that the legisla-
ture would advocate an unwanted pregnancy as punishment for viola-
tion of a misdemeanor fornication statute.228 "If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child.
229
Justices White and Blackmun concurred in the result, but
focused on the defendant's lack of status as a "distributor" of contra-
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that the fourteenth amendment protects the freedom to marry
someone of another race).
224. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Although the Court decided Eisenstadt on equal protection
grounds, it relied on Eisenstadt in later cases to define the scope of the right of privacy. See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
225. Id. at 442.
226. Id. at 440. The record was not clear as to the woman's marital status, but apparently
the majority assumed that the woman was single. Id. at n.l. See infra note 234 and
accompanying text.
227. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction. Eisenstadt, 405
U.S. at 440. The defendant subsequently filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus,
which the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted. Id. at 440.
228. Id. at 448-49. The state also argued that the legislature passed the statutes as a health
measure. The Court, however, found the statute discriminatory and overbroad because
unmarried persons have the same health needs as do married persons. In addition, not all
contraceptives are potentially dangerous. Id. at 450-51.
229. Id. at 453. Justice Douglas concurred in the decision stating that the defendant's
conviction was invalid on first amendment grounds because he was merely "dispensing"
information in conjunction with a lecture. Id. at 459.
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ceptives, rather than on the recipient's marital status.23° The statute
under review provided that only doctors or pharmacists could dis-
pense contraceptives for the purpose of preventing pregnancy and
then, only to married persons. 23' Assuming the woman who received
the foam was married, Justice White argued that the statute unrea-
sonably impaired the exercise of her constitutional right to obtain
contraceptives under Griswold because the state did not prove that the
use of vaginal foam posed a health hazard.232 According to Justices
White and Blackmun, however, the Court did not need to reach the
question of whether the state may restrict the distribution of contra-
ceptives to unmarried persons because the record in Eisenstadt never
definitively established the woman's marital status.233 Apparently,
Justice White believed that the majority's assumption that the recipi-
ent was unmarried resulted in an unwarranted extension of Griswold.
"Because this case can be disposed of on the basis of settled constitu-
tional doctrine, I perceive no reason for reaching the novel constitu-
tional question whether a State may restrict or forbid the distribution
of contraceptives to the unmarried. '234
The Court's attempt to define a constitutional right to privacy
culminated with Roe v. Wade. 2 35  A pregnant single woman, Jane
Roe, brought a class action suit in federal court to challenge the con-
stitutionality of Texas's criminal abortion statutes.236 Roe presented
three constitutional theories to support a woman's right to choose to
abort her pregnancy: (1) the personal liberty embodied in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment; (2) the personal, marital,
230. Id. at 460, 462.
231. Id. at 461.
232. Id. at 464.
233. Id. at 464-65.
234. Id. at 465. Chief Justice Burger dissented from the majority opinion stating that the
only issue was whether a state may require that only doctors and pharmacists could distribute
contraceptives. Unlike Justice White, however, the Chief Justice found that it was within the
state's power to require that medicinal contraceptives be dispensed by prescription only, rather
than on the open market, just as it could for any other medicine. Id. at 468. Regardless of
whether the woman was married or single, the defendant was not a licensed doctor or
pharmacist. Id. at 465-72.
235. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (decided as a
companion case to Roe).
236. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120. The Court dismissed a physician's complaint in intervention
because two state criminal actions were pending against him. Id. at 127. See Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
In addition, a married couple, the Does, filed a companion complaint to Roe's claim. The
wife was not pregnant, but alleged she would want to terminate her pregnancy if she became
pregnant. Roe, 410 U.S. at 121. The Court dismissed the Does' complaint because their
allegations were too speculative and therefore did not present a case or controversy. Id. at 128.
See Younger, 401 U.S. at 41-42.
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familial, and sexual privacy protected by the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights; or (3) the rights reserved to the people by the ninth amend-
ment. 237 The majority agreed that although the Constitution does not
explicitly grant a right to privacy, prior opinions had found zones of
privacy under all three theories. "They [prior decisions] also make it
clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to mar-
riage; procreation; contraception; family relationships; and child-rear-
ing and education. ' 238  Relying on precedent,2 39 the history of
abortion 240 and the emotional and physical effects of an unwanted
pregnancy,241 the Court held that the right of privacy protects a
woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.242
Justice Stewart, concurring, emphasized that the right of privacy
could only be properly understood as derived from the "liberty" con-
cept of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. This "lib-
erty" should not be confined to those rights specifically enumerated in
the Constitution. "It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking,
includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and pur-
poseless restraints .... "243 "Great concepts like . . . 'liberty'. . . were
purposely left to gather meaning from experience. For they relate to
the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who
founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society
remains unchanged."' 244  Justice Stewart went on to state that a
woman's decision to bear a child falls within the realm of protected
liberty. He commented that the right to make decisions regarding
child-bearing is surely more significant than the right to send one's
children to a private school (Pierce) or the right to teach a foreign
237. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129.
238. Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted). The Court cited the following cases to support its
proposition: Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the state may not
criminalize the use of contraceptives by either married or unmarried persons); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down antimiscegenation statute under the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (permitting the state to limit parental control if necessary for the
children's well-being); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (invalidating statute
ordering sterilization of certain "habitual criminals" on equal protection grounds); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (recognizing parents' right to choose to send
children to private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (upholding the right
to teach and the right to learn).
239. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
240. Id. at 130-52.
241. Id. at 153.
242. The Court felt that the right of privacy was founded in the fourteenth amendment's
concept of liberty. Id.
243. Id. at 169 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
244. Roe, 410 U.S. at 169 (quoting National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337




In 1976, the Court addressed some of the questions Roe left open
in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.246 In Planned Parenthood, the
Court considered constitutional challenges to a Missouri act which
required, inter alia, spousal consent if the patient was married and
parental consent for unmarried, minor patients. The Court held that
the state could not grant the husband a "veto power" over the wife's
decision to abort during the first trimester of pregnancy when the
state itself does not have that power. 247 Although the Court recog-
nized the husband's interest in the fetus 248 and the importance of the
marital relationship, it held that the mother's interest outweighed
these factors because an unwanted pregnancy would most directly
affect her.249
The majority similarly held the parental consent requirement
unconstitutional.2 50 Although parents do have an interest in control-
ling their children's behavior and the state does have broader author-
ity over children than adults, the state did not have an adequate
justification to grant a parent an absolute veto over a daughter's deci-
sion to terminate her pregnancy. "Minors, as well as adults, are pro-
tected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."25'
Granting such a veto would do little to further family relations where
the child and parent disagree on such a fundamental issue. The Court
held the statute to be defective because it did not provide for alterna-
tive procedures when the minor patient was sufficiently mature to give
effective consent for an abortion.2 52
Justice White, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, stated that the Constitution did not
elevate the wife's right to seek an abortion above the husband's inter-
est in raising a child. They would leave the states free to decide which
interest to favor.2 53 In addition, Justice White agreed with the state
that parental consent would further the state's asserted interest in
245. Roe, 410 U.S. at 170. Justice Douglas would find the right to privacy in the ninth
amendment. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). Justices
White and Rehnquist dissented from the majority's holding. Id. at 221; Roe, 410 U.S. at 171.
246. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
247. Id. at 69.
248. The act required the husband's consent regardless of whether he was actually the
father of the fetus.
249. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 69-71. Justice Stewart emphasized, in concurrence,
that a father enjoys a constitutional right to father children. Id. at 90 (Stewart, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 72-75.
251. Id. at 74.
252. Id. at 75, 90.
253. Id. at 93.
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guiding minors when making important decisions, such as the deci-
sion whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. 4
The Court addressed similar issues in Carey v. Population Serv-
ices International.255 Carey involved constitutional challenges to a
New York law that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives by
anyone other than a licensed pharmacist and the distribution of con-
traceptives to minors under 16 years of age.256 The case generated
considerable disagreement among the Justices who filed three concur-
ring opinions and one dissenting opinion. 7 Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, first surveyed the cases establishing a right of pri-
vacy. He concluded that although the Court has not established the
limits of the right of privacy, the fundamental decision whether or not
to bear a child is clearly within that right.258
Justice Brennan, joined by a majority, went on to hold that sec-
tion of the statute which prohibited the distribution of contraceptives
by anyone other than a licensed pharmacist as unconstitutional
because it served no compelling state interest and imposed an unrea-
sonable burden on the individual's right to make her own child-bear-
ing decisions.259
The Justices' disagreement centered on the section of the statute
that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to minors. Relying
on Planned Parenthood, a plurality held the section unconstitutional
because it prevented minors from exercising their fundamental right
to make their own decisions regarding procreation. The Court held
that the state's interest in deterring premarital sex among minors did
not override this right because it was unreasonable to punish an
offender by forcing her to accept an unwanted pregnancy.260
Justices White and Powell expressed concern that the Court's
holding would "subject all state regulation affecting adult sexual rela-
tions to the strictest standard of judicial review. "261 Justice Powell
254. Id. at 95. See also id. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that a legislative
requirement of parental consent is not irrational).
255. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
256. Id. at 681. The statute also prohibited all advertisement or display of contraceptives.
The Court held this provision unconstitutional under the first amendment. Id. at 700-02.
257. For a diagram of the Court's holding, see Note, Hardwick v. Bowers: An Attempt to
Pull the Meaning of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney Out of the Closet, 39 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 973, 990 n.103 (1985).
258. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85.
259. Id. at 690-91. The Court has provided that a state may only regulate the exercise of a
fundamental right if there is a compelling state interest and if the statute is narrowly drawn to
meet only that interest. Id. at 686. For a full discussion of this test, see infra Section VI.
260. Carey, 431 U.S. at 694-95. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448.
261. Carey, 431 U.S. at 703; id. at 702.
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elaborated on this concern stating that the "compelling interest" stan-
dard should not be applied to all matters involving sexual freedom,
but only when state regulation severely burdens the constitutional
right to make decisions regarding procreation. A rational relation test
would be sufficient to review statutes regulating the behavior of
minors because the state has an important interest in protecting the
well-being of children.262 Applying this test, Justice Powell found the
absolute prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives to minors
unconstitutional because the statute did not provide exceptions for
married minors or for parental distribution.263
Replying to Justice Powell's concerns, Justice Brennan noted
that the strict standard of review was limited to cases where the state
burdened the individual's right to make decisions regarding concep-
tion or terminating pregnancy.264 The plurality went on to stress that
"the Court has not definitively answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes
regulating [sexual relations] among adults. '265
C. Conclusion
The decisions in Griswold and Roe established only one thing for
certain-the existence of a constitutional right to privacy. The source
of that right, whether it be the penumbras emanating from the Bill of
Rights, the ninth amendment, or the fourteenth amendment, is still
unclear. More importantly, however, the Court has not definitively
defined the boundaries of the protected zone of privacy. The privacy
line of cases can be read to either restrict the right of privacy to famil-
ial decisions or to expand the right of privacy to protect individual
autonomy. It is not clear which interpretation the Court will ulti-
mately embrace.
262. Id. at 705-07.
263. Id. at 707-08. See also id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring).
264. Id. at 688 n.5.
265. Id. at 694 n.17 (Carey was not dispositive of that question because the statute in
question did burden the individual's right to make decisions regarding contraception). Cf id.
at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("While we have not ruled on every conceivable
regulation affecting such conduct the facial constitutional validity of criminal statutes
prohibiting certain consensual acts has been 'definitively' established." (citations omitted)).
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The Court's test of balancing fundamental rights vis-a-vis com-
pelling state interests presumes an operational definition of the con-
cept of privacy. Yet, the Court has not sufficiently delimited the
concept of privacy to allow a reasonable prediction of what activities
will be constitutionally protected.266 The Court needs to define what
makes a right "fundamental" and therefore entitles the right to
heightened constitutional scrutiny.
Consistent with a noninterpretivist posture, Herbert v. Louisi-
ana,2 67 defines a right as fundamental if the right cannot be denied
without violating those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. 2 6 The
Court gleans the meaning of a fundamental right from the traditions
and shared values of the society.2 69 In that vein, a right is fundamen-
tal when it is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."27 Ordered
liberty, from an interpretivist perspective, reflects only the express
266. Doss & Doss, On Morals, Privacy and the Constitution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395
(1971); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 926-
37 (1973); McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations, 64 MICH. L. REV. 259
(1965).
267. 272 U.S. 312 (1926). The cases cited in notes 267-70 and 290-91 are from the Lochner
era. During that era, the Court interpreted the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
expansively. The Court defined "liberty" interests to include not only "freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children .... " Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Lochner era Court strictly interpreted the "means-
ends relation test" for due process. The Court struck down statutes that substantially
impaired the "natural law" of private contractual autonomy and property, unless there was a
close relation between the means and the end. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW'
§ 8-3, at 437 (1978).
The post-Lochner Court distanced itself from the pitfalls of looking to "natural laws" for
the definition of "liberties" and the implied bounds of state police power. The Court has
consistently cited decisions from this era as support for propositions different from the narrow
issues with which the cases dealt. See Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the
Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-3. Thus, notwithstanding
the fact that the "liberty of contract" notion has since been discredited, the Lochner era cases
cited in this section have retained precedential value for other notions in the Court's more
recent decisions. The cases are thus useful in tracking the Court's search for a new way of
defining and protecting certain types of "liberties" from undue governmental intrusion. L.
TRIBE, supra note 267, § 11-1, at 564.
268. Id. at 316.
269. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
270. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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provisions of the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights.27 ' The
totality of the federal "constitutional scheme" supplements the spe-
cific textual provisions.27 2 Alternatively, ordered liberty in a
noninterpretivist model refers at a minimum to the traditionally
sacred social unit-the family with its incidents- which is considered
to be indispensable in defining the individual's relation to society.27 3
The difficulty of identifying what is fundamental carries over to
the definition of privacy. Justice Rehnquist, in Paul v. Davis, 274 classi-
fied the privacy cases as either dealing with unwarranted searches or
defying any meaningful categorization. The former consist of the
Brandeisian, informational torts line of cases.275 The concept of per-
sonal privacy derived from these cases is rooted in the express provi-
sions of the first, fourth, and fifth amendments. 276 The nontextual
right of privacy, on the other hand, originates independently from the
fourteenth amendment's protection of life, liberty, and property. Jus-
tice Rehnquist in Davis indicated that the fourteenth amendment was
not to be read substantively and independently of the Bill of Rights,
and that only the latter is a limit on state legislatures. Yet the Court
later said that the fourteenth amendment protects "the formation and
preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships.
'277
These relationships have "played a critical role in the culture and tra-
ditions" 278 of our society, and are important in "cultivating and trans-
mitting [the society's] shared ideals and beliefs. ' 279 Examples of
critical units in the process of enculturation, which deserve "constitu-
tional protection, are those that attend the creation and sustenance of
a family-marriage... childbirth,.., raising and education of children
... and cohabitation with one's relatives .... "280 The nature of the
activity and the status of the social unit, therefore, define the right of
privacy.
In contrast to the familial interpretation, an application of
Mill's 281 philosophy to the Court's precedents would suggest an
271. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
274. 424 U.S. 693, 694 (1976).
275. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890) (arguing
for the principle of "inviolate personality"). The concept of the right "to be let alone" was
within the context of prohibiting newspapers from disclosing personal information. Id. at 195.
276. 424 U.S. at 712-13.




281. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (E. Rapaport ed. 1978) (originally published in 1859) (arguing
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autonomy-based right of privacy. The Millian camp would restrict an
individual's sphere of action only where other members of the society
are at risk of harm.28 2 The right is anchored in interests of per-
sonhood and intimacy.28 3 It is a right which recognizes that individu-
als "have a set of capacities that enables them, with a sense of
separateness from other persons, to make independent decisions
regarding ... life choices. ' 28 4 Thus, privacy involves harmless con-
duct which is intimately related to an individual2 5 as distinguished
from concealment of information from others.
Philosophical distinctions as to the meaning of privacy, then,
underlie the choice of which intimate, personal activities the Constitu-
tion will protect. The task is to discover which of the competing prin-
ciples serves as the linch-pin for the Court's precedents. We shall,
therefore, evaluate the cases and identify what support exists for the
two competing principles.
This section first argues that the importance of the family as a
social unit links the precedents. In that sense, family decisions sub-
sume decisions on procreation, abortion, marital relations, child-rear-
ing, and the right to educate children. This section next uses those
same precedents to support the proposition that the right of privacy is
autonomy-based. The section concludes by suggesting a way of rec-
onciling the tensions between the two competing principles.
that the "only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a
civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others").
282. Id.; see also WOLFENDEN REPORT, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL
OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION (1963) [hereinafter cited as WOLFENDEN REPORT] (stating
that it is not the function of law to intrude on the personal choices of citizens, or to advocate
any specific pattern of behavior); Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The
Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 UCLA L. REV. 581, 603
(1967) (every individual deserves freedom, "even the freedom to be immoral" so long as
"others are not harmed").
283. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39 (1976); see
also Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288, 288 (1977) (defining privacy as the
"moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not to others nor to society as a whole").
284. Richards, Taking Taking Rights Seriously Seriously: Reflections on Dworkin and the
American Revival of Natural Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1329 (1977).
285. There are other philosophies of privacy. The moralists, for example, argue that
criminal law should reinforce morals of the community. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MORALS 25 (1st ed. 1959). The utilitarians, on the other hand, suggest that governmental
restrictions should be based on the community's judgment of what "is conformable to the
utility" of the community, and should "augment the total sum of the happiness of the
individuals that compose the community." J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 2
(Hildreth ed. 1876). Devlin's theory is reducible to a sub-theorem of Bentham's utilitarian
principle. The latter includes the former's psychic satisfaction from "doing good." Both
theories assume that community standards will determine the permissible extent of the
intrusion of the law on the individual. See Comment, Morals and the Criminal Law, 71 YALE
L.J. 662 (1962).
[Vol. 40:521
SEARCH FOR THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Privacy: A Familial Right
The catalogue of activities which the Court has afforded constitu-
tional protection seems to indicate a family-based right of privacy.
2 86
The family as a social unit has always been an important part of our
culture.2 87 A family-based right of privacy, therefore, reflects tradi-
tional institutions and social values.2 88 Although Griswold v. Connect-
icut 89 first articulated a familial right in the context of the
constitutional right of privacy, the Court had long noted a concern for
family rights in Meyer v. Nebraska,290 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
291
and Prince v. Massachusetts.
292
In Meyer, the Court invalidated a state law prohibiting teaching
foreign languages to children who had not finished the eighth grade.
The Court held that the statute unduly intruded on the parents' right
to educate their children. 93 Similarly, in Pierce, the Court struck
down a state statute requiring parents to send their children to public
schools as an impermissible intrusion on parent's rights to educate
286. See supra note 280 and accompanying text; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53
(1973) (stating that the right is related to "procreation ... contraception ... family relations
... and child rearing and education") (citations omitted).
287. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees. Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53
B.U.L. REV. 765, 772 (1973); see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04
(1976) (the family is deeply rooted in the society's traditions and history); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (parental authority in the family is basic in our societal
structure).
288. A value as used here is an enduring belief that certain modes of behavior or end-states
of existence are socially or personally preferable to their converse modes of behavior or end-
states. A value system then is a hierarchically structured set of beliefs in which values are
arranged in order of importance. Thus, personal autonomy and family security are terminal
values or end-states within society's value system. The choice of which value or values should
be protected reflects the societal ordering of the preferred ends. The ordering may change with
respect to changes in societal preferences. See generally M. ROKEACH, THE NATURE OF
HUMAN VALUES (1973).
289. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Although Meyer, Pierce, and Prince are not privacy cases, the
Court relied on them to find the right to privacy in Griswold. Despite the fact that these cases
are from the Lochner era and were not decided in the context of the right of privacy, they are a
rich source of "constitutional doctrine concerning the nature of liberty, the respective rights of
social institutions, and the limits of governmental power to homogenize the beliefs and
attitudes of the populace." L. TRIBE, supra note 267, § 15-6, at 902-03. The Court's
interpretations of these cases have divorced them from the historical context and the taints of
the Lochner era. The interpretations have significantly expanded their precedential effect as
support for the importance of the family in privacy cases. See Richards, supra note 267, at 1-3.
290. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
291. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
292. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
293. 262 U.S. at 401; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (citing
Meyer as authority for the right of "parental direction of the ... education of... children in
their early and formative years").
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their children.2 94 The Court rejected the state's attempt to "standard-
ize its children,"2 95 and "looked to the family as a constitutional
buffer between the individual and the state."2 96 The Prince Court
interpreted Meyer and Pierce as defining a "private realm of family
life" upon which the state could not intrude without a compelling
state interest.297 The Court has continued to vindicate parents' right
to control the early and formative years of their children. In Ginsberg
v. New York,2 98 the Court reiterated the importance of parents' right
to rear their children as "basic in the structure of our society. "299
More recently, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 the Court noted that "the
primary role of... parents in the upbringing of their children... [is]
an enduring American tradition" and an important element of the
"history and culture of Western Civilization." 30 1 The Yoder Court
held that the state's interest in compulsory education of children
beyond the eighth grade was subject to balancing against the tradi-
tional interests of Amish parents in the religious upbringing of their
children.30 2  The decision underscores the importance of the family.
Where the "state contravenes parental decisions in child rearing with
the claimed purpose of benefiting the child, the state must present a
convincing case that its intervention, in fact, will serve its professed
goal.
30 3
The constitutional protection for parental rights reflects "a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
... children. '" 304 The family is the primary reference group, and is
important as the basic socializing agent of children.30 5 The existence
and survival of society depends not only on marriage and procreation,
but also on the race's ability to enculturate its young. The Court has,
294. 268 U.S. at 534.
295. 268 U.S. at 535.
296. L. TRIBE, supra note 267, § 14-13, at 883-84.
297. 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
298. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
299. Id. at 639.
300. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
301. Id. at 232.
302. Id. at 214.
303. Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights of in, and for Children, 39 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 118, 127 (1975).
304. 406 U.S. at 232; see supra note 286 and accompanying text.
305. See Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the
Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 806-07 (1978); Hafen, Children's
Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their
Rights, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 626-29. See generally, Comment, Developments in the
Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1213-18, 1350-72 (1980).
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therefore, deferred to the decisional rights of parents with respect to
the rearing of their children.
The catalogue of activities afforded constitutional protection also
includes procreative decisions.3 °6 Poe v. Ullman3 °7 provided the juris-
prudential foundation for the procreative decisions. In Poe, the
majority of the justices held that the controversy involving a state
statute which prohibited the use of, and the provision of medical
advice on, contraceptives was not justiciable. °8 Justice Harlan, how-
ever, reached the merits of the case in his dissent. He stated that the
state illegitimately encumbered the "very heart of marital privacy 30 9
with the "whole machinery of the criminal law."'31  The zone of pri-
vacy, he continued, is a "liberty," which is limited to the marital rela-
tionship.3 ' This "zone" included those marital activities traditionally
acceptable to the state. The traditional sexual mores of the state pre-
cluded "adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest [which were
not] immune from criminal inquiry, however privately practiced. '312
Justice Harlan, therefore, struck down the statute for impermissibly
intruding upon the sanctity of the familial relationship.31 3
In dissent, Justice Douglas inferred the meaning of the concept
of ordered liberty from the Constitution. Specifically, he argued that
the first eight provisions of the Constitution's text and the "totality of
the constitutional scheme under which we live' 3 14 reflect the concept
of ordered liberty. Justice Douglas concluded that marital privacy
was entitled to constitutional protection.31 5
In Griswold v. Connecticut,31 6 the Court recognized the constitu-
tional protection against "unwarranted government intrusion in
familial and procreative affairs established by Meyer, Pierce, Prince
and Skinner. 31 7 Griswold held that the marital relationship is within
306. See supra text accompanying note 280.
307. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
308. Id. at 508-09. The Court held that the case was not justiciable because no one had
been charged under the statute since its passage in 1879, with the exception of two doctors and
a nurse charged with operating a birth control clinic. Compliance with the statute, therefore,
was uncoerced because there was no risk of enforcement. The litigants also suffered no
hardship if the Court denied them relief.
309. Id. at 553.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 552-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
313. See id. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
315. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
316. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
317. Heyman & Barzelay, supra note 287, at 771; see also Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp.
620, 624 (E.D. Va. 1973), affid, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976) (the
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a "Zone of Privacy" which is protected against governmental intru-
sion. 318 The source of the right of privacy in Griswold has been exten-
sively discussed.3 1 9 Some commentators, however, have criticized the
penumbral theory as a "fragile and convoluted reasoning of privacy
rights swirling around in ectoplasmic emanations. 32 ° Others have
criticized the decision for being unclear as to whether the crucial fac-
tor was protection of particular personal decisions (i.e., autonomy) or
protection of the sanctity of marital decisions.1
2 1
Although Justice Douglas's inferences from the language of the
Constitution may be weak,322 the penumbral concept is a vivid meta-
phor for the shared social values which are "so rooted in the con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. 3 23  The
Framers could not have anticipated all the contexts in which the gov-
ernment could intrude on values that should be protected from state
regulation. Therefore, the existence of unenumerated rights flowing
from the Constitution is necessary to protect the individual against
the state's control. Even if one were unwilling to concede the exist-
ence of unenumerated rights, the state should be estopped from regu-
lating marital intimacy and the use of contraceptives, because the
marital relationship is state-sanctioned.3 24 As the Court has noted,
marital intimacy is an integral part of the sanctioned relationship.
3 21
Nevertheless, the Griswold decision brought to the fore the rec-
ommendations of the Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal Code
marital relationship is inviolable). The procreative line of cases is a subset of the familial line
of cases because the latter embraces decisions on the former.
318. 381 U.S. at 485; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (the fourteenth
amendment protects rights that are fundamental or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty") (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497
("where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the state may prevail only
upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling") (quoting Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
319. See, e.g., Symposium on the Griswold Case and the Right ofPrivacy, 64 MICH. L. REV.
197 (1965).
320. G. HUGHES, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURTS 72 (1975). See also Kauper,
Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The
Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 242-44 (1965) (as a whole, the opinion "is ambiguous
and uncertain" in its use of the Bill of Rights to strike down the statute).
321. See, e.g., Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary and Intimate
Decisions, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1466 (1976).
322. See Note, Due Process Privacy and the Path of Progress, 1979 LAw F. 469, 476.
323. 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934)).
324. See infra note 336 and accompanying text.
325. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); see also infra notes 343-54 and accompanying text
(narrowly construing Eisenstadt as granting the unmarried person a right of privacy to
procreative decisions).
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to decriminalize the private, consensual, sexual behavior of adults.3 2 6
Griswold's emphasis on marital privacy as the fundamental value pro-
tected, however, forestalled any Millian interpretation of privacy. 27
Justice Douglas's majority opinion made it clear that the law was
unconstitutional because of the direct intrusion on "an intimate rela-
tion of husband and wife." '328 Justice Goldberg concurred that the
Constitution protects the right of marital privacy, 329 and that our tra-
dition and shared values could not countenance governmental inter-
ference with marital intimacies.
331
The limitation of the right of privacy to the family context is
made even clearer in Griswold's concurring opinions. These opinions
explicitly disavowed constitutional protection for sexual freedom
between unmarried adults.331 Indeed, the Court noted that
laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual pow-
ers may be used and the legal and societal context in which chil-
dren are born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery,
fornication, and homosexual [activities restrict] .. .sexuality to
lawful marriage, [and establish a pattern so embedded in] ... the
substance of our social life that any constitutional doctrine in this
area must build upon that basis.332
Griswold, therefore, upheld the fundamental right of marital privacy.
Marriage is "intimate to the degree of being sacred, '33 3 and procrea-
tion is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.
334
Griswold also extended derivative privacy to those who, at the
326. See WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 282; see also supra note 285 and accompanying
text (criminal law should reinforce society's morals); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND
MORALITY (1963); Schwartz, Moral Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
669 (1963) (explaining the rationale of the Code and distinguishing between permissible social
restraints and nonconformities which are constitutionally protected).
327. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 83, 84
(1980). "Millian interpretation" as used in this section refers to Mill's theory of individual
autonomy. See supra notes 281-85 and accompanying text.
328. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
329. Justice Goldberg also stated in his concurring opinion that the right of privacy
precludes governmental interference in autonomous decisionmaking, absent a compelling state
interest. Id. at 496-97.
330. See also id. at 485-86 (plurality opinion); id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(incorporating his dissenting opinion in Poe, 367 U.S. at 545-55).
331. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that the Court's decision "in no way
interfere[d] with a state's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct"); id. at 500
(Harlan, J., concurring and incorporating his dissent in Poe, 367 U.S. at 553); id. at 505
(White, J., concurring) (noting that the "statute is said to serve the state's policy against all
forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships, be they premarital or extramarital,
concededly a permissible and legitimate legislative goal").
332. 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
333. 381 U.S. at 486.
334. 316 U.S. at 541.
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behest of the married couple, shared in marital decisions. The deriva-
tive protection of the physician's role in decisions about birth control
was effectuated by the exercise of the right of privacy.33 5 Griswold
simply conceded limited sexual autonomy to married couples because
of the social compact between the state and the married couple.336
Griswold may be read to imply that the right of privacy, although
difficult to delineate,337 is family-based,338 and does not extend to
nonmarital, sexual activities.339
335. 381 U.S. at 482 (characterizing the law as operating "directly on an intimate relation
of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of the relation"). See also Note,
Consent, Not Morality, As the Proper Limitation on Sexual Privacy, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
637, 643 (1977).
336. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 285-311 (1973).
337. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 321, at 1447-66 (categorizing the right of privacy as
encompassing those activities involving repose, sanctuary and intimate decisions); see also L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-1, at 887 (1978) (commenting that the right
of privacy within the literature is unspecified); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 34, 42 (1967) (the right is illusory); Thompson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 315 (1975) (describing the right of privacy as a nebulous cluster of rights whose
boundaries are disputed).
338. See, e.g., 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The integrity of family "life is so
fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one
explicitly granted constitutional right." Id. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 551-52); see
also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that the right to marry is fundamental);
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (noting that "among the most
private and sensitive decisions" are those that involve procreation). In a plurality opinion in
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, the Court stated that the right of "close relatives" to live
together is related to the sharing of "mutual sustenance." 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977). Justice
Brennan, in concurrence, commented that the family gives social, economic and emotional
support. Id. at 508. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-53 ("the right has some extension
to activities relating to marriage.... procreation.., family relationships.... child rearing and
education") (citations omitted); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (stating that the
"warm, enduring and important" familial relationship between children and their families is a
basis for parental rights to custody and child rearing); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944) (holding that the Constitution protects the realm of family life against all but
compelling state interests). Because the right is family-based, the state cannot prosecute a
married person for a consensual act of sodomy with his spouse. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
339. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem.,
425 U.S. 901 (1976) (upholding sodomy statute).
Only a few courts have extended the right to privacy to nonmarital, sexual relations. See,
e.g., Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that
private sexual activities are within the zone of privacy); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381
A.2d 333 (1977) (striking down antifornication statute as violative of the right of privacy); see
also Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case-Study in
Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979) (the right of
privacy would extend to homosexuals if the Court consistently applies it); Rivera, Our
Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 799, 952-55 (1979) (reevaluation of societal attitudes would result in equal
application of the laws to all people).
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In addition to the right of privacy with respect to marital activi-
ties, the right to marry also reflects the importance of the family in the
society. The right to marry, as a type of familial activity, is protected
against undue intrusion by the state.3" The fundamental character of
the right to marry has "long been recognized as one of the vital per-
sonal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." 341 Thus, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court invalidated a state
miscegenation statute that impinged upon the "fundamental free-
dom" to marry.342 Although the Court did not discuss the right of
privacy in Loving, the Court has used Loving as a privacy case.343
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,3" a case involving a statute that restricted
distribution of contraceptives to married persons, the Court held that
although the state could prohibit sexual activity among unmarried
individuals, the state could not4 indirectly restrain procreative
choices. 34 5 The majority struck down only the means the state used
to attain the goal of deterring nonmarital sex. 346 Roe v. Wade34 7 later
340. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1967).
341. Id. at 12 (Stewart joined by Douglas, J., concurring).
342. Id. The Court stated that the statute also violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id.
343. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). The Court noted that Loving
"make[s] ...clear that the right of privacy has some extension to activities relating to
marriage .... " Id. at 152 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). Zablocki v.
Redhail recognized Loving as establishing the right to marry, and reiterated the constitutional
protection of the right to marry. 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978). In Zablocki, the Court struck
down a statute that had the effect of prohibiting a parent who was delinquent in child custody
payments from marrying as violative of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 388-90. The
Zablocki majority reconciled viewing the right to marry as fundamental with its holding in
California v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977). Jobst upheld the provisions of the Social Security Act
that reduced benefits of certain classes of persons upon marrying. The Court noted that the
only regulations which significantly interfered with "incidents of or prerequisites for marriage"
were subjected to rigorous scrutiny. Id. at 386. The regulation in Zablocki directly and
significantly intruded on the decision to marry by precluding those who could not meet their
obligations of support from remarrying. Id. at 387. Conversely, in Jobst, the termination of
benefits from the social security program was found to have an indirect and insignificant
impact on the exercise of the right to marry. 434 U.S. at 387 n.12. The provisions of the
regulation, therefore, triggered the traditional deference to the state legislature. Id. at 54.
Although Zablocki was an equal protection case, the fundamental character of the right to
marry would also trigger a due process analysis. The importance of family cohesion and
marriage (or remarriage) also underlie the Court's decisions dealing with dissolution of
marriage. For example, in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court held that
due process of law prohibited the state from charging fees which blocked indigents' access to
divorce. Such fees, the Court held, unduly restrained the indigents' right to marry. Id. at 374-
83.
344. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
345. Many commentators have interpreted Eisenstadt as extending an individual's right of
privacy to nonmarital sexual activity. E.g., W. BARNETTr, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1973); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 944 n.12 (1978).
346. 405 U.S. at 448-49.
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upheld that interpretation. The majority in Eisenstadt based the deci-
sion on individual choice, but the individual choice at issue was
procreational-not sexual.34 Thus, the holding in Eisenstadt may be
narrowly construed to limit an unmarried individual's right of privacy
to procreative decisions.349 Such decisions are familial in nature.
Justice Brennan's statement that a legislature has the discretion
to fashion "means to prevent fornication,"350 further buttresses a fam-
ily-based interpretation of Eisenstadt. Eisenstadt did not foreclose the
possibility that a state statute prohibiting access to contraceptives for
unmarried individuals enacted for the purpose of preventing
nonmarital sex would pass constitutional muster. This prohibition
arguably is constitutional where the statutory means bears a close
relation to deterring nonmarital sexual intimacies.351 If the legislature
could prohibit fornication, the Court's distinction between married
and unmarried individuals was redundant to the holding.352
Within the marital context of Griswold, Eisenstadt merely held
that individuals may have equal access to contraceptives, and not that
transient, consensual, sexual intimacy is protected by the right of pri-
vacy.353 Professor Gerety has suggested that married couples are
implicitly permitted access to contraceptives for marital activities
because those activities are state-sanctioned. He noted that the state
tolerates access to contraceptives by unmarried persons because of
"quasi-marital" intimacy concerns. This tolerance reflects a change
in the ways the state views nonmarital sex.354 Nonetheless, the state
347. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632,
640 (1974) (undue restrictions on maternity leave burden the exercise of the right of
procreation).
348. Grey, supra note 327, at 88.
349. See, e.g., Comment, Aids-A New Reason to Regulate Homosexuality?, 11 J.
CONTEMP. L. 315, 322 (1984); see also Grey, supra note 327, at 88 (the choice was one of
procreation); Katz, Sexual Morality and the Constitution, 46 ALB. L. REV. 311, 335 (1982)
(the Court only upheld the right of procreational choice); Note, The Constitutionality of
Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553, 557 (1976) (the right was the freedom to choose
whether or not to bear a child).
350. 405 U.S. at 449. The purpose of the statute at issue was not regulation of sexual
promiscuity. Id. at 448. See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 695-96 (1977)
(stating that contraceptive and abortion laws were not meant to discourage illicit sex, and it
would be absurd to assume that a state would prescribe pregnancy and the birth of an
unwanted child as a sanction for fornication).
351. See W. BARNETT, supra note 345, at 66.
352. Wellington, supra note 336, at 296-98; see also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO &
H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 189-91 (2d ed. 1973)
(Massachusetts affirmed defendant's conviction without determining whether he was married
or not; therefore, his marital status was separable from the decision).
353. Heyman & Barzelay, supra note 287, at 772-74.
354. Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 279 (1977).
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need not bestow any greater protection for nonmarital sexual activity
than the protection implied from the mandate of the majority.355
A couple's right to decide whether or not to have a child is
within the zone of privacy protected by the Court's marriage, procrea-
tion and child-rearing cases.356 Roe v. Wade357 located that zone of
privacy within the meaning of the due process clause's notion of "lib-
erty." '358 Although Roe held that the right to an abortion applied to
both married and unmarried women, the majority in Roe explicitly
rejected the Millian theory of an "unlimited right" "to do with one's
body as one pleases. ' 359 Roe's rejection of an individual autonomy-
355. Gerety, supra note 354, at 280 n. 173; see Heyman & Barzelay, supra note 287, at 774.
The state may regulate disfavored life styles or personal intimacies that do not conform
with majoritarian views where the state has a legitimate justification. See, e.g., supra note 321
and accompanying text; Paris Adult Theater 1, 413 U.S. at 61 (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)). In
Chaplinsky, the Court upheld an injunction prohibiting showing obscene films in two "adults
only" theaters partly because of the state's interest in protecting "the social interest in . . .
morality." Id. at 572. See Gelfand, Authority and Autonomy.- The State, the Individual and
the Family, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125 (1978); Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for
Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977); see also Richards, supra note 339, at 984-
99 (implicitly admitting societal interest in morality but noting that a sound moral basis no
longer exists for branding homosexuality as immoral).
The Court has prohibited use of interstate commerce under certain circumstances in order
to protect morality. See, e.g., United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); Cleveland v. United
States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465 (1920); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). The Court has also held that the states' police power extends to
the "preservation of good order and the public morals." Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S.
25, 33 (1877). For a condemnation of polygamous marriages, see Church of Latter Day Saints
v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1890); Reynolds v. United States 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Cf
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972) (stating that there "can be no assumption
that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and others like them are 'wrong.' A way of life
that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be
condemned because it is different."). It is worth noting that Chief Justice Burger wrote both
the Paris Adult Theatre I and Yoder decisions.
See generally Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967); Levi, The
Collective Morality of a Maturing Society, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 399, 400 (1973)
(establishment of religion clause of the first amendment as an alternative ground to invalidate
some laws regulating morality); Wellington, supra, note 336, at 225 (1973) (privacy as a
construct is culturally determined, so that an offensive situation in one culture may be an
indifferent situation in another).
356. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
357. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
358. Id. at 167-68 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)
("In Roe v. Wade, however, after carefully reviewing... [the precedents], the Court expressed
the opinion that the 'right of privacy' is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty."). Id. at 598-99 n.23 (1977).
359. 410 U.S. at 154. Subsequent Court decisions support rejecting Justice Douglas's
"choice-of-lifestyle" themes as issues of intimate associations and personal privacy. See, e.g.,
Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978), denying cert to 578 F.2d 1374
(3d Cir. 1978) (discharge of two employees for "living together in a state of 'open adultry' ");
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affg mem., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
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based right of privacy, and the trend of recent decisions suggest that
the right is not "an independent source of constitutional protec-
tion."36 The inclusion of spheres of activities outside marriage, pro-
creation and child-rearing within the zone of privacy must accord
with the liberty concept of the due process clause.36'
Roe, however, has been widely criticized.36 2 Professor Ely found
it disconcerting that a woman's right to have an abortion "is not infer-
able from the language of the Constitution, the Framers' thinking
respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value derivable
from the provisions they included, or the nation's governmental struc-
ture. ' 363 One may argue, however, that Roe reflected the implied
constitutional limitation of a state's exercise of police power with
respect to the public welfare.3 6 Under this argument, the substantive
rights of a woman to have an abortion represent an external bound to
the state's undue exercise of police power and are inferable from the
constitutional scheme. As Professor Perry has argued, the real issue
decided in Roe was "whether conventional moral culture supported
placing the criminal sanction behind a moral imperative against most
abortions or whether ... the legislation involved what is essentially a
personal matter" 365 beyond the scope of public morals. The Court's
Va. 1975) (upholding constitutionality of state sodomy statute); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50
n.3 (1975) (noting that no fundamental right of privacy was involved in the application of
sodomy statutes to unmarried individuals); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973)
(upholding state sodomy statute against vagueness challenge). In other contexts, the Court has
rejected an autonomy-based interpretation of the right of privacy. See, e.g., Kelly v. Johnson,
425 U.S. 238 (1976) (privacy rights do not protect policemen from hair length regulation).
360. 429 U.S. at 598-99 n.23.
361. See Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 521 (1983) (arguing that
nonmarital sexual intimacies are not within the zone of privacy).
362. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 266, at 920; Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other
Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159; O'Meara, Abortion: The Court Decides a
Non-Case, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 337.
363. Ely, supra note 266, at 935-36.
364. See Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power. The Ethical Function of
Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Abortion]; see also
Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited. Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw.
U.L. REV. 417, 452 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Due Process]; Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972
Term, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 18-25 (1973). Professor Tribe argued that Roe protected values implicit within the
first amendment's establishment clause. He suggested that restrictive legislations on abortion
do no more than entangle the legislature in a "whirlpool of religious disputation," which
would violate the establishment clause. Tribe, supra at 22-23. That may be true, but then a
fundamental moral conflict is not ipso facto beyond discussion of the legislature. The legal
conflicts that generally reflect tensions between communitarianism and individualism are
rooted in morality. Abortion conflicts are not necessarily different in law. See, e.g., G.
HUGHES, supra note 320, at 70; Abortion, supra note 364, at 692 n.23.
365. Abortion, supra note 364, at 733.
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implicit evaluation of majoritarian values was that abortion is essen-
tially a personal matter in the first trimester of pregnancy, but that it
may have ramifications for the public welfare and morality after that
trimester.3 66 Although one may criticize the conceptual distinction
between previability and viability of the fetus, 36 7 majoritarian views
nevertheless indicate that once the fetus is viable, abortion is closer to
infanticide than it is to ending a pregnancy.
368
In addition, "a pregnant woman and an unborn child each...
[may have] her own kind of claim on the interest of life and liberty in
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. ' 369  Whether a
woman has the right to unilaterally terminate the life of an unborn
child, or whether she may be compelled to continue the pregnancy
where she is not at risk of harm, depends on one's beliefs about an
unborn child.3 71 If a fetus is not considered to be equivalent to a per-
son, it can have no fundamental rights worthy of constitutional pro-
tection.371 Roe reflects existing cultural sensibilities.372 A woman's
right of privacy is not absolute, 373 but must be balanced against
"important state interests in regulation." 374 Roe again emphasized
the familial context of privacy. The right is related to "procreation
. . . contraception . . . family relations . . . child rearing and
education.
375
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,376 the majority also explicitly
recognized the "deep and proper concern and interest that a devoted
husband has in his wife's pregnancy. ' 377 The majority stressed the
"importance of the marital relationship"378 and balanced the interests
of the woman against those of the man.379 The recognition of the
366. Id.
367. Ely, supra note 266, at 924. According to Dean Ely, why viability is "the magic
moment" is unclear. He believes that the Court is confusing a definition with a syllogism. See
also Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process and the Right of Abortion, 25 HASTINGS
L.J. 867, 875 (1974).
368. See G. HUGHES, supra note 320, at 66-68.
369. Hafen, supra note 305, at 533 n.341.
370. Id.
371. Id.; see also Heyman & Barzelay, supra note 287, at 775-76 (society hardly associates
life with the few cells present at conception).
372. Abortion, supra note 364, at 689.
373. 410 U.S. at 159; see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976)
(cognizable interests of parents or husbands in abortion balanced against woman's interest).
374. 410 U.S. at 154.
375. 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
376. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down state abortion statute that encumbered the exercise
of the right to abortion).
377. Id. at 69.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 71.
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spousal and parental interests, implies an emphasis on the family con-
text of the right to privacy. Justice White's opinion directly empha-
sized the family context, stating that the husband's interests in the
fetus's life should not be unilaterally ended by the wife's decision.3"'
Although the Court struck down the statute because it impermissibly
delegated an absolute veto over minors' procreative decisions to par-
ents, the majority emphasized the lack of a nexus between the statute
and the asserted state interest in protecting the family as a social
unit.38 '
Although Danforth and Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional382 extended the right of privacy with respect to procreative
decisions to minors,383 Carey did not establish a right of privacy for
sexual freedom.3 84  Justice Rehnquist, for example, trivialized the
constitutional importance of sex outside of marriage.3 85 This view of
nonmarital sex as trivial suggests that nonmarital sex should not be
regulated, and also suggests that it is of little social utility. The Court
should not, therefore, elevate nonmarital sex to a prominence entitling
it to constitutional protection. The Court protects procreative auton-
omy as an incident of family and marital relationships. Transient,
tolerated, sexual activity "does not produce the same kind of nearly
irrevocable effects, nor spring from the same deep well of cultural val-
ues" as marital sexual intimacy.3 86 By implication, sexual practices
which are not incidental to marital sexual expressions are not
380. Id. at 93 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
381. Id. at 75.
382. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (plurality opinion) (striking down state statute that prohibited the
sale and distribution of contraceptives to minors under 16 years of age).
383. Id. at 693-96.
384. Id. at 702-03 (White, J., concurring); id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 705
(Powell, J., concurring) ("Neither our precedents nor sound principles of constitutional
analysis require state legislation to meet the exacting 'compelling state interest' standard
whenever it implicates sexual freedom."); id. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (the "facial
validity of criminal statutes prohibiting certain consensual acts has been 'definitively'
established") (citing Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)). Cf id. at 694
n.17 (Justice Brennan writing for the Court stating that the Court had not definitively
answered the question of the validity of state statutes proscribing adult consensual sexual
behavior).
The ambiguity of the summary affirmance of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney accounts
for the difference in opinion between Justices Rehnquist and Brennan. See Note, Hardwick v.
Bowers: An Attempt to Pull the Meaning of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney Out of the
Closet, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973, 983-95 (1985); Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme
Court Appeals: The Significance of Limited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedence, 52
B.U.L. REV. 373 (1972).
385. Carey, 431 U.S. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the heroes of
Bunker Hill, Shiloh, Gettysburg, and Cold Harbor sacrificed themselves to guarantee
teenagers access to contraceptives).
386. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 287, at 774.
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protected. 3 87
The line of cases dealing with associational privacy further but-
tresses the right of privacy's familial base. Justice Powell, in a plural-
ity opinion, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,388 stated that the
Meyer-Griswold-Roe line of cases had established a "private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter. '389 The plurality opinion in
Moore functionally defined the family as the extended family, and
protected a grandmother and her two sons from a local zoning ordi-
nance.3 90 The basis of the protection was not only "history and tradi-
tion,"391 but also the important function the extended family serves as
a social agent for child-rearing, and economic and social support.39 2
Because these functions are traditional incidents of the nuclear family,
an extended family performing such functions is equivalent to the
nuclear family. The extended family, like the nuclear family, is there-
fore constitutionally protected.393 The plurality's reasoning is consis-
tent with the constitutional protection of unmarried persons in the
procreative cases. The Court protects the unmarried individual's pro-
creative decisions as incidents of "quasi-marital" sexual practices.394
The autonomy of the extended family as an incident of the functions
of the nuclear family is similarly protected. Thus, the relationship of
a grandmother to her grandson is functionally similar to that of a
parent to his or her child.395
The emphasis in Moore was on the family as an important social
unit. It can be argued, therefore, that non-lineal and nonsexual
387. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affg mem., 403 F. Supp.
1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (summarily affirming a finding of no right of privacy for homosexual
practices); Lovisi v. Slayton, rev'd sub nom. Lovisi v. Zahradnick, 539 F.2d 349, 352 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976) (protected right to privacy confined "to heterosexual
conduct, probably even that only within the marital relationship"); Berg v. Clayton, 436 F.
Supp. 76, 79 (D.D.C. 1977) ("right to privacy does not extend to homosexual conduct even
where it occurs in private between consenting adults"); Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No.
10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (teacher in high school
discharged for being a homosexual).
388. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
389. Id. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
390. Id. at 504-06. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, the
Court explained that relationships of foster families may be functionally equivalent to those of
the traditional nuclear family because foster families also promote intimate emotional
relationships and perform functions of child-rearing. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). They may
therefore be entitled to protection similar to that which the Court gives to the nuclear family.
Id. at 842-47. The Court did not decide whether the foster family had a liberty interest.
391. Id. at 503.
392. Id. at 504-05.
393. Id. at 504.
394. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
395. Jensen, From Belle Terre to E. Cleveland." Zoning, the Family, and the Right of
Privacy, 13 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1979).
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cohabitations do not fall within activities protected by the right of
privacy. Applying Moore in this fashion, a court would be unlikely to
find a right of privacy in associations of unrelated persons.396 Even
Justice Douglas, who was the only judge to find a fundamental right
of privacy in Moreno,3 97 noted in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas
398
that the Constitution did not extend to communal living.399 Unlike
Moore, the relationship at issue in Belle Terre was devoid of child-
rearing or potential child-rearing. °  The Court, therefore, upheld the
ordinance with minimal scrutiny." The familial context, then, aside
from the marital relationship, is an important prerequisite for finding
the existence of the right of privacy." 2
B. Privacy: Personal Autonomy as a Principle
Contrary to the preceding familial interpretation of the right of
privacy, an alternative analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions
locates the right of privacy in the individual's autonomy from undue
396. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating a
state statute because the means stated therein were not rationally related to its stated purpose
of preventing fraud; only Justice Douglas found the legislation to infringe the fundamental
right of association).
397. Id. at 541 (Douglas, J., concurring).
398. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
399. Id. at 9.
400. See supra note 395 and accompanying text; see also Veitch, The Essence of Marriage-
A Comment on the Homosexual Challenge, 5 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 41 (1976) (homosexual
relations are devoid of the potential for child-rearing).
401. 416 U.S. at 8.
402. The importance of the familial relationship also has been emphasized in several cases.
See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816
(1977) (upholding procedures of New York statute dissolving relations of foster family as
satisfying due process; the Court distinguished foster families from the constitutionally
protected traditional family, because they are temporary contractual arrangements under state
law, and do not originate from the exercise of a fundamental human right). In Kyees v.
County Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, the court held that the foster parent/foster child relationship,
even over a substantial period of time, does not rise to the status of "family" so as to trigger
due process. 600 F.2d 693, 698-99 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). In Drummond v. Fulton
County Dep't of Family Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978), and Sherrard v. Owens, 484 F. Supp. 728 (W.D. Mich. 1980),
affd, 644 F.2d 542 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981), the courts
reiterated the distinction between traditional and foster families. In Rivera v. Marcus, 696
F.2d 1016, 1025, affig 533 F. Supp. 203 (1982), the court distinguished Kyees and held that a
half-sister has a liberty interest in the familial relationship with her foster children. See also
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (5-4 decision) (invalidating state law permitting a
child's stepfather to adopt the child without biological father's consent because the father had
acted as a father to the child); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (5-4 decision)
(upholding Georgia statute granting cause of action in wrongful death to all unwed mothers
and unwed fathers who had chosen to make their children legitimate); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978) (upholding application of state law requiring the consent of only the mother to
adopt a child as applied to a father who did not significantly protect or care for the child).
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governmental control.4°3 For example, the right of procreative auton-
omy, recognized in Skinner, Carey, Danforth, Roe and Griswold is the
"right of the individual... to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion." '  Under this theory, the right of privacy is simply a pro-
tection of human dignity and the freedom to choose lifestyles that
serve value-expressive functions." 5 In Poe v. Ullman," 6 the majority
did not address the substantive issue of the right of privacy. Justice
Douglas's dissent, however, noted that the "liberty" of the individual
within the "totality of the constitutional scheme"" protected the
individual from undue governmental influence. Although Justice
Douglas concluded that the state statute was illegal because it made
the use of contraceptives "a crime and... [applied] the criminal sanc-
tion to man and wife,"'"' ° his analysis went beyond the state's viola-
tion of the "innermost sanction of the home,"'"' 9 to a rejection of the
state's attempt to unduly control associational freedoms.41 The
state's "involvement in personal decisions concerning the use of con-
traceptive devices breached the most basic notion of what was implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty ... [and] was dangerously close to
totalitarian government. '41
1
Similarly, in Griswold,41 2 Justice Douglas's plurality opinion
noted the zone of privacy afforded to certain uncatalogued relations.
Although Justice Douglas's discussion of privacy was within the con-
text of the marital relationship, subsequent Supreme Court decisions
have indicated that the central issue in Griswold was one of freedom
of intimate associations.413 As Professor Richards has argued, the
Griswold plurality "properly invoked the right of privacy to invalidate
the Connecticut statute. '414 The invalidation, he noted, was proper
because the statute "failed to satisfy the postulate of constitutional
403. Saphire, Gay Rights and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Theory, Practice,
and Dronenburg v. Zech, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 767, 778-88 (1985); see also Ludd, The
Aftermath of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: In Search of the Right to be Let Alone, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 705 (1985).
404. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
405. Wilkinson & White, supra note 355, at 612.
406. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
407. Id. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
408. Id. at 520-21.
409. Id. at 521.
410. Id. at 522 (quoting Calhoun, Democracy and Natural Law, 5 NAT. L.F. 31, 36
(1960)); see also Ludd, supra note 403, at 720.
411. See Ludd, supra note 403, at 720.
412. 381 U.S. at 485.
413. See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980);
Richards, supra note 339.
414. Richards, supra note 339, at 981.
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morality that legally enforceable moral ideas be grounded on . . .
respect for autonomy."415 According to Professor Richards, the right
of privacy should not be defined in terms of rigid, marital procreative
sex.4 16 Sexual intimacy and "mature love" are terminal values
417
through which individuals add meaning to their lives.41  Therefore,
as in Griswold, statutes which determine "how one will have sex and
with what consequences are constitutionally invalid" 41 9 in the absence
of a compelling state interest.
The right to use contraceptives in marriage is fundamental
because it is integral to a relationship described by Justice Goldberg
as a "coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. '420 Griswold, therefore, links
Skinner, Eisenstadt, Roe and Carey to establish the fundamental right
of autonomy of intimate procreative decisions. As Justice Brennan
noted in Eisenstadt, Griswold's right of privacy is one of autonomy of
procreative decisions, regardless of marital status.42' The decision
whether to beget a child is no less important in a nonmarital context
than in a marital one. 422 The Court has rejected the proposition that
a state would prescribe pregnancy and child birth as the wages of
fornication. Such a rejection reflects the substantive choice of the
''special nature of procreative decisions and the heightened judicial
protection they deserve.
423
The majority in Loving v. Virginia repeated the theme of the mar-
ital relationship as a form of personal association in which individuals
choose to express, and give meaning to, their lives.424 The majority
characterized the freedom to marry as "one of the vitalpersonal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. "42' The
right to marry is properly considered to be within the zone of privacy
because the right guarantees individuals the right to form intimate
associations wherein they may care for, and love another.426 Mar-
415. Id. (emphasis added).
416. Id.
417. See generally Rokeach, supra note 288, at 14. A terminal value is an enduring belief
that an end is socially or personally preferable to its converse.
418. Richards, supra note 339, at 1003; see also Karst, supra note 413, at 653-54
(homosexuality is an expression of intimate associations and a personal statement of the
individual).
419. Richards, supra note 339, at 1006.
420. 381 U.S. at 486.
421. 405 U.S. at 453.
422. Id. at 448.
423. Note, The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1185 (1980).
424. 388 U.S. at 12.
425. Id.
426. Saphire, supra note 403, at 179.
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riage, as described in Zablocki v. Redhail,4 2 7 involves the "values of
self-identification and commitment, 42 8 and is a form of personal
association.
The majority in Stanley v. Georgia reiterated the individual right
of privacy as an external bound to the state's undue exercise of police
power.429 The Court noted that the state had a justifiable interest in
the regulation of obscenity.43° But the state could prohibit obscenity
only so long as the state interest outweighed the intrusion on the indi-
vidual's right to possess or use pornographic films at home.43' Stanley
emphasized the right of privacy and the first amendment, and implied
that the Constitution protects individual freedom in a general sense.
The Stanley Court rejected the state's effort to regulate the "moral
content of a person's thoughts. '432 Thus, Stanley articulates the indi-
vidual's "right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the
privacy of his own home, 4 33 even where public manifestations of the
activity would be prohibited.434
Similarly, the state could not control a visitor's activity in the
individual's home,435 in the absence of a compelling state interest,
even where the activity may be sodomitic and offensive to the sensibil-
ities of the popular majority. 436 The right of intimate associations,
therefore, should extend to intimate sexual practices so long as they
are consensual, private, and among adults.437 So characterized, these
427. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
428. Karst, supra note 413, at 669-71.
429. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
430. Id. at 564-66.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 565. Although morality may be a sufficient justification for public prohibition of
obscenity, it is not sufficient to justify state intrusion into the privacy of the home. See id. at
565 n.8 (quoting Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 391, 395 (1963)).
433. Id. at 565.
434. E.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (use of obscene materials
outside the home does not fall within the zone of privacy); accord United States v. Orito, 413
U.S. 139 (1973).
435. 413 U.S. at 142 (special constitutional "safeguards to the privacy of the home," and
"other special privacy rights"); see also Note, Roe and Paris" Does Privacy Have a Principle?,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1974).
436. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(Merhige, J., dissenting), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (stating that "socially condemned"
but harmless activity is "beyond the scope of state regulation when conducted within the
privacy of the home"); Moreno v. United States Dep't of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314
(D.D.C.1972), affd, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (states cannot use the police power to infringe the
rights to "privacy ... in the home" in the "name of morality").
437. See Note, supra note 335, at 656, 664. The Stanley Court focused on the first
amendment, rejected the state's attempt to control the "moral content of a person's thoughts,"
and implied that the Constitution protects individual freedom in a general sense. 394 U.S. at
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practices would include sodomitic activities. 38
The Karstian values of "caring and commitment, intimacy and
self-identification" 439 are interwoven within the autonomy-based
interpretation of privacy. In Eisenstadt and Roe the Court seemed to
favor an autonomy-based interpretation of the right of privacy over
the marital interpretation." ° The Eisenstadt plurality opinion inter-
preted the right of privacy as "the right of the individual,"441
independent of marriage, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters as fundamental "as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.""142 Thus, the zone of privacy in Griswold,
although carved from the familial context, protects intimate and fun-
damental personal decisions." 3 The right of privacy protects "the
choice to form and maintain an intimate association that permits full
realization of the associational values we cherish,"'  and not the form
per se. The plurality decision in Eisenstadt, coupled with Loving's fun-
damental right to marry, casts Griswold in a new light. Eisenstadt and
Loving read together seriously question the justification of marital pri-
vacy based on the theory of a compact with the state. 45 As Professor
Karst has forcefully argued, Wellington's theory of marital compact
with the state" 6
565. Yet, when Paris Adult Theater I is read together with Stanley, it is apparent that the
former severely curtailed the Millian overtones of the latter. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973). Justice Burger's majority opinion in Paris Adult Theater I defines
privacy interests as encompassing and protecting "motherhood, procreation and childrearing."
Id. at 65 (1973); accord Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (the right of privacy covers "matters
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education"). The protection of the privacy of the home is not because of the "sanctity of
property rights," or the privacy of consensual sexual practices. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This protection stems from the preeminence of the marital
relation, the family as an important social unit, and the home as the seat of the family. Id.
The Paris Adult Theater I majority refused to extend Stanley to protect purchasing and
transporting obscene materials. United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S.
123 (1973) (barring private importation of obscene materials); United States v. Reidel, 402
U.S. 351 (1971) (refusing to extend Stanley to include commercial distribution); United States
v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (refusing to extend the zone of privacy to include use of
obscene materials outside the home).
438. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: A Set-Back For the Right of Privacy, 65 Ky.
L.J. 718, 757 (1977).
439. Karst, supra note 413, at 640.
440. Eichbaum, Towards An Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy.- Beyond the
Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 373 (1979).
441. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
442. Id.
443. Eichbaum, supra note 440, at 373; accord Comment, supra note 305, at 1467.
444. Karst, supra note 413, at 637.
445. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
446. Id.
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appears to promote a reasoning that would permit the state to reg-
ulate would-be spouses' sexual intimacy by simply refusing them
the status of marriage. Where marriage is involved, however, the
state does not have a contracting party's choice to accept or reject
the compact. The most clearly established feature of the constitu-
tional freedom of intimate association is the freedom to marry,
which radically restricts the state's power to withhold the status of
marriage from a willing couple. A compact that one party is com-
pelled to enter is not much of a compact; it is, instead, a fictional
middle step in a line of legal reasoning-a step that can be elimi-
nated in the interest of economy. Justice Douglas was sometimes
accused of using Occam's Razor to achieve not economy or reason-
ing but parsimony; in Griswold, however, he correctly saw that it
was the freedom of intimate association, not the state's contractual
obligation, that justified the Court's decision.
The logic of the freedom of intimate association-that is, the
implications of the values that are the substantive components of
this associational freedom-cannot be contained at the' status
boundaries of formal marriage or legitimacy of parentage."
7
The right to choose whether to beget a child is a right of the
individual in association with another. A formal "associational status
plainly is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the realiza-
tion""'  of intimate associations. Therefore, the marital/nonmarital
distinction for criminalizing access to contraceptives in Eisenstadt was
unconstitutional. Eisenstadt reflected the national attitude toward
nonmarital sexual behavior at the time it was decided." 9 Eisenstadt
and Griswold together free individuals in an association to "express
themselves through sexual intimacy without the 'chilling effect' of the
risk of unwanted" 450 pregnancies.
Because of its emphasis on the sanctity of the marital relation,
Griswold can be said to protect consensual sodomy between married
couples. Eisenstadt, as previously mentioned, was an equal protection
case based on the Griswold right of privacy.45' It can be argued, then,
that the two cases read together do not legitimize the state "in prose-
cuting private, consensual heterosexual sodomy between unmarried
people" any more than the regulation of the use of contraceptives by
447. Karst, supra note 413, at 652 (footnotes omitted).
448. Id. at 647; see also Saphire, supra note 403, at 790 (how an individual chooses to
express his/her association with another is a statement about the individual).
449. Morse, Family Law in Transition: From Traditional Families to Individual Liberties,
in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 327 (V. Tufte & B. Myerhoff eds. 1979).
450. Karst, supra note 413, at 654.
451. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
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unmarried people." 2
Eisenstadt, read in the context of Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe
and incorporated in Griswold, however, severely cripples the right to
privacy. Such a reading legitimizes Wellington's argument that the
right of privacy depends on a pact with the state.4 5 3 But an individual
need not be married to activate a right to self-expression. At a mini-
mum, consistency and equal application dictate an autonomy-based
right of privacy barring state intrusion into personal decisions regard-
ing harmless, consensual, sexual intimacies.454 Selective application
of a right results in failure to protect the constitutional rights of politi-
cally weak455 minorities.
When Griswold and Eisenstadt are considered in light of Stanley;
the right of privacy seems to extend to protect private, adult, consen-
sual sexual behavior against state intrusion. Thus, it can be argued
that laws against heterosexual practices45 6 including sodomy,457 and
homosexual intimacies,4 58 are unconstitutional in the absence of a
compelling state interest.
Roe v. Wade underscored the importance of protecting the indi-
vidual's choice to form an association. The form of association, how-
ever, was not determinative. 45 9 The right of a woman to choose
whether to end her pregnancy is unambiguous, regardless of the form
of association she chooses to express her love and caring for
another.460 A woman's decision to have an abortion is an intimate
decision that involves her self-fulfillment, 46 identification,4 62 and
autonomy. Such a decision affects her sexuality and choices about her
452. Hindes, Morality Enforcement Through the Criminal Law and the Modern Doctrine of
Substantive Due Process, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 344, 365 (1977).
453. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
454. See Gerety, supra note 354, at 280.
455. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see also Note, supra note 322, at 499.
456. See Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1977); Comment, Sexual Freedom for Consenting Adults-Why
Not?, 2 PAC. L.J. 206 (1971); Comment, California's "Consenting Adults" Law: The Sex Act
in Perspective, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439 (1976).
457. See generally Richards, supra note 210, at 1347-48; Note, On Privacy: Constitutional
Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670, 719-738 (1973).
458. Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-A Right to be Different?, 38 ALB. L. REV. 84
(1973); Comment, The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REV. 687 (1973); Note, The
Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613
(1974).
459. Note, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553, 577
(1973).
460. 410 U.S. 113, 170 (Stewart, J., concurring).
461. See generally Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204
(1972).
462. Karst, supra note 413, at 665.
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reproductive life. Therefore, the line between viability and
previability as drawn in Roe demarcates a woman's right to contra-
ception and choice of associations on the one hand, and her legal disa-
bility to commit infanticide on the other hand. The former
guarantees the autonomy of her intimate decisions and self-expres-
sions, which are decidedly harmless to others. The latter circum-
scribes her choices where her intimate decisions and self-expressions
are demonstrably harmful to others. Roe, therefore, may be inter-
preted as curtailing state power to impose criminal penalties on activi-
ties repugnant to majoritarian morality where the activities are of no
demonstrable harm to others.
State restrictions on abortion also affect reproductive auton-
omy,463 although abortion has not been used to effectuate procreative
autonomy. Abortion is now an instrument in a woman's exercise of
procreative autonomy. Criticisms of the difficulty in drawing the line
between viability and previability do not tarnish a woman's choice to
exercise her right to procreative autonomy.464 As Professor Tribe has
noted, Roe is simply a question of role-allocation.465 Roe represents
"less a decision in favor of abortion than a decision in favor of leaving
the matter... to women. '466 Roe, therefore, emphasizes the right to
choose and not the form of association. Roe implies that "much that
we associate with the value of human life is not present" at the early
stages of pregnancy to justify "overriding the right of the woman to
decide whether she will bear a child. '4 67 The fetus may have moral
claims to life in the early stages of pregnancy, but it certainly has no
legally enforceable claims. 468 The state, therefore, cannot intrude
upon a woman's right to make personal decisions in the previable
period of pregnancy. Even within a marital context, a spousal veto of
a woman's personal decision on abortion in the first trimester would
be constitutionally illegitimate. The veto would impermissibly
encumber the exercise of her fundamental right to procreative
autonomy.469
Roe also reaffirmed consensual sharing of the right of privacy. A
woman's right to end her pregnancy confers an implied protection on
463. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 287, at 775.
464. See generally Bym, An American Tragedy.- The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41
FORDHAM L. REV. 807 (1973); Riga, Byrn and Roe: The Threshold Question and Juridical
Review, 23 CATH. LAW. 309 (1978).
465. Tribe, supra note 364, at 44.
466. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-1, at 933 (1981).
467. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 287, at 776.
468. Id. at 777.
469. Eichbaum, supra note 440, at 375.
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those rights indispensable to effectuating that decision.170 The right
was exercised in a hospital, abrogating the home-bound interpretation
of the right to privacy. This activity, like many sexual practices, is
not public. Stanley, Eisenstadt, and Roe have thus extended the right
of privacy to include a generalized right of personal autonomy,
regardless of marital status.471
The extension of reproductive autonomy to sexually active
minors in Danforth4 72 directly contradicts the notion of a family-
based right of privacy.4 73 Danforth preserved the decisionmaking role
in abortions to the pregnant individual and not to her parents or
spouse.4 74 Admittedly, the plurality opinion recognized the "impor-
tance of the marital relationship" and would balance the interests of
the woman against those of the husband.475  Relying on Roe v.
Wade,4 76 the Danforth Court held that the state "cannot delegate to a
spouse a veto power which the state itself is absolutely and totally
prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy.
477
A woman's right to procreative decisions exists regardless of whether
or not it is within a marital context.4 78 The existence of the right to
procreative decisions precludes the state from adopting an affirmative
stance as to how that right may be exercised.479
Carey v. Population Services International"° further confirms the
existence of an autonomy-based right of privacy. The right was
extended to minors with respect to decisions on abortions4  and con-
traceptives. 4 2 Again, these decisions are protected, regardless of the
470. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 287, at 375.
471. See Wolff, Expanding the Right of Privacy, 27 Loy. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (1981); see also
Levy & Hectus, Privacy Revisited: The Downfall of Griswold, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 627, 630
(1978).
472. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
473. Eichbaum, supra note 287, at 374; accord Richards, The Individual, The Family and
the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1980).
474. 428 U.S. at 67-72.
475. Id. at 69.
476. 410 U.S. at 152-53; see also Note, supra note 435, at 1165, 1167. See generally L.
TRIBE, supra note 267, at 933.
477. 428 U.S. at 69 (quoting the dissent in Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1375 (1975)).
478. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right to procreative
autonomy extends to unmarried individuals); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to
abortion extends to unmarried women).
479. Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations on State Action After Danforth and
Carey, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1216, 1232 n.88 (1977).
480. 431 U.S. at 691-96 (plurality opinion).
481. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 887 (1979) (right of
privacy in having an abortion for mature, unmarried minors); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75
(abortion by minors).
482. 431 U.S. at 694 (plurality opinion) (contraceptives); see also Note, Parental Consent
Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV.
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form of association.483 The exercise of the right may not be unduly
encumbered by approval procedures,484 restricted to specified hospi-
tals,48 5 or constrained by means which may have a chilling effect on
it.4 86
The autonomy-based interpretations of the right of privacy show
the weakness of the plurality opinion in Moore,487 which failed to pro-
tect alternative living arrangements that did not conform to the
"traditional model of the white middle class nuclear family. '488
Among the poor, and among racial and ethnic minorities, living
arrangements differ considerably489 from the Moore plurality's appar-
ent concept of the family. If the right of privacy is a family-based
concept, racial and ethnic minorities who have nontraditional living
arrangements will be denied the right to choose forms of association
in which to express the values of intimate association. Indeed, the
import of the right of privacy is the freedom to choose in which form
to express oneself49 ° in the absence of a compelling state interest.
C. Conclusion: A Reconciliation
Prior to Griswold, the law governing the family and sexual rela-
tions was mainly dicta, scattered in Pierce,4 91 Meyer,492 Skinner,49 3
and Prince.494 When one views the right of privacy as an autonomy-
based concept, Griswold and its progeny embody the Millian princi-
1001 (1975); Note, Sexual Privacy: Access of a Minor to Contraceptives, Abortion, and
Sterilization Without Parental Consent, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 221 (1977). See generally
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Perry, The Abortion Finding
Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American Government, 66 GEO. L. J. 1191
(1978); Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations of State Action After Danforth and
Carey, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1216 (1977).
483. See supra note 459 and accompanying text.
484. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198 (1973).
485. Id. at 195.
486. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); see also Comment, Colautti v. Franklin:
The Court Questions the Use of "Viability" in Abortion Statutes, 6 W. ST. U.L. REV. 311
(1979).
487. See supra notes 388-91 and accompanying text.
488. Karst, supra note 413, at 686 (citing tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family
Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964) (part one); 16
STAN. L. REV. 900 (1964) (part two); 17 STAN. L. REV. 614, 682 (1965) (part three)).
489. See tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development and
Present Status, 17 STAN. L. REV. 614, 617-21 (1965); see also Karst, supra note 413, at 687
(different types of familial arangements are a reality because of the deficiencies of the
traditional family).
490. Karst, supra note 413, at 688.
491. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
492. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
493. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
494. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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ples of individual autonomy.495 On the other hand, the right of pri-
vacy in the familial context simply manifests the Court's continued
use of "marriage and kinship as the criteria for determining the rela-
tional and sexual interests protected by the Constitution. "'496
The familial and autonomy-based interpretations of the right of
privacy vividly reflect the tension between two conflicting societal val-
ues.497 The familial interpretation reflects communitarian values.
The autonomy-based interpretation reflects individualistic values.
The familial interpretation manifests the Court's concern with the
need to reinforce traditional social institutions, and to allow gradual
social reforms. New and untested social changes do not need to be
elevated to the same status as tried and tested social values which are
designed to serve legitimate social functions, such as child-rearing.
The familial interpretation of the right of privacy reflects an approach
to constitutional adjudication that is less flexible and sensitive to the
facts of each particular case. Although the absence of a formally real-
izable rule as to what is constitutionally protected makes prediction of
the outcome of cases difficult, the Court has consistently emphasized
the stability of the family unit, and social cohesion in its decisions
involving the right of privacy. For example, as Professor Grey has
argued, the abortion cases simply deal with family planning. 498 They
protect the stability of the family from the threats of transient sexual
intimacies, single parenthood, and abused and neglected children.499
Similarly, in cases dealing with child-rearing, the concern is for
the proper enculturation of the children, 5°° a function that the family
ably performs. As Justice Powell argued in Bellotti v. Baird,50 1 the
legal "restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the paren-
tal role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth
and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society mean-
ingful and rewarding."502 In cases dealing with abortions by minors,
however, "the minors are themselves potential parents."50 The deci-
495. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 84
(1980).
496. Hafen, supra note 361, at 533.
497. The tensions between the two competing values-family-based rights (protected
rights) and autonomy-based rights (the right to personal freedom) are also evident in other
areas of the law. See generally Olsen, supra note 180.
498. Grey, supra note 493, at 88.
499. The problems associated with the abuse of children have alarmed society. For a
discussion of some of the problems of child abuse, see Symposium on Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: The Current State of the Art, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 1-216 (1985).
500. Grey, supra note 495, at 88.
501. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
502. Id. at 638-39 (plurality opinion).
503. Id. at 642.
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sion to have an abortion is therefore different from other decisions
that a minor will normally make."°  The right of the minor to make
that decision conflicts with her parents' right to rear her. 5 The
Court's decisions in favor of the minor's right reiterates the funda-
mental nature of the decision whether or not to beget a child and form
a family. Unless the minor makes the decision, she might be forced to
have a child that she does not want. If she gives birth to the child, she
assumes a parental relationship with the child.50 6 The cases dealing
with the minor's abortion, therefore, are more supportive of the fam-
ily than they are of individual autonomy.
5 07
The Court's opinions are couched in terms of individualistic val-
ues which are the building blocks of the line of cases dealing with
informational tort." 8 Admittedly, an autonomy-based right is more
formally realizable and more likely to protect against "prohibitions on
nontraditional lifestyle choices which incur the obloquy of the major-
ity than a family-based right. ' '50 9 In addition, the Court's pronounce-
ments in terms of individual autonomy conform with the Kantian5 10
view of autonomy and equality underlying constitutional adjudica-
tions. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently emphasized tradition
and family stability as the values underlying its decisions about pro-
creation, abortion, and other associational rights. Yet, a dispropor-
tionately large number of commentators have found support in the
cases for sexual freedom as a fundamental right.51'
Recently, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,512 the Court reiter-
ated the existence of constitutional protection for "formation and
preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships" 513 from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. 14 The right protects those
kinds of "personal bonds [which] have played a critical role in the
culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting
504. See generally Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605.
505. Hafen, supra note 361, at 515.
506. Id.
507. See Grey, supra note 495, at 90.
508. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
509. Eichbaum, supra note 440, at 367.
510. I. KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 57-58 (T.
Abbot trans. 1838).
511. A survey of articles on the right of privacy published between 1965 and 1979 reveals
that 38 of 41 commentators agreed that the right of privacy protects consensual sexual
relations. Grey, supra note 495, at 98-100 (opinion of the staff of LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.).
512. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
513. Id. at 3250.
514. The opinion cited Pierce and Meyer as authority.
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shared ideals and beliefs."51 It is a recognition that individuals emo-
tionally enrich themselves from close relations with others. The pro-
tection offers individuals the choice to independently define their own
identity, an idea considered to be "central to the concept of lib-
erty." 6 Roberts, therefore, recognized not only the importance of
the family, but also that of the individual within society. The major-
ity opinion carefully balanced the needs of the individual in relation to
the needs of others in society. The personal relations that are consti-
tutionally protected by the right of privacy are those related to the
"creation and sustenance of a family-marriage."5 7 The attributes of
these relations are "relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in
decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation and seclusion from
others in critical aspects of the relationships."5' 8 Privacy is not a
blanket protection for the individual. There is a wide spectrum of
activities lacking these attributes that are, therefore, not protected.
Sexual promiscuity, and deviant sexual practices either lack the enu-
merated attributes or are not related to the creation and maintenance
of a family. Under this analysis, then, the Court's precedents show no
support for sexual freedom.1 9
The Court's decisions, however, afford protection for certain
types of personal relationships that are geared toward the formation
and maintenance of the family and its incidents. The issue, therefore,
is whether a relationship has the distinct attributes of "relative small-
ness," 520 selectivity, and exclusion of others from the "critical aspects
of the relationship"52' so as to constitute a family. The definition of
family need not depend upon the sexual practices of its members but
by the presence or absence of the attributes enumerated above. The
relationship must meet all of the essential attributes to qualify for pro-
tection. Even a heterosexual relationship that is promiscuous would
not qualify. Thus, the protection is for certain types of intimate rela-
tionships, and not for homosexuality or heterosexuality per se.
515. 104 S. Ct. at 3250 (emphasis added). The Court cited Zablocki, Moore, Yoder,
Griswold, Pierce, and Poe, among others, as authority.
516. Id. at 3250.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. See Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 670, 734-36 (1973); Note, 'Texas Statute Prohibiting Sodomy is Unconstitutionally
Overbroad in Proscribing Private, Consensual Acts of Married Couples, 49 TEX. L. REV. 400,
405 (1971).
520. 104 S. Ct. at 3250.
521. Id.
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The specific question of whether the constitutional right to pri-
vacy as developed in Griswold v. Connecticut522 and its progeny52 3
protects private consensual homosexual activity among adults is far
from settled. Indeed, there is a great deal of controversy over whether
the one Supreme Court case on the subject-a summary affirmance of
a three-member district court opinion in Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney524-has the precedential value needed to command respect
in the lower courts.5 2 Because of the somewhat dubious nature of
Supreme Court authority in this area, various lower federal courts
and state courts have reached sharply different conclusions on the
constitutionality of statutes that prohibit homosexual activity. More-
over, the lower courts' analyses, both for and against expanding the
right of privacy, have been diverse and unfocused.526
A. Right to Privacy Found
The first judicial appearance of the notion that the right to pri-
vacy protects consenting adult homosexual activity came in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney. In this case, a homosexual plaintiff asked
a federal court to issue an injunction to prevent enforcement of Vir-
ginia's sodomy statute. Because the case challenged the constitution-
ality of a state statute, a special three-judge district court panel
convened.527 In a split decision, the district court refused to issue the
injunction, finding that the sodomy statute did not violate the plain-
tiff's right to privacy.528 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court
522. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
523. See supra Part III.
524. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three judge panel).
525. This issue has been the focus of debate and confusion in the lower courts. For a
comprehensive discussion of the question, see Note, supra note 383, at 992.
526. Some courts have found similar, but more limited, privacy rights for homosexuals. See
Ben Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 966 (E.D. Wis. 1980) ("constitutional
privacy principles clearly protect one's sexual preferences in and of themselves from
government regulation" as distinguished from the unsettled question of whether homosexual
conduct is protected); see also Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1976) (court
blended concepts of fourth amendment privacy rights holding that: "The Federal constitution
protects ... the right of privacy in circumstances in which it may reasonably be expected.
Once a married couple admits strangers as onlookers, federal protection of privacy
dissolves.").
527. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
528. Id. at 1203.
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affirmed without a written opinion.5 29
By affirming the district court's decision, the Supreme Court
seemingly approved an opinion that gave a very narrow interpretation
to the right of privacy. The interpretation that the Court approved
found that the right to privacy protected only the marital relationship
and procreative choice. Judge Merhige strongly challenged this inter-
pretation at the district court level in a stinging dissent.5 3' The cen-
tral premise of Judge Merhige's dissent was that although Griswold
and its progeny did not specifically articulate a broad right to sexual
privacy, these opinions stood for "the principle that every individual
ha[d] a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
one's decisions on private matters of intimate concern. ' 531 One such
private decision, according to Judge Merhige, is "[a] mature individ-
ual's choice of an adult sexual partner, in the privacy of his or her
own home.... "532
The heart of Judge Merhige's argument was that while Griswold
developed the right to privacy within the specific context of a case
involving a marital relationship, later cases had diminished that dis-
tinction.533 As a consequence, Judge Merhige argued, the majority's
reliance on Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman5
34
was misguided. Judge Merhige specifically pointed to Eisenstadt v.
Baird.35 as primary support for the proposition that the right to pri-
vacy extends to all adult private consensual activity. 36  Roe v.
Wade,537 according to Judge Merhige, reaffirmed the expansive nature
529. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). The Supreme Court's entire
opinion read: "Affirmed on appeal from D.C.E.D. Va." Id.
530. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id. at 1204.
534. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Doe majority relied heavily on
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe, and specifically pointed to certain passages Justice Goldberg
adopted in his concurrence in Griswold to support the position that the privacy right developed
in this line of cases is limited to the marital relationship.
535. 405 U.S. 430 (1972).
536. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1204. Judge Merhige quoted the critical language from Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in Eisenstadt, where the Court refused to restrict the right of
privacy as it related to contraceptives for married couples. The quoted portion reads in full:
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child ....
405 U.S. at 453.
537. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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of the right to privacy when it extended that right to individual
women without regard to the family relationship. Judge Merhige
concluded: "Both Roe ... and Eisenstadt ... cogently demonstrate
that intimate personal decisions or private matters of substantial
importance to the well-being of the individuals involved are protected
by the Due Process Clause. The right to select consenting adult sexual
partners must be considered in the category. "538
In Judge Merhige's view, this right of privacy, though important,
was not without limits. First, the state could only regulate these pro-
tected activities after demonstrating a compelling state interest. 39
Second, this activity could only be sanctioned if the participants were
adults capable of consenting to the activity and who actually had con-
sented.5" Third, an additional limitation on this right was that it
could only be exercised in the privacy of one's own home.5 41
The elegance and power of Judge Merhige's reasoning soon
found its way into the opinions of courts who favored a broader right
to privacy. Initially, at least, these courts tended to be state interme-
diate appellate courts. State supreme courts, however, began over-
turning these decisions, generally refusing to give an expansive
reading to Griswold and its progeny.
In 1975, two divisions of Arizona's court of appeals found that
the right to sexual privacy between consenting adults was fundamen-
tal and that the state's sodomy statutes furthered no compelling state
interest. One division of the court found that the right to sexual pri-
vacy was limited to the marital relationship,542 while the other divi-
sion found that the right to sexual privacy among consenting adults is
wholly independent of a marital relationship. 43 After an extensive
review of Supreme Court precedents, the court found that the right of
sexual privacy is "deemed fundamental because it is basic to the con-
cept of the individual in our American culture and because it is a
538. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1204. Judge Merhige adheres to the view that the right of privacy
derives from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment or from "penumbras"
emanating from the Bill of Rights. For a discussion of these theories, see supra notes 201-07
and accompanying text.
539. Id. at 1204-05. See infra note 652 and accompanying text.
540. Id.
541. Id. It is unclear to what extent Judge Merhige accepts the reasoning of Lovisi, where
the court used a fourth amendment privacy analysis along with a Griswold right of privacy
analysis. See supra note 524. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Judge Merhige would extend
the right of privacy in sexual activity only to nonpublic areas. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1204-05.
The Court developed this concept of the home providing a greater protection from
governmental intrusion in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
542. State v. Bateman, 25 Ariz. App. 1, 540 P.2d 732 (1975), vacated, 547 P.2d 6 (1976).
543. State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 273, 542 P.2d 1147, 1150-51 (1975), rev'd sub
nom. State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976).
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necessary prerequisite to the effective enjoyment of all of our other
fundamental rights." 544 This division of the court went on to hold that
the right to sexual privacy was so basic that it could not rationally be
limited to the marital relationship. The precedential value of both of
these court of appeals cases is limited, however, because the Supreme
Court of Arizona later vacated both decisions on the basis that the
legislature could criminalize consensual sodomy under its traditional
power to regulate the health and morals of its citizens.545
In State v. Elliot,i46 a New Mexico appeals court struck down
that state's sodomy statute on the ground that it violated the right to
sexual privacy and unconstitutionally regulated the sexual affairs of
consenting adults within the privacy of their homes. The New Mex-
ico Court of Appeal found that the power to forbid sodomitic acts
between consenting adults was outside the scope of the state's police
power. The court stated that "the [c]onstitutional protection from
governmental interference with sexual relations of married couples
must extend also to unmarried consenting adults." '547 The court
added that the sodomy statute was unconstitutional because it "regu-
lates the sexual conduct of consenting adults in the home, where sex-
ual activity is centered in our society. In reaching into the home, the
statutes invade a constitutionally-protected zone of privacy-the pri-
vacy of the home." '548 The court concluded: "We have found nothing
in judicial opinions dealing with sodomy statutes which suggests that
a compelling necessity to regulate sexual conduct between consenting
adults overcomes this . . . violation of constitutionally-protected
rights."' 4 9 This finding was ultimately overturned, however, when
the Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed the court of appeals,
holding that the state's police power could reach into the home to
regulate private sexual activity.
5 0
In 1976, the Supreme Court of Iowa broke this trend, becoming
the first state high court to give Griswold and its progeny an expansive
reading. In State v. Pilcher,51 a man was convicted under Iowa's sod-
omy statute for having oral sex with a woman who was not his wife.
After reviewing cases on the right to privacy, the state supreme court
544. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. at 273, 542 P.2d at 1151.
545. State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (en banc) (state may criminalize
consensual sodomy by both married and unmarried couples), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 684 (1976).
546. 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1975), rev'd, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976).
547. Id. at 192, 539 P.2d at 212.
548. Id. at 194, 539 P.2d at 214.
549. Id.
550. Elliot v. State, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976).
551. 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976).
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concluded that the sodomy statute was unconstitutional as applied to
the defendant. The court stated that the statute was "unconstitu-
tional as an invasion of fundamental rights, such as the personal right
of privacy, to the extent it attempts to regulate, through use of crimi-
nal penalty, consensual sodomitical practices performed in private by
adult persons of the opposite sex.""' 2 Reading Griswold and Eisen-
stadt together, the Iowa court concluded that the right to privacy
attempts "to protect the manner of sexual relations performed in pri-
vate between consenting adults of the opposite sex not married to
each other." ' The Supreme Court of Iowa thus became the first
state supreme court to find that consensual adult sodomy is protected
constitutionally. However, the Pilcher court expressly left open the
question of whether adult consensual homosexual conduct is constitu-
tionally protected within the zone of privacy.55 4 Nevertheless, the
court's constitutional analysis would seem to be of equal force in cases
of homosexual sodomy.
Soon after the Pilcher decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
employed a right to privacy analysis to declare a statute regulating
sexual behavior unconstitutional. In State v. Saunder,"5 a man was
convicted under a fornication statute for having sexual relations with
two women in a deserted parking lot. New Jersey's high court
reversed the conviction and found the statute unconstitutional. The
court concluded:
[T]he conduct statutorily defined as fornication involved, by its
very nature, a fundamental personal choice. Thus, the statute,
infringes upon the right of privacy. Although persons may differ as
to the propriety and morality of such conduct... [the] decision [to
engage in such conduct] is necessarily encompassed in the concept
of personal autonomy which our Constitution seeks to
safeguard.
5 56
New Jersey thus joined Iowa in finding that the Constitution offers
some protection for sexual privacy.
In light of Pilcher and Saunder, the New York Court of Appeals
agreed to hear People v. Onofre.557 Along with Onofre, New York's
highest court decided two companion cases. In the first case, Ronald
Onofre was convicted of violating New York's statutes that criminal-
552. Id. at 359.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
556. Id. at 213-14, 381 A.2d at 339.
557. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
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ized consensual sodomy. Onofre had admitted to engaging in sexual
activity in his home with a 17 year old male."' In the second case,
two men were convicted of violating New York's sodomy statutes. At
trial, the jury determined that the two had engaged in an act of sod-
omy in a parked automobile on a city street.559 In the last case, Mary
Sweat was convicted under the sodomy statutes for engaging in oral
sex with a man in a truck parked on a residential street."6
The court of appeals consolidated the three cases because, in the
court's opinion, they presented the common question of whether New
York's sodomy statutes were constitutional in light of the Supreme
Court's cases articulating a right to privacy. 6 The court interpreted
the right to privacy as a "right of independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions, with a concomitant right to conduct
oneself in accordance with those decisions, undeterred by governmen-
tal restraint .. ."562 The court then held that because the sodomy
statutes were "broad enough to reach noncommercial, cloistered per-
sonal sexual conduct of consenting adults,"5 63 they violated the right
to privacy.
In Onofre, the state argued that the the right to privacy protected
only two areas of sexual affairs: marital intimacy and procreative
choice. 64 The court rejected this contention because it "fails... ade-
quately to take into account the decision in Stanley v. Georgia ... and
the explication of the right to privacy contained in ... Eisenstadt...
[and] the right enunciated in Griswold ... to make decisions with
respect to the consequences of sexual encounters ... 565
After further reviewing the Supreme Court cases, the court of
appeals commented:
In light of these decisions, protecting under the cloak of the right
of privacy individual decisions as to indulgence in acts of sexual
intimacy by unmarried persons ... no rational basis appears for
excluding from the same protection decisions-such as those made
by defendants before us-to seek gratification from what at least
once was commonly regarded as 'deviant' conduct, so long as the
decisions are voluntarily made by adults in a noncommercial, pri-
vate setting.
5 66
558. Id. at 484, 415 N.E.2d at 938, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
559. Id. at 484, 415 N.E.2d at 938, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
560. Id.
561. Id. at 486, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
562. Id. at 486, 415 N.E.2d at 938, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
563. Id.
564. Id. at 487, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
565. Id. at 488, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
566. Id. at 488, 415 N.E.2d at 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
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By equating sexual gratification with the right to privacy, New York's
Court of Appeals was the first state high court to find a constitutional
right to sexual privacy for homosexuals.
Shortly before Onofre, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
decided Commonwealth v. Bonadio.5 6' This case involved a challenge
to the constitutionality of two state sodomy statutes that prohibited
oral and anal intercourse between unmarried adults.568  The court
found these sodomy statutes to be unconstitutional under the equal
protection clauses of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitu-
tions, because the statutes discriminated against unmarried per-
sons.5 69 While this decision was not based on the right to privacy, the
court did note:
With respect to regulation of morals, the police power should
properly be exercised to protect each individual's right to be free
from interference in defining and pursuing his own morality ....
'No harm to the secular interests of the community is involved in
atypical sex practice in private between consenting adult partners.'
... Spiritual leadership, not the government, has the responsibility
for striving to improve the morality of individuals.57 °
Thus, Bonadio can properly be seen as within the trend of decisions
recognizing the right to sexual privacy. Moreover, the court's analysis
in Bonadio left little doubt that homosexuals were among those
unmarried individuals the Constitution protected.57
In 1982, after a long silence in the area, the federal courts again
dealt with the scope of the right of privacy as it relates to private adult
consensual homosexual activity. In Baker v. Wade,572 a homosexual
activist573 challenged the constitutionality of Texas's "Homosexual
Conduct" statute. 74 The district court initially held that the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance of Doe had not resolved the constitu-
567. 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
568. Id. at 95, 415 A.2d at 51.
569. Id. at 95, 415 A.2d at 49-50.
570. Id. at 96, 415 A.2d at 53 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 comment 276 at 278
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955)).
571. 490 Pa. at 99, 415 A.2d at 52.
572. 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985).
573. The court found that the plaintiff, Donald F. Baker, had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute even though he had never been arrested, or threatened with
arrest under the statute. Despite the apparent lack of injury, the court found that the statute
made Baker, who is active in various gay organizations, a "criminal" within the community.
Id. at 1128. The stigma of being labeled a criminal was enough of an injury to give Baker
standing. Id.
574. Section 21.06 provides: "A person commits an offense if he [or she] engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex."
Section 21.01 defines deviate sexual intercourse: " 'Deviate sexual intercourse' means any
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tional controversy over sodomy statutes.575 The district court was
free, therefore, to reach the merits of the case. In a comprehensive
and detailed opinion, the district court found that the statute was
unconstitutional because it violated homosexuals' right of privacy." 6
Despite the Fifth Circuit's reversal of this decision,5 77 the district
court's opinion stands as one of the best expressions of the argument
favoring a broad right to privacy.
In declaring the sodomy statute unconstitutional, the district
contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another
person."
Section 21.06 further provides that: "A violation of this statute is a 'Class C
misdemeanor,' punishable only by a fine not to exceed $200." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 21.01, 21.06 (Vernon 1974).
575. 553 F. Supp. at 1137.
576. Id. at 1137-38, 1140. The court held that because § 21.06 discriminated against
homosexuals in permitting only consenting heterosexual adults to commit the prohibited acts,
the statute would be unconstitutional unless the state could demonstrate a rational relation
between this prohibition and a legitimate state interest. Id. at 1143. The court added that the
statute was unconstitutional because at trial the state did not demonstrate any legitimate state
interest to support the statute. Id. at 1144. See Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434
N.Y.S. 947. Although the court did not reach the issue, it did state that homosexuals would
not qualify as a "suspect class" so as to trigger the "compelling state interest" standard of
review. 553 F. Supp. at 1144 n.58. The court chose not to discuss the possible application of
"the emerging intermediate level of review" which has been utilized in certain gender and
illegitimacy cases. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982).
577. 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc). The Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court after some unusual procedural and political maneuvers.
Approximately one month after the district court rendered its judgment, Danny Hill, the
district attorney for Potter County, Texas, filed a notice of appeal. District Attorney Hill was
a member of the class of defendants in the suit, but was neither a named defendant nor a class
representative. Soon afterward, the Attorney General of the State of Texas filed a notice of
appeal on behalf of the State of Texas. 769 F.2d 289, 294 (Rubin, J., dissenting). The
Attorney General then withdrew his notice of appeal. In response, District Attorney Hill
made an unsuccessful attempt to have the Supreme Court of Texas compel the Attorney
General by writ of mandamus to continue his appeal. Id. District Attorney Hill then filed
both a motion to set aside the judgment and to reopen the evidence and a motion to intervene
and to substitute class representatives. An organization called Dallas Doctors Against AIDS
also sought to intervene. Id. at 239. A motions panel denied all the motions except District
Attorney Hill's motion to intervene on appeal which was granted. Id. Another Fifth Circuit
panel then reversed the finding of the motions panel on the grounds that as class member in an
action where the representative was the government, District Attorney Hill had no right to
challenge the decisions of the class representative because the interest at stake was not personal
in nature, but was instead a sovereign interest. Id. at 236, 244. On grant of rehearing en banc,
the Fifth Circuit reversed the panel's decision as to the motion to intervene. The court went on
to reverse the decision of the district court, and held that the statute was constitutional based
on the precedential value of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). The
court also disagreed with the district court's equal protection analysis of the statute. The Fifth
Circuit held that § 21.06 did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because morality, a legitimate state interest, was not totally unrelated to the
statute and the regulation of homosexual conduct. Id.
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court found that the right to privacy protected private consensual
homosexual activity among adults. It was the court's view that Gris-
wold and its progeny recognized a right of privacy that extended
beyond the specific settings presented in those cases such that its
"outer limits" had not yet been established. 7 8 Therefore, the court
concluded, the fact that the right of privacy has developed on almost
a case-by-case basis evinced the notion that there were other unspeci-
fied fundamental personal liberties protected by the right of privacy.
The district court stated further that the Supreme Court's refusal,
despite several opportunities, to directly confront the issue, was fur-
ther proof that the limits of the rights of privacy had not yet been
defined.579
The heart of the district court's argument was that, because the
right of privacy had already been found to protect marital privacy 580
and procreative choice,58 it would be broad enough to include "[t]he
right of two individuals to choose what type of sexual conduct they
will enjoy in private. ' 582 That is, decisions concerning "a person's
sexual needs or desires are "in a field that by definition concerns the
most intimate of human activities and relationships"583 and hence,
should be "free from undue interference by the state .... ,,584 Further-
more, the court argued that Eisenstadt made clear that personal pri-
578. 553 F. Supp. at 1135.
579. The three cases cited by the court were Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.
Supp. 1199, af'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1971); Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex.
1970), remanded, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); People v. Onofre, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936,
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). Buchanan involved a challenge to the previous Texas
sodomy statute, which prohibited all oral and anal sex by homosexuals and heterosexuals. The
plaintiffs included a homosexual male seeking an injunction against two pending prosecutions
for public offenses. Among the intervenors seeking declaratory relief was a homosexual male.
A three-member district court panel found the act unconstitutional on its face as overbroad.
308 F. Supp. at 736. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States remanded on the
basis of the Younger doctrine. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Judge Buchmeyer
argued that no Younger abstention problem was presented in the case of the homosexual
because no prior state action was pending. 553 F. Supp. at 1136.
Judge Buchmeyer pointed out that although the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari has
no precedential value, it nevertheless demonstrates the openness of the question. Id. at 1139.
Similarly, Judge Buchmeyer found that the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Doe did
not control the instant case. Id. at 1136-38.
580. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
581. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
582. 553 F. Supp. at 1140.
583. Id. (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1978)).
584. 553 F. Supp. 1140. The court seemed quite impressed with the plaintiff's testimony.
The plaintiff stated that his decision regarding sexual orientation came only after much
suffering and difficulty. The court stated that "it is evident that Baker's resulting decisions
concerning his sexual needs and desires are of the most personal, intimate and important
concern...." Id. at 1140 n.52.
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vacy rights were not limited to the marital relationship. 5
The court also found additional support for its holding in Stanley
v. Georgia.586 The court reasoned that it would be an unreasonable
distinction to differentiate between the right to seek sexual gratifica-
tion by viewing obscene materials, as accorded in Stanley, and the
right to seek sexual gratification with a consenting adult partner in
private as was sought in Baker.587 The court also noted that the fact
that Stanley and Eisenstadt would surely permit a person to possess
and enjoy, in private, pornographic materials depicting homosexual
conduct best illustrated this idea.
5 88
Hardwick v. Bowers is the most recent case where a federal court
found that the right of privacy protects homosexual conduct.58 9 This
case involved a challenge to Georgia's criminal sodomy statute.59°
Hardwick was arrested in 1982 after he was observed engaging in
homosexual activity in his home. 91 Following a hearing before the
Municipal Court of Atlanta, the local district attorney's office decided
not to pursue the case.5 92 Nevertheless, Hardwick filed a complaint in
the federal district court asking for declaratory relief.5 93 Hardwick
alleged that Georgia's sodomy statute was unconstitutional as applied
to him because it violated his right to privacy. The district court dis-
missed the claim, stating that the Supreme Court's summary affirm-
585. Id.; see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
586. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). For a full discussion of this case, see supra notes 220-23 and
accompanying text.
587. 553 F. Supp. at 1141.
588. Id.
589. 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
590. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1982) reads as follows:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another. A person commits the offense of aggravated sodomy when he commits
sodomy with force against the will of the other person.
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. A person convicted
of the offense of aggravated sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for life or
by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.
Id.
591. 760 F.2d 1202. Hardwick was joined in the suit by a married couple, using the
pseudonyms John and Mary Doe, who claimed that the existence and enforcement of the
statute chilled and deterred their desire to engage in sexual activity. The district court found
that the Does lacked proper standing to maintain the action. The court of appeals affirmed
this decision. Id. at 1206.
592. Id. at 1204.
593. Hardwick v. Bowers, No. C83-273A, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 1983). The Does
were found at the district court level, and again in the court of appeals, to lack proper standing
to maintain the action because they had failed to demonstrate a "realistic" threat of harm from
the statute. 760 F.2d at 1206 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 342 (1985).
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ance of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney was controlling precedent.594
In a split decision, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the district court's finding. The court of appeals held that
the district court erred in relying on Doe as controlling precedent.59 '
The court, however, did not end its analysis there; it went on to hold
that Georgia's sodomy statute infringed upon Hardwick's constitu-
tionally protected right of sexual privacy.5 96 The Eleventh Circuit
then remanded the case to the district court shifting the burden to the
state to demonstrate a compelling interest that would justify its inva-
sion of Hardwick's privacy. 597 Before the district court could take
evidence on this matter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the court of appeals' decision. 98
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion provides an interesting analysis of
the issues. The court found that the right of privacy was a constitu-
tional safeguard that "prevents the states from unduly interfering in
certain individual decisions critical to personal autonomy . . .,599
The court stated that while it was willing to extend the right of pri-
vacy beyond the specific factual circumstances of the Griswold line of
cases, it was unwilling to expand this right outside the natural path of
its historical development. 6°°
The court of appeals stated that the right of privacy protected
Hardwick's conduct on two primary grounds. First, the court found
that Hardwick's conduct and lifestyle was similar to that found in a
594. 760 F.2d at 1206.
595. Id. at 1214.
596. Id. at 1211.
597. Id. at 1210.
598. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 342 (1985).
599. 760 F.2d at 1211. The court analyzed the factual circumstances of the Supreme Court
cases both before and after Griswold. The court concluded that the right developed around
broad factual contexts such as the right to choose whether or not to conceive a child. City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). The privacy right also emanates from the right to make decisions affecting
intimate relationships such as marriage, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), or about the
makeup of the family unit, Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
The court also clarified an often confused issue, stating that the term "right to privacy" is
somewhat of a misnomer because the right is not limited to "non-public" decisions but rather
encompassed certain private "personal" decisions. 760 F.2d at 1211.
600. The court relied on language in Griswold and Zablocki to support the proposition that
these interests were separate and therefore entitled to their own protection. Id. at 1212.
Similarly, the court also looked to Eisenstadt to demonstrate that these rights were not
intended to be limited to married couples. Id.
The court stated that "the marital relationship is . .. significant because of the
unsurpassed opportunity for mutual support and self-expression that it provides." Id. at
1211-12.
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marital relationship"' and it should, for that reason, be protected. 6 2
It was the court's opinion that the right of privacy was not limited to
the procreational aspects of marriage, but rather that it extended far
enough to protect the "association of interests" found in marriage and
in intimate relationships like marriage."
The second ground the court found for protecting Hardwick's
conduct was that Hardwick's activities took place in the home.'
The court stated that "the constitutional protection of privacy reaches
its height when the state attempts to regulate an activity in the
home."'" The court added that "the fact that the activity is carried
out in seclusion bolsters its significance."'  In short, the court con-
cluded that
the Supreme Court's analysis of the right to privacy in Griswold
..., Eisenstadt.. ., and Stanley .... leads to ... [the conclusion]
that the Georgia sodomy statute implicates a fundamental right of
Michael Hardwick. The activity he hopes to engage in is quintes-
sentially private and lies at the heart of an intimate association
beyond the proper reach of state regulation.
607
B. No Right to Privacy Found
As previously stated, the first case to specifically address the
question of whether there was a right of privacy for private adult con-
sensual homosexual conduct was Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.6°8
The Doe court viewed the right of privacy as a narrow and limited
guarantee whose "outer limits" the Supreme Court had already devel-
oped. The Doe majority looked to Griswold and to Justice Harlan's
dissent in Poe v. Ullman60 9 to examine the purposes and limits of the
right of privacy. The court concluded from its review of the Supreme
Court's cases that the right to privacy was built on the "sanctity of the
home and family. ' 6'0 This notion, along with the specific references
to Justice Harlan's Poe dissent,6 ' moved the court to conclude that
601. The court stated that "for some, the sexual activity in question here serves the same
purpose as the intimacy of marriage." Id. at 1212.
602. Id.
603. Id.
604. Id. at 1211.
605. Id. at 1212.
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (1975).
609. 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion
took on added significance when Justice Goldberg adopted a portion of its text in his
concurrence in Griswold. 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
610. 403 F. Supp at 1201-02.
611. The court relied not only on that part of Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman as
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the right to privacy did not prohibit the state from exercising its sov-
ereign power to regulate certain types of sexual conduct.6 12
The Doe majority did not go beyond Griswold itself to explain or
discuss the right of privacy. Nowhere in the opinion is there any
mention of the cases following Griswold that arguably broadened the
right of privacy, such as Eisenstadt and Loving v. Virginia.6"' Perhaps
even more significant was the court's failure to even mention Roe v.
Wade,61 '4 decided only two years earlier.
The Doe court, having found no fundamental right of privacy in
private consensual adult homosexual activity, applied a rational rela-
tion test to Virginia's sodomy statute. 61 5 Not surprisingly, the court
found that the statute easily passed this test. The court ultimately
held that the state had met its burden of proving that it had a legiti-
mate interest in regulating this activity6 6 and that, although the law
was "questionable," its basis was well-supported from both a histori-
cal and precedential perspective.61 7
Following Doe, state courts adopted similarly wooden reasoning
in refusing to expand the right of privacy.61 I A thoughtful opinion as
to why the right of privacy should be narrowly construed was not
forthcoming until Judge Gabrielli's biting dissent in Onofre.6 19 Judge
Gabrielli attacked the majority's "amorphous concept of personal
autonomy ' 62 ° and its interpretation of Griswold and its progeny.
According to his dissent in Onofre, "the right of sexual choice estab-
lished... [by the Onofre majority] is really a wholly new legal con-
cept bearing little resemblance to the familiar principles enunciated in
Griswold... and its progeny. "621
Judge Gabrielli's interpretation of the right to privacy cases was
was adopted by Justice Goldberg in his Griswold concurrence, but also noted some additional
language for support. Id. at 1201-02 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546, 552-53 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
612. Id. at 1201.
613. 388 U.S. 1 (1973).
614. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
615. 403 F. Supp. at 1202. The court stated that: "It is enough for upholding the
legislation that the conduct is likely to end in a contribution to moral delinquency. Plainly, it




618. See, e.g., State v. Poe, 40 N.C. App. 385, 252 S.E.2d 843, cert. denied, 218 N.C. 303,
259 S.E.2d 304 (1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 947 (1980); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.
I. 1980); State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976).
619. 51 N.Y.2d 495, 415 N.E.2d 944, 434 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1980) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
620. Id. at 496, 415 N.E.2d at 944, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
621. Id. at 496, 415 N.E.2d at 945-46, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 954-55.
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much narrower than the majority's interpretation. In his view, the
Supreme Court had extended the right of privacy only to decisions
relating to the family, marital intimacy, and procreation.622 He
rejected the majority's contention that Eisenstadt provided a general
right of privacy to seek sexual gratification. According to Judge
Gabrielli, Eisenstadt stood for the narrow proposition that the funda-
mental right of an individual to decide whether to bear or beget a
child could not be limited to married adults.623
Perhaps the biggest difference between the majority's views in
Onofre and those of Judge Gabrielli involved the role of the court in
making decisions affecting individual rights. Judge Gabrielli feared
that the majority's open-ended concept of fundamental rights could
be a vehicle for law-making by "judicial fiat. ' ' 624 Because the majority
did not articulate an analytical framework with which to resolve
future cases under its "amorphous concept of personal autonomy,"
Judge Gabrielli feared that the majority's opinion could "bring the
law of substantive due process full circle" and usher back Lochner-
type judicial decisionmaking.625
Judge Bork shared Judge Gabrielli's concern over the return of
Lochnerism in Dronenburg v. Zech.626 This case involved a United
States Navy enlisted man's challenge to his discharge for homosexual
conduct.627 After the discharge was recommended at an administra-
tive hearing and approved by the Secretary of the Navy, James
Dronenburg filed suit in federal district court claiming that the
Navy's policy of mandatory discharge for homosexual conduct 628 vio-
622. Id. at 500-01, 415 N.E.2d at 947, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 957-58.
623. Id., 415 N.E.2d at 947, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
624. Id. at 503, 415 N.E.2d at 948, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
625. Id. at 503, 415 N.E.2d at 948-49, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 957-59.
626. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
627. Id. Prior to his discharge, James L. Dronenburg had served in the Navy for nine years
as a linguist and cryptographer. Id. Dronenburg was discharged pursuant to SEC/NAV
Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20, 1978), Joint Appendix at 216. That instruction provides:
Any member [of the Navy] who solicits, attempts or engages in homosexual
acts shall normally be separated from the naval service. The presence of such a
member in a military environment seriously impairs combat readiness, efficiency,
security and morale.
Id.
628. The Navy's policy does not precisely call for mandatory discharge for homosexual
conduct, providing instead that:
A member who has solicited, attempted or engaged in a homosexual act on a
single occasion and who does not profess or demonstrate proclivity to repeat
such an act may be considered for retention in the light of all relevant
circumstances. Retention is to be permitted only if the aforesaid conduct is not
likely to present any adverse impact either upon the member's continued
performance of military duties or upon the readiness, efficiency, or morale of the
[Vol. 40:521
LOWER COURT OPINIONS
lated his constitutional right to privacy. 62 9 The district court upheld
the constitutionality of the policy, granting the Navy a summary
judgment. Based on the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney as controlling, 630 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision.
After reaching this decision, Judge Bork, writing for the court,
began an extraordinary and comprehensive discussion in dicta on
whether homosexual conduct is entitled to the protective cloak of the
constitutional right of privacy.631 This discussion of the relevant case
law is perhaps the best existing statement of the view that homosexual
conduct does not merit fundamental right protection.
Judge Bork first examined each of the seminal "right to privacy"
cases individually, to determine if they explicitly extended the right to
privacy to protect homosexual conduct. Judge Bork stated that while
the right to privacy was developed in Griswold,63 2 that decision gave
no indication of what activities were protected beyond those within
the marital context.633 Similarly, the court argued that Loving v. Vir-
ginia,611 where the Court struck down Virginia's anti-miscegenation
statute, provided no guidance as to the rights of homosexuals, because
Loving was also based on the concept of "the right to marry. 635
Supporters of homosexual rights have interpreted Eisenstadt v.
Baird636 as providing the critical link between the right to privacy
within a marital context and the right within an individual rights set-
ting.637 Judge Bork refused to afford the opinion this significance,
stating instead that Eisenstadt itself did not provide guidance as to
what activities the right of privacy should protect and in what con-
texts. Judge Bork then examined the often-quoted phrase from
Eisenstadt: "If the right of privacy means anything it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
unit to which the member is assigned either at the time of the conduct or at the




631. Id. at 1389-93.
632. Id. at 1391.
633. Id. at 1392.
634. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
635. 741 F.2d at 1393. The court further noted about Loving that: "It is not entirely clear
whether the due process analysis broke new ground." Id.
636. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
637. For a full discussion, see supra notes 344-52 and accompanying text.
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the decision whether to bear or beget children."6 a Judge Bork noted
that the Court's failure to define what rights are "so fundamental" or
what types of intrusions are "unwarranted" has created a situation
that would necessarily involve courts in judicial legislating.
639
The court similarly reasoned that the Court in Roe v. Wade6 40
gave so little guidance as to the right of privacy's parameters that it is
of almost no use in principled judicial decisionmaking. After examin-
ing and quoting critical portions of Roe v. Wade, Judge Bork con-
cluded that aside from affirming that the right of privacy has certain
limits, Roe v. Wade "provided no explanatory principle that informs a
lower court how to reason about what is and what is not encompassed
by the right of privacy. ' ' 6 '
Finally, Judge Bork stated that Carey v. Population Services
International, 6 2 another case involving the right to access of contra-
ceptives, did little to extend the right of privacy or provide guidance
as to how the privacy right relates to homosexuals. Judge Bork rea-
soned that the holding in Carey merely reaffirmed the notion embod-
ied in the prior cases that the "right of access to contraceptives" was
''essential to exercise the constitutionally protected right of decision
in matters affecting childbearing ....
Judge Bork concluded that neither these cases, nor any general
principle so far articulated, 6" provided the court with support to find
that the right of privacy protects private adult consensual homosexual
conduct. The court further noted that such a holding would be an
extension or creation of a constitutional right; something it, as a lower
federal court, was unable and unwilling to do. If this were to occur,
Judge Bork reasoned, many cases would evade Supreme Court review
and "a great body of judge-made law would grow up" preempting the
authority of another branch of government without proper constitu-
tional authority.6 15 Judge Bork summed up the court's reasoning
638. 405 U.S. at 453.
639. 741 F.2d at 1393-94.
640. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
641. 741 F.2d at 1395.
642. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
643. 741 F.2d at 1395 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89
(1976)).
644. After examining the case law, the court discussed the question of whether a more
general principle would provide any guidance. The court found that the language
"fundamental rights" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," was "not particularly
helpful to us . . . because they are less prescriptions of a mode of reasoning than they are
conclusions about particular rights enunciated." Id. at 1396.
645. Judge Bork stated in a footnote that he believes that no court, even the Supreme Court,
may create constitutional rights. However, as a circuit judge he must apply those rules laid
down by the Supreme Court. He stated further that:
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quite cogently: "[W]e can find no constitutional right to engage in
homosexual conduct and..., as judges, we have no warrant to create
one.,,646
C. Conclusion
This discussion of federal and state court decisions that have con-
fronted the question of whether the right to privacy extends to protect
private, adult consensual homosexual conduct clearly demonstrates
the divergence of views on the subject. It is to be expected that the
extension of a doctrine, particularly one involving constitutional
rights, would generate such differences. Thus, the judges' analyses
contained in these decisions can best be utilized as a tool to under-
stand the current debate about the right to privacy and to determine
what the limits of the right should be. The ideas expressed in these
opinions should also be helpful to develop an understanding of the
right, not only in the context of homosexual activity, but as applied to
other activities as well.
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A. The Constitutional Test
As the right to privacy emerged from the Griswold v. Connecticut
line of cases, this right came into conflict with state interests. It thus
became necessary for the Court to develop a standard of review that
The Supreme Court has decided that it may create new constitutional rights and,
as judges of constitutionally inferior courts, we are bound absolutely by that
determination. The only questions open for us are whether the Supreme Court
has created a right which, fairly defined, covers the case before us or whether the
Supreme Court has specified a mode of analysis, a methodology, which, honestly
applied, reaches the case we must now decide.
Id. at 1396 n.5.
646. Id. at 1395.
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would apply whenever an individual claimed that a state law violated
a fundamental freedom. The Court struggled to settle upon such a
standard in Griswold.6 47 In Roe, the Court applied a strict scrutiny
level of judicial review which it borrowed from equal protection anal-
ysis. 648 The Supreme Court has continued to adhere to this standard
in cases where state laws have conflicted with privacy rights protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 649
After examining prior lower court abortion decisions, the Court
in Roe first concluded that "the right of personal privacy is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state interests
in regulation. ' 65 ° The Court then observed that "most . . . courts
have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough
to cover the abortion decision ... and that at some point state inter-
ests of health protection, medical standards, and prenatal life, become
dominant. We agree with this approach."' 651 The Court next made
647. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Justices appeared to disagree on the proper test
to apply to protect the right to privacy, as much as they disagreed on the theory explaining the
source of the right. Justice Douglas, in a rather summary fashion, deplored the statute's
"maximum destructive impact" on the marriage relationship as well as its undue breadth. Id.
at 483. Justice Goldberg enunciated the requirement that the law serve any " 'subordinating
[state] interest which is compelling' or that is 'necessary . . . to the accomplishment of a
permissible state policy'." Id. at 497-98 (citing two equal protection cases, McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) and Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)). While
questioning the rationality of the justification for the state concern-the discouraging of extra-
marital relationships-he struck down the statute on the ground that it was essentially
unnecessarily broad and indiscriminately tailored. Id. at 497-98. Justice White's concurrence
began by requiring a "strict scrutiny" approach which "must be viewed in the light of the less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." He then stated that the Connecticut
statute would not be invalid under the due process clause "if reasonably necessary for the
effectuation of a legitimate and substantial state interest, and not arbitrary or capricious in
application." Id. at 503-04.
648. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1972).
649. The Court has quoted and applied Roe's "compelling interest/narrowness" test in
privacy cases: Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1976) (striking limitations
on sale and advertisement of contraceptives); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
60-61 (1975) (examining various state abortion regulations passed in the wake of Roe).
In some fundamental rights cases not dealing with privacy, the Court has repeated Roe's
"important state interests" language, but has gone on to overturn statutes that failed the lesser
standard of rationality. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1976)
(reversing conviction for violation of ordinance limiting the extent of family relations that may
dwell together); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 641-43 (1973) (examining
rules regulating maternity leave and return).
The Court has used an identical analysis where fundamental rights issues have been raised
along with equal protection issues. In Zablocki v. Redhail, for example, the Court held that
"[w]hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently compelling state interests and is
closely tailored to effectuate only those interests." 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (citing Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1976)).
650. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
651. Id. at 155.
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the oft-quoted statement that "[w]here certain 'fundamental rights'
are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights
may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' . . . and that
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake. ' 652 Every state and federal court
that has recognized a fundamental right to privacy in adult sexual
relations outside marriage has used this standard to evaluate the chal-
lenged statute.653  The only exception would be where a court has
652. Id. (citations omitted).
653. Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960, 967 (E.D. Va. 1985), vacated, No. 85-1326 (4th Cir.
1986) (available Feb. 17, 1986, on WESTLAW, Allfeds database); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp.
1121, 1141 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Doe, 12
Crim. L. Rep. 2531, 2533 (BNA) (Mar. 28, 1973); State v. Bateman, 25 Ariz. App. 1, 540
P.2d 732 (1975), rev'd, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359
(Iowa 1976); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 217, 381 A.2d 333, 341 (1977).
Courts do not always use the fundamental right/compelling interest/narrowness rubric.
In at least two cases, state supreme courts have either upheld or invalidated sodomy statutes
without considering the compelling state interest/narrowly tailored analysis. In
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, before even raising the issue of a fundamental right to privacy, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the statute in question, which forbade "sexual
intercourse per os or per anus between human beings who are not husband and wife, and any
form of sexual intercourse with an animal," was an invalid exercise of the state's police power.
415 A.2d 47, 49 n.1 (Pa. 1980). The court found that "[t]he Voluntary Deviate Sexual
Intercourse Statute has only one possible purpose: to regulate the private conduct of
consenting adults." This, according to the court, was beyond the police power of the state. Id.
at 50. When dealing with morality, the state may validly exercise the police power to protect
individuals' rights to follow their own moral codes, not to enforce external codes on
individuals. "Spiritual leadership, not the government, has the responsibility for striving to
improve the morality of individuals." Id.
The Supreme Court of Arizona reached a contrary result in State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz.
107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976). An intermediate court had held that the challenged statute violated
the right to privacy, and that no compelling state interest would justify the statute. State v.
Bateman, 25 Ariz. App. 1, 540 P.2d 732 (1975). The supreme court employed an analysis that
bypassed the issues of fundamental rights and compelling state interests. The court first
observed that "[t]he State may ... regulate.., sexual conduct in its rightful concern for the
moral welfare of its people .... The right of privacy is not unqualified and absolute and must
be considered in the light of important state interests." 113 Ariz. at 111, 547 P.2d at 10 (citing
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). Then, after stating that the Supreme Court had never
discussed the issue, Doe v. Commonwealth was summarily affirmed 19 days after the court
decided Bateman. The court went on to hold that "sexual activity between two consenting
adults in private is not a matter of concern for the State except insofar as the legislature has
acted to properly regulate the moral welfare of its people, and has specifically prohibited
sodomy and other specified lewd and lascivious acts." Id. at 111, 547 P.2d at 10. The court
was apparently willing to let the legislature determine the "importance" of its own interests.
The court appeared to draw support from Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, and from
the fact that neither Griswold nor Eisenstadt decided that the state could not regulate sexual
misconduct. Id. at 110, 547 P.2d at 9-10. The holding is baffling, however, because, as the
dissent succinctly points out, even though the Court appeared to acknowledge the protection
of the right to privacy "within the context of the intimate sexual relations between consenting
adults in private, whether single or married," it nonetheless allowed the state to "separate
certain of these relations it finds distasteful, label them as misconduct," and subject the
participants to felony charges. Id. at 112, 547 P.2d at 11. The oddity of the holding may be
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invalidated a statute under a minimal rationality test.654
States generally assert two broad categories of interests in sup-
port of sodomy statutes-morality and health.6 5  This section will
examine each of these values and discuss their treatment by state and
federal courts under the strict scrutiny standard.
B. Morality
1. BACKGROUND
Dean Rostow once remarked, "Men often say that one cannot
legislate morality. I should say that we legislate hardly anything
else."'656 Undoubtedly, most criminal laws enforce morality because
serious crimes which criminal laws seek to punish or prevent also con-
stitute moral wrongs. It is equally clear, however, that criminal laws
cannot enforce morality in its entirety. Bad thoughts, verbal cruelty,
or lying in private relationships, for example, which everyone would
agree constitute morally reprehensible conduct, hardly seem appro-
priate subjects for criminal sanctions.
In his essay On Liberty, John Stuart Mill took the position that:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not
a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
attributable to two factors. First, the court's reliance on Justice Harlan's dissent may be
misplaced because Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold did not follow Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe, as the Supreme Court of Arizona apparently thought. Id. at 110, 547
P.2d at 9. Second, had the Arizona court properly articulated and applied the compelling state
interest/narrowness test, it might well have invalidated the statute because it was not narrowly
drawn.
654. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
The requirement that a statute bear a rational relation to a legitimate state objective is a
less demanding test than the compelling state interest requirement. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 172-73 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). When states seek to support statutes such as
fornication or sodomy laws, which were presumably enacted to further morality, on more
generally acceptable bases such as "family values," courts may invalidate those statutes
because they are not rationally related to those proffered bases. This is the thrust of the court's
opinion in Onofre. Likewise, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Saunders, applied
both "compelling interest" and "rational relation" tests while examining that state's
fornication statute: "We fail to comprehend how the state's interest in preventing the
propagation of illegitimate children will be measurably advanced." 75 N.J. at 217-18, 381
A.2d at 341 (1977).
655. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 34-39, Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 85-140 (U.S. filed Dec.
19, 1985). For a compilation of state legislative histories that evidence the concerns of
legislators in prohibiting sodomy, see Appendix, at 639-57, attached to this Survey.
656. Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174, 197.
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make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so
would be wise, or even right.657
Mill's attempt to limit the enforcement of morality to the preven-
tion of "harm to others" runs into definitional difficulties inherent in
the concept of "harm." His view was reflected, however, in the
Model Penal Code's proposal in 1955 to exclude from criminal prose-
cution "all sexual practices not involving force, adult corruption of
minors, or public offense ....
In 1957, the British Wolfenden Committee on Homosexual
Offenses and Prostitution released a report adopting the Millian view
that it is not the law's business to regulate private morality unless
society is to equate crime with sin.6 9 Two years later, the noted Eng-
lish jurist Lord Devlin, in his now famous Maccabaean lecture "The
Enforcement of Morals," 660 argued that society should impose on all
of its members the moral views of the majority. He tendered two
principal grounds in support of his view, the first being that "a recog-
nized morality is as necessary to society as, say, a recognized govern-
ment."' 66' Lord Devlin maintained that "[a]ny immorality is capable
of affecting society injuriously. ' 662 He further noted that "the sup-
pression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of
subversive activities. '66 ' The purpose in either case is the preserva-
tion of an organized society. His second reason for societal enforce-
ment of morality is that in a democracy, a majority of the members
has the right to set the moral stage for the entire community.66 Lord
Devlin illustrated the application of this second argument to the prac-
tice of homosexuality as follows:
We should ask ourselves in the first instance whether, looking at it
657. J. MILL, supra note 281, at 9.
658. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 commentary at 277 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The
Model Penal Code, as adopted in 1962, does not punish "deviate sexual intercourse" among
consenting adults, "given the absence of harm to the secular interests of the community." Id.
659. "Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting through the agency of the
law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, there must remain a realm of private
morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business." See
WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 282, at 24.
660. LORD DEVLIN, Morals in the Criminal Law, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS
(1965).
661. Id. at 11.
662. Id. at 15.
663. Id. at 13-14.
664. Id. at 86-101. Professor Dworkin suggested that the second argument, as developed in
disjointed forms through chapters V, VI, and VII of Lord Devlin's The Enforcement of Morals,
supported the community's moral responsibility to act on "its own lights-that is, on the
moral faith of [the majority of] its members" in protecting its "central and valued social
institutions." Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986, 993-94
(1966).
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calmly and dispassionately, we regard it as a vice so abominable
that its mere presence is an offense. If that is the genuine feeling of
the society in which we live, I do not see how society can be denied
the right to eradicate it.
665
Lord Devlin's views have been attacked on both grounds. As to
his first argument, Professor H.L.A. Hart pointed out that "no evi-
dence is produced to show that deviation from accepted sexual moral-
ity, even by adults in private, is something which, like treason,
threatens the existence of society. ' 666 Even assuming such a threat
existed, Professor Dworkin has pointed out the difficulty of determin-
ing just when a danger is of sufficient magnitude to justify its
eradication.667
At least three lines of attack have been directed at Lord Devlin's
second argument. Professor Hart, although agreeing that political
power is better entrusted to the majority than to a selected class, nev-
ertheless took issue with the view that the majority's views on moral-
ity should always be imposed upon the entire society. He raised the
argument that even in a democracy, the "high-minded politician"
must adhere to "the theory that his duty is to do what he thinks is
right," and not to defer to community judgments on moral
questions.6 68
665. LORD DEVLIN, supra note 660, at 17. Courts appear to embrace Lord Devlin's
emphasis on the protection of society as a whole, as opposed to the protection of individual
members of the society, whenever they decide to apply the "rational relation" test in the
absence of a fundamental constitutional guarantee. In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, a
majority of the three-judge panel in the lower court, after excluding homosexuality from the
realm of protection afforded by the right of privacy, was willing to find that the state interests
of promoting morality and decency and of preventing moral delinquency rationally supported
the Virginia sodomy statute. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), af'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
The court deferred to the legislature's finding that such proscribed conduct is likely to
contribute to moral delinquency and relieved the state from the burden of having to prove that
such conduct actually encourages moral delinquency. Id. at 1202.
666. H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 50 (1963). Professor Hart contended that
Lord Devlin based his first argument on the incorrect assumption that "all morality ... forms
a single seamless web, so that those who deviate from the part are likely or perhaps bound to
deviate from the whole." Id. at 50-51. Even if this assumption were to hold true, Professor
Hart pointed out that "there [was] again no evidence to support, and much to refute, the
theory that those who deviate from conventional sexual morality are in other ways hostile to
society." Id. at 51.
667. Dworkin noted that the danger may be "so small that it would be wise policy, a
prudent protection of individual liberty from transient hysteria, to raise [a] constitutional
barrier" which placed private sexual practices beyond the law's scrutiny. Dworkin, supra note
664, at 991.
668. H. HART, supra note 666, at 79-81. "No one should think even when popular morality
is supported by an 'overwhelming' majority or marked by widespread 'intolerance,
indignation, and disgust' that loyalty to democratic principles requires him to admit that its
imposition on a minority is justified." Id.
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Professor Dworkin's attack of Lord Devlin's view took a quite
different approach. Even if the legislator were to follow a moral con-
sensus reached by the majority, Professor Dworkin disagreed with
Lord Devlin as to how the majority should reach that consensus.6 6 9
For a legislator to deem a practice immoral, Lord Devlin only
required that a reasonable man so believe, and also believe that "no
right-minded member of his society could think otherwise," so long as
the belief is "honest and dispassionate," and regardless of whether it
is "right or wrong. ' 670 Professor Dworkin, on the other hand, argued
that the conscientious legislator must distinguish between consistently
reasoned, principled moral convictions and prejudices, rationaliza-
tions, or personal aversions. If the latter constitute the bases of the
consensus, the enforcement of that consensus is not justified.671
Professor Sartorius suggested yet another line of attack. Echoing
Mill, Professor Sartorius pointed out why legislators should not
impose majority morality, however reached, on society as a whole.
"[T]he strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the
public with purely personal conduct is that, when it does interfere, the
odds are that it interferes wrongly and in the wrong place. '672 Mill
conceded that the opinion of the overruling majority should prevail
on matters of social morality involving duty to others because the
majority is more likely to be right than wrong when it has only to
consider how a certain practice affects its own interests. On matters
involving self-regarding conduct, however, "the opinion of a similar
majority ... is quite as likely to be wrong as right, for in these cases
public opinion means, at the best, some people's opinion of what is
good or bad for other people.
673
669. Dworkin, supra note 664, at 1000-02. "What is shocking and wrong is not [Lord
Devlin's] idea that the community's morality counts, but his idea of what counts as the
community's morality." Id. at 1001.
670. LORD DEVLIN, supra note 660, at 22-23.
671. The argument begs the question: How reasoned and principled need one's moral
conviction be before they can be counted towards the moral consensus? See Sartorius, The
Enforcement of Morality, 81 YALE L.J. 891, 896-97 (1972).
672. Id. at 903 (quoting J. MILL, supra note 281 at 81).
673. Id. at 904 (quoting J. MILL, supra note 281 at 81). Professor Sartorius modified Mill's
views to accommodate instances where social interference is necessary to protect individuals
against themselves, where "identifiable classes of individuals can be shown to be likely to
manifest choice behavior inconsistent with their preferences as these preferences can be
unproblematically attributed to them." Id. at 905-06.
Professor Hart also departed from Mill's absolute antipaternalism. He would allow legal
interference not only to protect others from harm, but also "even when the victims consent to
or against the acts which are harmful to them." H. HART, supra note 666, at 33. Even if
Professor Hart meant only physical, and not moral, harm to be the event triggering legal
interference into self-regarding conduct, he did not advance any theory to distinguish between
physical and moral paternalism. Professor Hart's views appear to allow society to substitute
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Professor Feinberg, in his recent book entitled Harm to Others,6 74
agreed with Mill that the "harm principle" is a valid legislative princi-
ple. He began with the premise that "whenever a legislator is faced
with a choice between imposing a legal duty on citizens or having
them at liberty, other things being equal, he should leave individuals
free to make their own choice. '675 He then considered various "lib-
erty-limiting principles ' 7 6 which various philosophers have put forth
to overcome the "presumptive case for liberty." He concluded that
the "harm to others principle" derived from Mill's On Liberty
presents the potentially most valid justification for penal interven-
tion.677 He stated the principle as follows: "state interference with a
citizen's behavior tends to be morally justified when it is reasonably
necessary [and effective] to prevent harm or the unreasonable risk of
harm to parties other than the person interfered with. '67' He defined
harm as "the thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest.
679
The concept of "interest" is closely related to the "components of a
person's well-being: ... [what] promotes them is to his advantage or
in his interest; what thwarts them is to his detriment or against his
interest."6 ° Professor Feinberg specifically excluded from his defini-
tion of "harm" those invasions of interest to which the victim has
consented or which constitute merely occasional unpleasant exper-
iences.6"' The harm principle, he concluded, "will not suffice to legiti-
mize prohibition of conduct on the grounds that it is offensive to
others, harmful to the actor himself, or inherently immoral. Elastic it
its judgment for that of the individual on the question of what might constitute harm to
himself. Professor Sartorius, however, would employ a concept of harm and immorality that
would bear on "the needs and desires [of the individual whom society seeks] to protect against
[himself], as [that individual] quite consistently [perceives his] needs and desires." Sartorius,
supra note 671, at 906.
674. J. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1984).
675. Id. at 9.
676. Among liberty-limiting principles considered by Feinberg are: the offense principle
(preventing offenses to others), legal paternalism (preventing harm to the actor himself), legal
moralism (preventing inherently immoral conduct even though it causes neither harm nor
offense to anybody) and moralistic paternalism (preventing moral harm to the actor himself).
Id. at 13, 26. Harm to Others is the first in a four-volume work. The later volumes would
discuss offensive conduct (such as offensive nuisances, obscenity and pornography); harm to
self (and the problems of legal paternalism) and harmless wrongdoing (including various
justifications for morality enforcement under the heading "legal moralism"). Id. at vii.
Feinberg found, however, that "paternalistic and moralistic considerations, when introduced
as support for penal legislation, have no weight at all." Id. at 15.
677. Id.
678. Id. at 11.
679. Id. at 33.
680. Id. at 34.
681. Id. at 45-46.
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may be, but it cannot stretch that far."' 682 Thus, the "harm to others
principle," as refined by Professor Feinberg, would not justify the pro-
hibition of private sexual activities among consenting adults.
Because notions of morality appear, within the context of a plu-
ralistic society, not only heterogeneous, but also transient, Mill's sug-
gestion of "harm to others" as a neutral ground for penal intervention
is appealing when applied to the arena of consensual adult sexual
activities, despite definitional problems with the concept. The Model
Penal Code in its final form adopted the Millian view of abolishing
sanctions against deviate sexual intercourse between consenting
adults, regardless of gender, or marital status.683 The Code's underly-
ing rationale is that atypical sexuality between consenting adults does
not occasion any harm to the secular interests of the community.684
2. THE STATE INTEREST IN MORALITY IN THE FACE OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Where courts have found a fundamental right, they have been
unwilling to recognize the state's interest in promoting morality as
sufficiently compelling, if no legally cognizable harm resulted from
the breach of the challenged statute. In Stanley v. Georgia,685 after
holding that the first amendment protects possession of obscene
materials in the home, the Court refused to defer to Georgia's
unproven assumption that exposure to obscene materials may lead to
deviate sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence.686
In Roe v. Wade,687 the Court recognized that the fundamental
right of privacy protects a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy.688 The Court then refused to allow Texas to act
on its assumptions that life begins at conception, or that abortion is
immoral or offensive and not "good for the people, '689 or that it could
682. Id. at 245.
683. The term "deviate sexual intercourse" would encompass all acts proscribed by various
state sodomy statutes. It is intended to refer to "various styles of sexual intimacy between man
and wife and to sexual relations between unmarried persons, regardless of gender." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.2 commentary at 363 (1980).
684. Id. at 369.
685. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
686. Id. at 566.
687. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
688. Id. at 153.
689. Cf Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1972). After finding that commerce
in obscene material and its exhibition in public places were not protected by the fundamental
right of free speech or right to privacy, the Court upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing the
distribution of obscene material. The Court deferred to the state legislature's determination
that a nexus did or might exist between antisocial behavior and obscene material, although
conclusive proof of such a connection was lacking. Id. at 60, 63. The Court went on to grant
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contribute to moral delinquency. 690 The Court thus rejected the
state's interest in protecting prenatal life.
Instead, the Court acknowledged only the state's interest in pro-
tecting the potentiality of human life-an interest the Court did not
recognize as compelling until after the first trimester of pregnancy.69'
The Roe Court's notable lack of discussion on morality and offensive-
ness, along with its acknowledged resolve to judge questions of consti-
tutionality "free of emotion and of predilection," indicate that it
required considerably more than society's mere disapproval to justify
a denial of the right of privacy in that case.692
Lower federal courts have also followed the same mode of criti-
cal analysis in refusing to uphold public morality as a sufficiently
compelling interest to justify sodomy statutes. In Baker v. Wade,6 93
the district court held that the assertion of "general platitudes (moral-
ity, decency, etc.)" is totally inadequate to justify Texas's unprovable
assumptions that criminal sanctions against sodomitic acts would pro-
mote morality and decency. The court went on to hold that even
widespread public distaste would not constitute a "compelling state
interest" sufficient to justify an infringement upon the right of
privacy.694
In United States v. Doe,695 the District of Columbia Superior
Court addressed a constitutional attack on the District of Columbia's
sodomy statute, which was directed to "[e]very person who... [takes]
into his mouth or anus the sexual organ of any other person .... 696
The defendants, who were arrested for violating the statute in a
the states a sweeping mandate to act "on unprovable assumptions about what is good for the
people," to protect "the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community
environment." Id. at 62, 58.
690. Texas did not press the argument that antiabortion laws served to discourage illicit
sexual conduct. The Court nevertheless concluded that this was not a proper state purpose,
and that in any case, the Texas statute was overbroad for failing to distinguish between
married and unwed mothers. Id. at 148.
691. Id. at 163. The Court's decision as to when the "compelling" point is reached was
based on the state of "present medical knowledge."
692. Id. at 116. The Roe Court began by quoting Justice Holmes's "now-vindicated
dissent" in Lochner v. New York, that "[the Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally
differing views, and the accident of [the Court's] finding certain opinions novel and even
shocking ought not to conclude [its] judgment upon the question" of constitutionality. Id. at
117 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76).
693. 553 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Tex. 1982). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court opinion, holding the Texas statute constitutional on the strength of Doe's
precedential value.
694. Id. at 1142.
695. 12 CRIM. L. REP. 2531 (BNA) (Mar. 28, 1973).
696. Id. at 2532.
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"quasi-public place, ' 697 claimed that the statute was overbroad
because it could reach behavior protected by the right to privacy. In
order to save the statute from constitutional infirmity, the court inter-
preted it so as to exclude from its proscription the private sexual
activities of consenting adults.
In the course of its opinion, the court addressed a number of
governmental interests in proscribing sodomy. After reviewing the
long history of Judeo-Christian abhorrence of sodomy, the court
observed that "[t]he mere recitation of this history suggests that the
governmental interest served by this statute is not only far from com-
pelling, but may well be violative of the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution. ' 698 Aside from the establishment issue, the "enforcement of
Judeo-Christian notions of sexual morality, absent a clear secular jus-
tification, is not a 'compelling' governmental interest sufficient to
override the fundamental right of individuals to privacy in sexual
matters."
699
In People v. Onofre,7° the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a
lower court's opinion declaring New York's sodomy statute unconsti-
tutional. The state had argued that the statute would, inter alia, pro-
mote public morality. The court rejected the propriety of such a goal:
Any purported justification for the consensual sodomy statute in
terms of upholding public morality is belied by the position
reflected in the Eisenstadt decision in which the court carefully dis-
tinguished between public dissemination of what might have been
considered inimical to public morality and individual recourse to
the same material out of the public arena and in the sanctum of the
private home. There is a distinction between public and private
morality and the private morality of an individual is not synony-
mous with nor necessarily will have effect on what is known as
public morality.... So here, the People have failed to demonstrate
how government interference with the practice of personal choice
in matters of intimate sexual behavior out of view of the public and
with no commercial component will serve to advance the cause of
,public morality or do anything other than restrict individual con-
duct and impose a concept of private morality chosen by the
State.70
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v.
697. Id. at 2531.
698. Id. at 2533.
699. Id.
700. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
701. Id. at 489-90, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951-52 (citation omitted).
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Bonadio70 2 likewise overturned that state's sodomy statute. The court
rejected any state interest in morality as a proper exercise of the police
power, even in the absence of a constitutional right to privacy. The
court stated:
With respect to regulation of morals, the police power should
properly be exercised to protect each individual's right to be free
from interference in defining and pursuing his own morality but
not to enforce a majority morality on persons whose conduct does
not harm others. 'No harm to the secular interests of the commu-
nity is involved in atypical sex practice in private between con-
senting adult partners.' . . . Many issues that are considered to be
matters of morals are subject to debate, and no sufficient state
interest justifies legislation of norms simply because a particular
belief is followed by a number of people, or even a majority.
Indeed, what is considered to be "moral" changes with the times
and is dependent upon societal background. Spiritual leadership,
not the government, has the responsibility for striving to improve
the morality of individuals. Enactment of the Voluntary Deviate
Sexual Intercourse Statute, despite the fact that it provides punish-
ment for what many believe to be abhorrent crimes against nature
and perceived sins against God, is not properly in the realm of the
temporal police power.7°3
The court quoted extensively from Mill's On Liberty7 l and con-
cluded that Mill's "philosophy, as applied to the issue of regulation of
sexual morality presently before the court, or employed to delimit the
police power generally, properly circumscribes state power over the
individual. 
705
In State v. Pilcher,7 °6 the Supreme Court of Iowa held Iowa's
sodomy statute unconstitutional as it sought to regulate the private,
consenting sexual interaction of unmarried adults of the opposite sex.
The decision did not reach the rights of homosexuals because the
defendant in the case specifically excluded that issue.70 7 Although the
holding is thus limited to heterosexual acts of sodomy, the Court's
reasoning is nevertheless instructive. After recognizing a right to sex-
ual privacy for unmarried adults under Eisenstadt,7 °8 the court stated
that "[b]efore the state can encroach into recognized areas of funda-
mental rights, such as the personal right of privacy, there must exist a
702. 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
703. Id. at 96, 415 A.2d at 50 (citation omitted).
704. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
705. Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 51.
706. 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976).
707. Id. at 352.
708. See supra notes 224-34.
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subordinating interest which is compelling. . . . The State has not
shown the existence of any such interest here."7 9 The court cited
Buchanan v. Batchelor'10 for the proposition that "[a]bsent some
demonstrable necessity, matters of (good or bad) taste are to be pro-
tected from regulation .... ",711 Although Buchanan was ultimately
vacated on comity grounds, the Supreme Court of Iowa noted that
Buchanan's "reasoning concerning sodomy is capable of reliance."7 2
Constitutional challenges to prosecutions for fornication raise
many of the same issues as do prosecutions for sodomy. Two such
cases are State v. Saunders,713 a case from the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, and Doe v. Duling,7 4 a Virginia federal district court case
which was subsequently vacated on standing grounds. 71 5 Both courts
acknowledged a right of privacy in unmarried adults to engage in pri-
vate consensual intercourse.71 6 Both courts rejected asserted state
interests in morality.
The New Jersey court, although willing to admit that the state
could act in the area of public morality, found it necessary to "strike
down a measure which has as its objective the regulation of private
morality. To the extent that [New Jersey's fornication statute] serves
as an official sanction of certain conceptions of desirable lifestyles,
social mores or individualized beliefs, it is not an appropriate exercise
of the police power. 71 7 The Duling court similarly ruled that "[tihe
state interest of promoting healthy and conforming social values is
not a compelling interest which justifies deprivation of the constitu-
tional right to privacy in adult sexual relations."7 8
Other morality-based state interests in promoting family values
have not fared well at the hands of those courts that have directly
addressed this interest. The Onofre court spoke of the institution of
marriage as merely "[c]ommendable." 7 9 The Saunders court would
not permit the state to intrude into this area: "we can only reiterate
that decisions such as whether to marry are of a highly personal
nature; they neither lend themselves to official coercion or sanction,
709. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d at 359.
710. 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
711. Id. at 733.
712. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d at 357.
713. 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977).
714. 603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985).
715. No. 85-1326 (4th Cir. 1986) (available Feb. 17, 1986, on WESTLAW, Allfeds
database.)
716. Doe, 603 F. Supp. at 967; Saunders, 75 N.J. at 213, 381 A.2d at 339.
717. Saunders, 75 N.J. at 219, 381 A.2d at 342.
718. Duling, 603 F. Supp. at 967.
719. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 489, 415 N.E.2d at 941, N.Y.S.2d at 951.
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nor fall within the regulatory power of those who are elected to gov-
ern."7 20 The Duling court also rejected family values as beyond the
state's business altogether:
Just as the decisions whether to bear or beget a child, a deci-
sion to marry is a personal choice protected by the right of pri-
vacy.... Such a decision cannot be coerced through infringement
on other constitutional rights. Moreover, this state purpose, an
attempt to regulate public morals, cannot extend into the privacy
of one's home.
721
3. NARROWNESS OF MEANS
One approach the courts have used to decide whether a statute
meets the "narrowly drawn" requirement is to determine whether the
state's interest could be advanced by alternative means that would not
affect the individual's fundamental right.722 One argument states may
advance is that the sodomy statutes, though rarely enforced, still serve
to express society's disapproval of the prohibited acts. According to
this argument, then, the criminal system may legitimately contribute
to the moral education of society.723 Courts may not allow resort to
the coercive powers of the criminal law, however, where the commu-
nity can otherwise condemn morally repugnant acts through "theo-
logical teaching, moral suasion, parental advice, psychological and
psychiatric counseling and other non-coercive means. ' 724 Similarly,
courts may be unwilling to uphold sodomy statutes solely on the
grounds of protection of public decency, where statutes are, or could
be, enacted to specifically prohibit the public display or public solici-
tation of sodomitic acts.725
It seems obvious, however, that if a court were to uphold moral-
ity as a sufficiently compelling interest to override a fundamental right
to privacy, then sodomy and fornication statutes would pass the "nar-
rowly drawn" test. Because those acts would themselves constitute
"the substantive problem which legitimately concerns" 726 the state, a
720. Saunders, 75 N.J. at 219, 381 A.2d at 342.
721. Duling, 603 F. Supp. at 967.
722. "The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
723. Because criminal liability is seldom imposed on omissions except where a duty for
affirmative action arises from common law, statute or contract, a knowledge of wrong based
solely on what the law punishes would be sadly amiss. Furthermore, sporadic and erratic
enforcement would foster disrespect for the law rather than moral enhancement.
724. Onofre, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951 n.3.
725. Analogically, the state can properly uphold its interest in the protection of the young
by enacting laws against homosexual conduct by force or with a minor.
726. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2132 (1984).
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law prohibiting just those acts would be perfectly tailored.
C. Health
1. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE PROTECTION
OF PUBLIC HEALTH
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the
enactment and enforcement of statutes aimed at the preservation of
public health constitutes a legitimate exercise of the state's police
power.727 The state's interest in safeguarding the health of its citizens
becomes more important when a particular threat to life grows more
dangerous. Thus, in Roe v. Wade,7 28 the Court held that the state's
interest in the health of the mother was not compelling until after the
first trimester of the pregnancy because it found that the mortality
rate for abortions performed in later stages of pregnancy exceeded the
mortality rate in normal childbirth.7 29 The Court went on to grant
the state the power to regulate the abortion procedure after the first
trimester of pregnancy, even though it had found earlier that the right
of privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."730 The Roe decision
thus established that the state may assert a compelling interest in pro-
tecting a person from personal decisions that affect his or her own
body, notwithstanding that in doing so, the state may be infringing
upon the fundamental rights of the very person whom it seeks to
protect.
If, as the Roe Court suggested, the state's interest in protecting
an individual's health can reach a compelling point sufficient to sus-
tain state regulation, then the state's interest in preserving public
health would seem to take on even greater importance. The state has
traditionally exercised its police power to control the spread of com-
municable diseases through measures that have restricted individual
rights.
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,73' the Supreme Court of the United
States upheld a state statute that permitted municipalities to require
727. "A state has broad power to establish and enforce standards of conduct within its
borders relative to the health of everyone there. It is a vital part of a state's police power."
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954). Similarly, the Roe Court approved the
state's assertion of "important interests in safeguarding health." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
154 (1972).
728. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
729. Id. at 163.
730. Id. at 153.
731. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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all citizens to obtain vaccination against smallpox, a contagious
disease.
The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such rea-
sonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing country
essential to the safety, health .... and morals of the community.
Even liberty, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to
act according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint
under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right
by others. It is then liberty regulated by law.
7 3 2
Some courts have allowed the states to prevent the spread of
veneral diseases by subjecting persons suspected of being afflicted with
the disease to involuntary physical examination.733 Other courts,
however, declined to uphold the constitutionality of involuntary phys-
ical examinations based on mere suspicion.3 Quarantine and isola-
tion is another means of controlling contagious diseases.735 Even
though the courts have established that a mere suspicion will not jus-
tify the quarantine, they have only required that the person placed
under quarantine is likely to have contracted the disease.736 Further-
more, the state did not have "to wait until the person affected with a
contagious disease has actually caused others to become sick . . .
before he is placed under the quarantine. ' 737 Thus, the compelling
necessity for health regulations may justify the infringement on fun-
damental rights.
The Court in Jacobson, however, was careful to announce its
willingness to interfere to "prevent wrong and oppression," where
state regulations are "arbitrary and oppressive" in their enforce-
ment.738 Similarly, the Roe Court only allowed the state to regulate
the abortion procedure during later stages of pregnancy only "to the
extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and
protection of maternal health. ' 739 Thus, even though a state regula-
tion may address a compelling interest in protecting the health of its
people, the Court could still invalidate it on the gound that it is not
732. Id. at 26-27.
733. See, e.g., People v. Strautz, 386 Ill. 360, 54 N.E.2d 441 (1944) (The court found it
reasonable to suspect that prostitutes may be carriers of venereal diseases). See also infra note
815 and accompanying text.
734. See, e.g., Wragg v. Griffin, 85 Iowa 243, 170 N.W. 400 (1919) (Restraint of a person
solely as a suspect of having a venereal disease for the purpose of subjecting him to involuntary
examination is a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law.).
735. See infra note 816 and accompanying text.
736. 302 Ill. 422, People ex rel Barmore v. Robertson, 113 N.E. 815 (1922). See also In re
Arata, 52 Cal. App. 380, 198 P. 814 (1921).
737. 302 Ill. at 434, 134 N.E. at 820.
738. 197 U.S. at 38-39.
739. 410 U.S. at 163.
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"narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interest at
stake. "74
The prevention of the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases is
likely to fail constitutional muster as a state interest justifying the sod-
omy statutes, because such diseases could be controlled through other
means which are both less drastic and more efficient.74 State courts
have struck down fornication statutes on the same grounds. In State
V. Saunders,742 even though the Court did "not question the state's
compelling interest in preventing the spread of veneral diseases, ' 743 it
concluded that the fornication statute would actually hamper the pre-
vention of such diseases:
To the extent that any successful program to combat venereal dis-
ease must depend upon afftected persons coming forward for treat-
ment, the present statute operates as a deterrent to such voluntary
participation. The fear of being prosecuted for the 'crime' of forni-
cation can only deter people from seeking such necessary
treatment. 7"
The Duling court specifically found that "the fornication statute
is not narrowly drawn. All single people who engage in sexual inter-
course do not pose a threat of spreading sexual diseases. ' 745 Simi-
larly, in In re p, 7 46 the court held that the attenuated relationship
between prostitution and venereal diseases makes it "unreasonable to
prohibit all prostitution for the sake of eradicating 5% of the venereal
disease health hazard" 747 actually attributable to prostitution; even
though it admitted that "the state may have a legitimate interest in
seeking to eradicate event this small incidence of disease. '748
The prohibitions on homosexual conduct are likely to result in
homosexuals becoming involved in furtive affairs and engaging in sex-
ual intercourse with strangers and prostitutes. This promiscuous
nature of homosexual relationships, in turn, increases the chance of
contracting and transmitting infectious diseases. Furthermore, fear of
prosecution under sodomy statutes will discourage honosexuals from
seeking necessary treatment, or identifying their partners, thereby
seriously undermining the efforts of health authorities to control the
spread of venereal diseases.
740. Id. at 155.
741. See supra notes 731-37 and accompanying text.
742. 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977).
743. Id. at 217-18, 381 A.2d at 341.
744. Id. at 218, 381 A.2d at 342.
745. Duling, 306 F. Supp. at 967.
746. 92 Misc.2d 62, 400 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1977).
747. Id. at 73, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
748. Id.
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The debate over the proper balance between the state's police
power to protect the public health and respect for individual rights
has taken on added dimensions of importance and urgency, as a
deadly epidemic illness, Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) continues to spread across the country. The following section
will discuss whether a state interest in controlling the spread of AIDS
would justify the enactment and enforcement of sodomy statutes.
2. AIDS: A NEW CASE FOR STATE REGULATION
OF HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT?
a. Background
In 1981, a California doctor began to treat several patients for an
unusual lung infection called Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia.74 9
This type of infection generally only attacks persons who have a
weakened immune system, 5° such as cancer victims and transplant
recipients."' All of the persons with the infection were homosexu-
als.752 The doctor reported these incidences to federal health authori-
ties at the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia (Center). 53
At that time, there were only four reported cases.7"4
The Center published its first report on the strange new disease in
1981, naming it acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.755 Several
months after the Center published its report, doctors from around the
country reported over 100 new cases of AIDS.75 6 The Center reports
that since 1979, doctors have diagnosed 18,406711 cases. Of this
number of AIDS victims, 9,780, or fifty-three percent, have died.758
With the number of AIDS cases expected to double annually,
researchers estimate that doctors will diagnose over 12,000 new cases
between July 1985 and June 1986, 71 and a total of 40,000 new cases







755. 30 CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT
250 (1981).
756. See A Growing Threat, supra note 749, at 42.
757. Telephone interview with the office of Mr. Charles Fallis, Center for Disease Control,
Atlanta, Georgia (Mar. 19, 1986).
758. Id. Prior to January 1, 1983, 73% of those persons that doctors diagnosed as having
AIDS died. See United States Congress, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, REVIEW OF
THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES RESPONSE TO AIDS 6 (Wash., D.C.) (pub. no. OTA-TM-H-
24) (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO AIDS].
759. Curran, Morgan, Hardy, Jaffe, Darrow & Dowdle, The Epidemiology of AIDS.
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over the following two years. 76° At present, no one has recovered
from the disease.76
"HUMAN T-cell lymphotropic virus type III/lymphade-
nopathy-associated infection" (HTLV-III/LAV) is the cause of the
AIDS disease.762 The "T-cells, ' '763 which are found in the white
blood cells, can be broken down into two subsets. One subset, "T-4,"
functions to "help" the body's immune system function when foreign
materials invade the body.76 The other subset, "T-8," functions to
"suppress" the immune system when foreign materials invade the
body. 765  Consequently, the "T-4" subset is called the "helper/
inducer" portion of the "T-cell," and the "T-8" subset is called the
"suppressor" portion of the "T-cell. ' 766
The "T-4" subset performs a scavenging function, engulfing and
consuming foreign materials that enter the body.76 7 Researchers have
concluded that HTLV-III/LAV enters the cell through a cell surface
interaction with the "T-4" subset.768  Once inside the "T-cell,"
HTLV-III/LAV reproduces at a rate over 1000 times as fast as any
other virus. 769 Eventually, HTLV-III/LAV destroys the entire "T-
cell". 770 Without the "T-cell," the immune system allows bacteria or
viruses to enter the body and cause diseases where they otherwise
would not but for the body's weakened condition.77t
Some of the typical symptoms that AIDS victims experience are
fever, weight loss, sore throat, swollen lymph nodes, diarrhea, and a
general feeling of discomfort. 772 Not all persons who suffer from
AIDS experience the typical symptoms, however. Persons with
AIDS but without the symptoms, called "carriers," can infect others
Current Status and Future Prospects, 229 SC. MAG. 1352-57 (Sept. 1985) [hereinafter cited as
The Epidemiology of AIDS].
760. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO AIDS, supra note 758, at 6.
761. See supra note 757.
762. Redfield, Markham, Salahuddin, Wright, Sarngadharan & Gallo, Heterosexually
Acquired HTL V/LAV Disease, 254:15 J. AM. MED. 2094 (Oct. 18, 1985) [hereinafter cited as
Heterosexually Acquired HTL V/LAV]; GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO AIDS, supra note 758, at
4.







769. A Growing Threat, supra note 749, at 42.
770. Id.
771. See GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO AIDS, supra note 758, at 3.
772. See The Epidemiology of AIDS, supra note 759, at 1354.
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with the disease.773 The condition of symptomless AIDS is called
"AIDS-related complex" (ARC).774 Researchers estimate that
500,000 to 1,000,000 Americans have ARC.775  No one knows just
what is going to happen to these "carriers," but researchers estimate
that one to two percent of the "carriers" will become AIDS victims
annually,776 with the total number eventually reaching ten to fifteen
percent of the "carriers.
777
Researchers have isolated four ways in which AIDS victims and
"carriers" transmit the disease: (1) sexual contact; (2) intravenous
drug abuse; (3) blood transfusions, and; (4) mother to child at birth
where one parent has the disease or is a member of a high risk
group.778 Newly developed blood screening methods, however,
should eliminate blood transfusions as a means of contracting
AIDS.779
Transmission of HTLV-III/LAV through infected blood is the
surest way to contract AIDS. 7 0  There is also evidence that other
body fluids, such as saliva, contain the AIDS virus, but researchers
have determined that the incidence of transmission through saliva is
773. Often the symptomless AIDS carriers are unaware that they are infectious. See A
Growing Threat, supra note 749, at 42.
774. Id.
775. See supra note 757.
776. See The Epidemiology of AIDS, supra note 759, at 1354.
777. See A Growing Threat, supra note 749, at 42.
778. See supra note 759.
779. Federal authorities licensed a serolgic blood test for antibodies to HTLV-III/LAV in
March, 1985. The Epidemiology of AIDS, supra note 759, at 1356. Blood and plasma centers
throughout the United States are currently using this test. Results show that only one quarter
of one percent of the donated blood contains HTLV-III/LAV. Id. The blood centers can
discard the HTLV-III/LAV infected blood without significantly affecting blood supplies. Id.
The new blood screening test should help detect the disease before donor blood is transmitted
to hemopheliacs and others, thus, eliminating blood transfusion as a high risk means of
contracting AIDS. The new test uses an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) to
detect antibodies to HTLV-III/LAV. SPECIAL REPORT: The AIDS Epidemic, 312:8 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 521 (Feb. 21, 1985) [hereinafter cited as The AIDS Epidemic]. Despite the new
blood test, doctors will continue to diagnose AIDS in hemophiliacs and blood transfusion
recipients because the long incubation period prevents those persons that the disease has
already infected from benefiting from the blood screening test. Id. AIDS researchers have
also developed heat treatments that eliminate HTLV-III/LAV from donated blood. Id. To
further decrease the incidences of HTLV-III/LAV donor infected blood, the U.S. Public
Health Service asked members of AIDS high risk groups to voluntarily refrain from donating
blood. See The Epidemiology of AIDS, supra note 759, at 1356.
780. AIDS, Newsweek, Aug.12, 1985, at 24 [hereinafter cited as AIDS]. This may be the
reason for the high incidences of transmission among homosexuals. Generally, bleeding is
more likely to occur during rectal intercourse than it is during vaginal intercourse. Id. As
such, the AIDS virus can gain easy entry into the bloodstream through semen, which often
transmits the disease.
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almost nonexistent."' The risk of transmission is much greater with
another body fluid, namely semen. 782 To avoid any risk of transmis-
sion, researchers assert that persons should avoid any sexual activity
involving the exchange of semen with a person who is known or sus-
pected to be infected with AIDS.7 3 Researchers have concluded that
casual contact will not transmit the disease. 8
Researchers have classified certain groups as high risk groups.
These groups are homosexuals, intravenous drug abusers, and
hemophiliacs.785 AIDS victims, however, are not limited to members
of the high risk groups. Research indicates that all types of heterosex-
ual contact can transmit the disease.78 6 At present, heterosexuals
account for at least 118 of the reported AIDS cases.787 In fact, in
Central Africa, where many researchers believe the disease originated,
AIDS is most prevalent among heterosexuals.7 8 Many of the heter-
osexuals in Central Africa who have the disease, however, have come
in contact with a large number of sexual partners.789 In the United
States, many of the heterosexuals with AIDS are intravenous drug
users. 790  It follows that the heterosexuals with AIDS in both the
United States and Central Africa have had contact with or are associ-
ated with members of the high risk groups. Exactly how the disease
spread from Central Africa to the United States remains
unanswered.7 91
781. Sande, Transmission of AIDS: The Case against Casual Transmission, 314:6 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 380-84 (Feb. 6, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Transmission of AIDS].
782. The Epidemiology of AIDS, supra note 759, at 1356.
783. Id.
784. See Transmission of AIDS, supra note 781, at 380-84.
785. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO AIDS, supra note 758, at 6.
786. Telephone conversation with Dr. Margaret Fischel, AIDS Researcher at Jackson
Memorial Hospital, Miami, Florida (Feb. 3, 1986). Researchers are not certain as to the
mechanics of heterosexual transmission, however. Id. Heterosexual contact is defined as oral-
genital, vaginal, or rectal intercourse. Heterosexually Acquired HTL V/LAV, supra note 762, at
2094.
787. A Growing Threat, supra note 749, at 43. Of the heterosexual cases, only 14 are female.
AIDS, supra note 780, at 24. AIDS among heterosexuals has been closely associated with
steady sexual activity with a heterosexual partner who has AIDS or is a "carrier." The
Epidemiology of AIDS, supra note 759, at 1355.
788. A Growing Threat, supra note 749, at 43-44.
789. Id. at 43.
790. AIDS, supra note 780, at 23.
791. One of the leading theories of how AIDS made its way into the United States suggests
that the disease first spread from Central Africa to the Caribbean. AIDS, supra note 780, at 23.
From the Caribbean country of Haiti, a popular vacation resort for homosexuals, visitors
contracted the disease and brought it over to the United States. Id. The disease has spread far
beyond Central Africa, the Caribbean, and the United States, as research indicates that almost
every European country has reported incidences of AIDS. Id.
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Some experts are calling AIDS the number one health menace.7 92
Others feel that the disease will be the worst of this century.7 93 The
public has reacted to AIDS with widespread fear. A recent magazine
survey revealed that the percentage of people who fear that either
they or someone they know will contract AIDS has doubled over the
past two years. 9
Because a large segment of the population is ignorant as to the
actual cause and transmission of AIDS, many people have reacted
irrationally. Recently, the technicians of a New York television sta-
tion refused to work in the studio during a live interview with an
AIDS victim. 795 School authorities have refused to allow a young boy
with AIDS to return to school;79 6 firemen have refused to give AIDS
victims, and homosexuals in general, mouth-to-mouth resuscita-
tion;797 ambulance drivers have refused to transport AIDS victims.
798
Additionally, undertakers in several cities have refused to embalm
AIDS victims. 99
Undoubtedly, the list of public incidents such as these is growing
daily. At what point societal pressures will force governmental action
to regulate homosexual activity as a means of protecting public health
is an open question. "Control of AIDS and HTLV-III/LAV infection
cannot await the benefits of future research. There is an urgent need
for community groups and health professionals to work together and
utilize the tools available to prevent AIDS and care for its victims.""
b. Analysis
The high mortality rate of those who have contracted AIDS, the
alarming rate at which AIDS is spreading, and the absence of any
known cure for AIDS, pose a significant health problem with which
the states must deal. Hardwick v. Bowers80 presents the Court with
the questions of whether the fundamental right of privacy protects
792. Id. at 20.
793. A Growing Threat, supra note 749, at 41.
794. AIDS, supra note 780, at 23.
795. A Growing Threat, supra note 749, at 41.
796. Id. at 45. The boy was a hemophiliac. Id. The school superintendent feared that the
boy posed too much of a threat to the other students. Id. The superintendent said that
according to state health officials, body fluids, such as saliva, transmitted the disease. Id.
Recent discoveries, however, indicate that saliva and casual contact do not transmit AIDS.
See Transmission of AIDS, supra note 781, at 380-84.
797. A Growing Threat, supra note 749, at 45.
798. Id.
799. Id.
800. The Epidemiology of AIDS, supra note 759, at 1357.




private adult homosexual conduct and, if so, whether a Georgia sod-
omy statute infringes upon that right. Notwithstanding the possibility
that the Supreme Court may find the Georgia sodomy statute uncon-
stitutional, the Court may provide the states with guidelines for enact-
ing AIDS legislation that would pass constitutional muster. In this
respect, the Court may use Hardwick in the same manner as it used
Roe. Although the Court in Roe struck down the antiabortion stat-
ute, the Court utilized available medical data so as to provide states
with guidelines for enacting constitutional antiabortion legislation.
Similar to Roe, the Court in Hardwick may be presented with the
most recent medical data on AIDS as a possible justification for the
Georgia sodomy statute. Assuming arguendo that the Court holds
that the fundamental right of privacy protects consensual homosexual
sodomy, the Court can use the AIDS data to find a compelling state
interest in preventing the spread of the disease. The Court could
hold, as in Roe, that a person has a fundamental right of privacy to
make decisions regarding his or her own body-in this case, the deci-
sion to engage in homosexual sodomy. Armed with the data on
AIDS, the Court may decide to hold that the state's interest in
preventing AIDS victims from engaging in sodomy limits the right of
privacy. By doing so, the Court can reemphasize the principle that it
set forth in Roe that the state can protect a person from himself, even
if the person whose rights are infringed is at the same time the person
whom the state is seeking to protect. The State of Georgia, like other
states in their efforts to prevent the spread of AIDS, may enact legis-
lation to protect homosexuals from their own personal decisions to
engage in acts of sodomy. This would apply to homosexuals who
either have AIDS or those who will engage in sodomitic acts with
homosexuals who do have AIDS. This type of legislation, however,
would have broader-reaching implications than the legislative guide-
lines that the Court set in Roe. The only health interests at stake in
antiabortion statutes are those of the pregnant woman and the fetus.
On the other hand the health interests at stake in sodomy statutes are
not only those of the homosexuals who engage in sodomy, but also
those of others who engage in activities that may transmit the disease.
Several cities have already taken active measures to control the
spread of AIDS by regulating homosexual activity. In an effort to
curb the sexual activity of homosexuals, the Health Director for the
City of San Francisco, for example, announced that the Health
Department would take steps to curb sexual activity in the city's gay
bathhouses. s02 Initially, the Health Director announced that either
802. Washington Post, Apr. 10, 1984, § A2. For a constitutional analysis of the restrictions
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the city's gay bathhouses eliminate all sexual activity or the city
would not renew their licenses.8 0 3  Shortly thereafter, the Health
Director ordered the closing of the gay bathhouses and other estab-
lishments suspected of promoting the spread of AIDS °.8 1 Within sev-
eral hours after the Director's order, however, several clubs reopened,
challenging the order.80 5 Following the actions of the health authori-
ties in San Francisco, the City of New York empowered its health
directors to close gay bathhouses and other establishments where
"unsafe sex" took place.80 6
States may attempt to justify their sodomy statutes by advancing
the argument that such statutes are necessary to contain AIDS. One
attack on such an argument, however, is based upon a principle that
the Supreme Court expressed in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld. °7 In
Weinberger, the Court stated that a court may reject a state's asserted
reason for enacting a statute if the asserted reason "could not have
been a goal of the legislation"808 at the time of its enactment. The
Weinberger rationale, then, might disqualify prevention of AIDS as a
post-hoc justification for a sodomy statute. The recent emergence of
AIDS809 indicates quite obviously that the prevention of AIDS could
not have been a goal of the legislatures at the time they enacted the
sodomy statutes.
The states' response to this argument would be to focus on the
their general interest in preventing diseases, of whatever kind. As the
courts in People v. Onofresl ° and Commonwealth v. Bonadio8 " have
stated, and as the State of Georgia is presently asserting in Hardwick,
one of the goals of sodomy statutes is to prevent the spread of sexually
transmitted diseases.8 12 As researchers have established that AIDS
can be transmitted sexually, it appears that the prevention of the
spread of AIDS is consistent with at least one of the goals of sodomy
on sexual activity in gay bathhouses, see Preventing the Spread of AIDS by Restricting Sexual
Conduct in Gay Bathhouses: A Constitutional Analysis, 15 GOLDEN GATE 301 (1985).
803. Washington Post, supra note 802, at § A2.
804. San Francisco Chron., Oct. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 1, cited in Preventing the Spread of
AIDS by Restricting Sexual Conduct in Gay Bathhouses: A Constitutional Analysis, 15
GOLDEN GATE 301, 307 n.39 (1985).
805. Id.
806. N.Y. Times Oct. 26, 1986 § A, at 1, col. 4.
807. 420 U.S 636 (1974).
808. Id. at 636 n.16.
809. See supra notes 755-61 and accompanying text.
810. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
811. 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
812. Brief for Appellant at 37, Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 85-140 (U.S. filed Dec. 19, 1985).
[Vol. 40:521
PROHIBITION OF SODOMY
statutes. Therefore, an attack on these statutes based upon the Wein-
berger principle is unlikely to succeed.
Perhaps there is a more fundamental attack that may be made
against state sodomy statutes. Unquestionably, the prevention or con-
tainment of AIDS would be deemed a compelling state interest. It
appears, however, that state sodomy statutes would encounter diffi-
culty surviving a narrowness analysis. The types of activities that
these statutes restrict are far beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objective of preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases
such as AIDS. Some sodomy statutes restrict the sexual activities of
perfectly healthy homosexuals, as well as the sexual activities of per-
fectly healthy heterosexuals, both married and unmarried. Addition-
ally, sodomy statutes are indifferent as to where the prohibited acts
occur; they ignore the privacy of the marital bedroom. t 3 Sodomy
statutes may therefore be overbroad in that they reach persons whose
activities are unrelated to the interest that the state seeks to protect.
Many statutes that deal with venereal disease are narrowly writ-
ten for that purpose. In Florida, for example, it is unlawful for any-
one with a venereal disease to engage in sexual intercourse. 14
Additionally, Florida has the authority to subject any suspected car-
rier of the disease to a physical examination. 15 If any person is diag-
813. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Supreme Court
held that the right of privacy extends to the marital bedroom. Id. at 484. As such, it is
unlikely that courts would tolerate general intrusions into the marital bedroom in a state's
effort to enforce restrictions on sexual activity.
814. Section 384.02 states:
Sexual intercourse with person afflicted with any venereal disease illegal. It is
unlawful for any female afflicted with any venereal disease, knowing of such
condition, to have sexual intercourse with any male person, or for any male
person afflicted with any venereal disease, knowing of such condition, to have
sexual intercourse with any female.
FLA. STAT. § 384.02 (1985).
The Florida statutes define "venereal disease" as "[s]yphilis, gonorrhea, and chancroid are
designated as venereal diseases and are declared to be contagious, infectious, communicable,
and dangerous to the public health. It is unlawful for any one infected with either of these
diseases to expose another to infection." FLA. STAT. § 384.01 (1985).
815. Section 384.04 states:
Physical examination. Any person suspected of being afflicted with any
infectious venereal disease shall be subject to physical examination and
inspection by any representative of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services, and for failure or refusal to allow such inspection or examination, they
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished as for a misdemeanor;
provided, the suspected person shall not be apprehended, inspected or examined
against his will, except upon the sworn testimony of the person or persons
accusing; and upon the presentation of the warrant duly authorized by the
county court judge or some court officer chaged with the execution of this law.
FLA. STAT. § 384.04 (1985).
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nosed to have venereal disease, the state may, if necessary to protect
the public health, quarantine that person and require treatment.
8 1 6
With the states' ability to provide for such measures under the
authority of their police power, similar measures may be taken to pre-
vent the spread of AIDS.
AIDS, however, is quite different from venereal diseases. Vene-
real diseases are treatable, whereas there is presently no treatment
available to cure AIDS victims."1 7 Thus, when a person who is
afflicted with a venereal disease is quarantined for treatment, any such
isolation is likely to be temporary. With AIDS, though, a quarantine
would in effect impose a "life sentence" on those so isolated. More-
over, a quarantine would not only require the isolation of those per-
sons who exhibit AIDS symptoms, but would also require the
isolation of AIDS carriers. As previously stated, researchers estimate
that the number of AIDS carriers may be as high as one million.18
Given the above facts, a court might well decide that a sodomy stat-
ute, though not the most refined method for controlling AIDS, is the
narrowest and most efficient practical means toward that end under
the circumstances. The consequences of AIDS are so severe, and its
control is so difficult, that courts may be reluctant to second-guess a
state's proposed method for dealing with this disease. Sodomy, forni-
cation, adultery and rape laws, if enforceable, could significantly
reduce instances of sexually transmitted diseases. In order to locate
AIDS victims and carriers, however, the states would be forced to
conduct mandatory blood tests on all citizens. This would, of course,
be both time consuming and extremely costly. Perhaps states will
816. Section 384.14 states:
Venereal diseases; quarantine; power and authority of health officers. State,
county, and municipal health officers, or their authorized deputies, when in their
judgment it is necessary to protect the public health, may commit persons within
their respective jurisdictions, infected with venereal disease, for quarantine and
compulsory treatment in any hospital within the state operated for that pupose
by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for quarantine and
treatment.
FLA. STAT. § 384.14 (1985).
Section 384.17 permits the isolation of infected persons, and states:
Isolation of infected persons. In the event persons infected with venereal disease
for any reason cannot be received at any hospital operated by the Department of
Rehabilitative Services for quarantine and treatment of persons infected with
venereal disease, and such persons, in the opinion of the health officer, should be
isolated and quarantined for the protection of public health, then and in such
event the health officer may cause such persons to be isolated, where such person
resides, at the expense of the county or city involved.
FLA. STAT. § 384.17 (1985).
817. See supra note 757.
818. The Epidemiology of AIDS, supra note 759, at 1354.
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require AIDS testing prior to issuing marriage licenses.8 '9 As a result,
states may then require authorities to report those whose test results
are positive so that health authorities could keep these people under
surveillance.8 2 ° Who would bear such costs?8 2' How could the states
detect those persons whose blood tests are negative, but who subse-
quently contract AIDS from those who have not been tested? At
present, these questions remain unanswered. Scientific breakthrough
would at least quell the public fear that currently surrounds the dis-
ease and would make regulating AIDS more like the routine regula-
tion of venereal diseases. Hopefully, the future holds promise for a
breakthrough in the discovery of a cure for AIDS. Currently, how-
ever, the prevention of AIDS depends solely upon social education
and counseling. 22
D. Conclusion
No court that has recognized a fundamental right to sexual pri-
vacy outside marriage has viewed a state interest in morality as suffi-
cient to override that right. This may simply be a function of the fact
that a noninterpretivist court will be predisposed to view morality
through the eyes of contemporary society, rather than through the
eyes of the Founding Fathers. If a court were to deem morality a
sufficiently important interest, a statute prohibiting "immoral acts"
would perforce pass a narrowness test.
Just as in the case of morality, no court that has recognized the
right to sexual privacy has seen as compelling a state interest in pro-
moting "family values." Statutes limiting acts which run contrary to
the family ethic also appear to be flawed for lack of narrowness.
Although no court would likely question a state's interest in
preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, the prohibition
of sexual activity outside marriage may be too broad a method of
dealing with such disease. In the context of sodomy in particular, a
statute intended to prevent the transmission of Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and other diseases would raise a serious
narrowness question.
819. The AIDS Epidemic, supra note 779, at 523.
820. Id. Colorado is the first state to require those who have AIDS to report their names
and addresses to the state health department. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1986 § A, at 30, col. 5.
821. The cost of caring for AIDS victims is already high. The AIDS Epidemic, supra note
779, at 523. The cost of caring for the average AIDS victim over the victim's expected life is
$42,000. Id. Estimates indicate that if there are 8,000 new cases of AIDS during 1985, the
cost of caring for the new victims alone will be approximately $336 million. Id.
822. The Epidemiology of AIDS, supra note 759, at 1357.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Court's method of constitutional analysis will obviously
affect the Court's decision. A strict interpretive model and the repre-
sentation-reinforcing model preclude the finding of a right to privacy
as a fundamental right. The battle over the scope of the right of pri-
vacy must therefore be fought entirely within the noninterpretivist
camp. The opposing forces are those who would restrict the right to
the protection of traditional family-related activities, and those who
would broaden the right so as to include nonmarital consensual sexual
activities. Although a noninterpretivist model may legitimize the
right of privacy as a fundamental right, the model does not itself pro-
vide a framework for delimiting the scope of that right.
Given the Court's past rulings in the area of privacy rights, it is
difficult to fashion a doctrine that can support the extension of pri-
vacy rights to homosexual activity. The Court has stated that the
right to do with one's body as one wishes is not absolute. There has
never been any indication that the Court will extend this right beyond
the area of procreative choices.
Many of the Court's privacy decisions tend to suggest a family
basis to the right to privacy. A privacy right based on the family will
not provide much support for homosexuals. To date, the Court has
not looked beyond marriage, biology and adoption to define the fam-
ily. However, an argument can be made that the values which under-
lie heterosexual relationships are furthered by stable homosexual
relationships as well. The family as a social unit is simply a type of
intimate relationship characterized by relative smallness, high selec-
tivity in its formation and exclusion of others from the important
functions of the relationship. The family provides succor and emo-
tional support for its members. A family, therefore, need not be
defined by legal or biological relationships. Whether a relationship is
protected may be determined by the presence or absence of the associ-
ational attributes enumerated above. Thus, a homosexual relation-
ship might satisfy the definition of a family where all the attributes are
present. A heterosexual relationship which failed to meet all of the
attributes, however, would not. The protection would extend to cer-
tain types of intimate relationships, then, and not to homosexual or
heterosexual activities per se.
The immediate consequences of denying homosexual activities
the protection of the right to privacy would be few. Hardwick v.
Bowers would be reversed, and Georgia's sodomy statute would
remain valid. Those statutes that have outlawed sodomy, as well as
those legislative acts that have decriminalized sodomy, would remain
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unchanged. Most state court decisions upholding or invalidating sod-
omy statutes would not be affected. The only jurisdictions that would
be affected would be New York and Washington, D.C. Neither New
York's Legislature nor the Congress has repealed those jurisdictions'
criminal sodomy statutes, despite court decisions invalidating those
statutes on privacy grounds. In those instances there would no longer
be any federal privacy right that would interfere with the enforcement
of those statutes. On a broader level, the exclusion of homosexual
activities would confine the limits of privacy rights to some reason-
ably close variant of the traditional family. Certainly, homosexuals
would lose a major legal weapon in their fight against sodomy stat-
utes. Homosexuals would have to look to legislatures rather than
courts in their fight against sodomy statutes.
If the Court were to extend the right of privacy to adult, private,
consensual, homosexual activities, the impact would be extensive. All
current state sodomy statutes would be subject to certain challenge by
homosexuals. In every case, states would likely find themselves called
upon to show that their sodomy statutes were narrowly tailored to
further a compelling state interest. A pattern might emerge. Courts
which had previously upheld sodomy statutes might in many cases
determine that the states' interests in morality, family values and/or
health outweighed homosexuals' right to privacy. Almost certainly,
there would be some disagreement among the state courts as to vari-
ous asserted state interests, and the Supreme Court would eventually
have to reconcile these conflicting results.
At that point, the Court would face issues as profound as the
threshold privacy question. Do the states have an interest in regulat-
ing private morality sufficient to override a right to privacy? Is a state
interest in furthering family values an important state interest and, if
so, is it rationally furthered by sodomy statutes? Although a state
clearly has an interest in protecting the public health, do sodomy stat-
utes narrowly and rationally further that interest?
Of course, the Supreme Court could establish homosexual pri-
vacy rights and at the same time subject asserted state interests to
strict scrutiny. In that event, it is unlikely that the Court would find
private morality a sufficiently compelling interest to outweigh a fun-
damental right to privacy. It is unclear whether the state interest in
promoting family values would outweigh an autonomy-based right of
privacy. Should the Court base the right on intimate "familial"
associations, the state interest in family values would by definition be
furthered. And while there is no question that the state has an inter-
19861
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
est in preventing the spread of communicable diseases, it is difficult to
see how the criminalization of sodomy narrowly furthers that interest.
There would be other important implications to a Supreme Court
decision recognizing homosexual privacy rights. Persons prosecuted
for fornication, bestiality, and similar crimes would for the first time
be able to raise a plausible fundamental right defense to their prosecu-
tions. It is possible that such statutes would be subjected to strict
scrutiny.
In a broad sense, a Supreme Court decision on the privacy rights
of homosexuals could have a major impact on both constitutional
doctrine and on our society's view of homosexuals. A decision in
favor of homosexual rights would leave the limits of the right to pri-
vacy undefined. A contrary decision would have the effect of enshrin-
ing, within the Constitution, majoritarian morality. The result could
be a radical redefinition of the purpose and utility of substantive due
process.
Furthermore, some of the Court's past decisions affecting inter-
personal relations have had a profound effect on societal values. For
example, the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education legiti-
mized the civil rights movement. Similarly, a decision extending the
right of privacy to homosexual activities could legitimize the gay
rights movement. A contrary decision might reinforce negative atti-
tudes toward homosexuals. In this way, the symbolic importance of a










* The contributors to this Survey wish to express their gratitude to Professors Keith
Rosenn, Kenneth Casebeer, Tony Powers, Mary Coombs, and Instructor Robert Tischenkel
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This appendix contains the results of a survey of state legislative
reference librarians. The survey requested copies of any and all
committee reports, reports of legislative and committee hearings,
penal code commission reports, etc., discussing state legislation con-
cerning sodomy statutes. The results give some indication of legisla-
tive intent in regard to the retention, modernization, or repeal of
criminal sodomy statutes. The results are categorized by the type of
statute to which they apply: states with archaic statutes, states with
modern statutes, and states that have decriminalized sodomy. For a
complete collection of the texts of all state statutes prohibiting con-
sensual sodomy in effect as of 1984, see Comment, The Right of
Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 15
U. ToL. L. REv 811, 868-75 (1984).
The authors extend their deepfelt thanks to the many state law
reference librarians who demonstrated thoroughness and profession-
alism in their detailed reponses to the survey. To them alone belongs
the credit for useful information contained within this survey.
ARCHAIC SODOMY STATUTES
Archaic 1 - North Carolina
State v. Stubbs, 145 S.E.2d 899 (N.C. 1966):
Defendant contends G.S. § 14-177 prior to the 1965 amendment
is unconstitutional on its face "because the act of a crime against
nature does not serve and comply with the legislative intent and pur-
pose of the statute." His argument in essence is that the legislative
intent of this statute is to punish offenses against public morality and
decency, and if homosexuality is an illness, it cannot in any way be
offensive to public morality and decency, and it should naturally fol-
low that if the intent of the statute is not served then the statute on its
face is unconstitutional. Prior to the 1965 amendment to G.S. § 14-
177, the punishment by that statute was fixed at imprisonment in the
State's prison for not less than five nor more than sixty years. The
1965 amendment provided that if any person shall commit the crime
against nature with mankind or beast he shall be guilty of a felony,
and shall be fined or imprisoned, in the discretion of the court.
Defendant's contention is overruled. It is manifest that the legislative
intent and purpose of G.S. § 14-177 prior to the 1965 amendment and
since is to punish persons who undertake by unnatural and indecent
methods to gratify a perverted and depraved sexual instinct which is
an offense against public decency and morality.
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MODERN SODOMY STATUTES
Modern 1A - Alabama
ALABAMA LAW INSTITUTE, ALABAMA CRIMINAL CODE, PROPOSED
REVISION WITH COMMENTARY 123 (1974):
Section 2318(1)(c) covers deviate sexual intercourse without law-
ful consent under the same terms and circumstances as subparagraph
(I) (a) covers vaginal intercourse. If both actors are adult and both
consent, there is no offense; but this subparagraph covers situations
where both parties are over sixteen, yet one party does not expressly
or impliedly acquiesce in the actor's conduct, either as to the act
done, or as to the person doing the act.
Modern 1B - Alabama
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-63 to -64 commentary (1975):
Alabama law was general in its scope as denouncing any crime
against nature. Former § 13-1-110. There were no degrees of the
offense, and it included all "unnatural" copulation with man or beast,
whether homosexual or heterosexual in nature. Woods v. State, 10
Ala. App. 96, 64 So. 508 (1914); Brown v. State, 32 Ala. App. 131, 22
So. 2d 445 (1945); Tarrant v. State, 12 Ala. App. 172, 67 So. 626
(1915).
Sections 13A-6-63 and 13A-6-64 provide a more specific defini-
tion of the types of acts proscribed. See "deviate sexual intercourse,"
§ 13A-6-60(2). That which is specific, however, by definition excludes
the general. Hence, an inventive mind could conceive of acts, pres-
ently unlawful and generally distasteful, yet not covered by these sec-
tions, primarily bestiality in many forms and acts committed by
consenting adults in private, whether heterosexual or homosexual.
Under the original draft deviate conduct between consenting
adults was not criminal under this article. It was deemed that such
acts are not subject to effective regulation--especially marital rela-
tions-and what few prosecutions may result are the product of either
the use of vice squad decoys or the anguished cries of vengeful or
disgruntled relatives or associates. Too, imprisoning a confirmed
homosexual is "a little like throwing Brer Rabbit into the briarpatch."
Cravan, C.J. Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C.
1964).
No attempt, therefore, was originally made to regulate consen-
sual acts performed in private. But such conduct was included by the




Modern 2 - Kentucky
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY, GENERAL COUNSEL, TITLE L
KENTUCKY PENAL CODE, KY. REV. STAT. § 510.070 COMMENTARY
(1984):
The essence of sodomy is "deviate sexual intercourse" as that
term is defined in KRS 510.010(1). Although the primary concern is
with homosexual contacts, the definition of deviate sexual intercourse
includes nonvaginal heterosexual intercourse other than between
spouses.
Sodomy in the Fourth Degree: KRS 510.100 prohibits deviant
sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex. The statute is
aimed primarily at private, consensual homosexual acts between
adults. Subsection (2) provides that consent of the participants is not
a defense, and the state does not have to prove lack of consent as an
element of this offense. Each participant in the act violates this stat-
ute. Force is not an element of this offense.
Sodomy in the fourth degree differs from the other sodomy
offenses in that it is restricted to persons of the same sex and is aimed
at those persons who are not statutorily incapable of consenting. As
noted above, this statute broadens former Kentucky law by including
oral copulation.
Modern 3 - Maryland
MARYLAND SENATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMMITrEE, REPORT
ON SB 358 4 (1976):
Present law proscribes consensual anal (sodomy) or oral (per-
verted practices) sexual acts. Since these crimes, when committed
between consenting adults, are very rarely prosecuted because of their
clandestine and personal nature, they are not a proper subject of stat-
utory recognition by prohibition.
Modern 4 - Missouri
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 comment (Vernon 1973):
Subsection 1(2) and (3) authorizes punishment for deviate sexual
intercourse committed by unmarried persons, whether committed
with or without consent. Since felony provisions punishing sodomy
and deviate sexual assault parallel the rape and sexual assault provi-
sions, the primary purpose of the subsection is to cover all other devi-
ate sexual intercourse including deviate sexual intercourse by a person
under 17 with a person to whom he is not married who is 14 or 15.
The Committee was closely divided on whether deviate sexual inter-
course between consenting adults in private should be a crime. It
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remains a crime under this section, unless the courts ultimately hold
the provision unconstitutional as unjustified governmental interfer-
ence with the developing right to sexual privacy. Since § 566.010,
subsection 1(2), defines deviate sexual intercourse as any sexual act
involving the genitals of one person and the mouth, tongue, hand or
anus of another person, subsection 1(2) also covers male-female inter-
course of this nature.
Modern 5 - Montana
MONTANA SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, MINUTES OF SB 109
DISCUSSION 2 (Mar. 1, 1973):
Representative Greely proposed that beastiality and homosexual-
ity as crime be eliminated. Representative Greely stated the criminal
code commission was very much in favor of eliminating beastiality
and homosexuality as crimes for various reasons but, in order to elim-
inate much dissension, and since the vote was close, put it in. Discus-
sion followed among committee members regarding the death
penalty, desecration of flag, homosexuality and beastiality. Represen-
tative Hall stated he felt the sense of proportion bothered him and
that there were more important issues to be considered in this bill.
Representative Towe disagreed. Motion to amend bill to eliminate
beastiality and homosexuality failed with Representative Baucus,
Greely, Roberts, Towe and Warfield voting yes.
Modern 6A- Nevada
NEVADA SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, MINUTES OF SB 412 DIs-
CUSSION 2-5 (Apr. 5, 1977):
In this bill whether you intended or not turns out to be a gay
rights bill. All sexual acts between consenting adults is legalized: all
consentual [sic] sodomy between adults, fellatio, cunninlingus. He
didn't have any suggested language here; where it is in the bill is the
last line, page 9, lines 37 to 38 and it repeals NRS 201.190 which is
the former infamous crime against nature statute.
It says that any infamous crime against nature by force, or on a
minor under 18 is punishable by life, otherwise its 1 to 6. And, it
includes bestiality, consenting adults and all the rest of it. He said
that the USSC, in the last year, ruled in Dover vs. Commonwealth
City of Richmond, in a one word opinion, affirmed, binding upon all
courts in this country as an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.
Under Hicks v. Miranda, it upheld a Virginia statute prohibiting con-
senting adults in a case where a homosexual male, who sought to have
the statute declared unconstitutional because it invaded his right of
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privacy. The 3 judge, lower court said simply, nuts, there is no right
of privacy and there is nothing involved here. This is not a marital
relationship and there is no significant interest for adult persons to
commit acts of sodomy in private. So, if a state desires, they may
prohibit such acts. That is a policy question, but in acting on this bill,
I think you should be aware that the present act is repealed.
Senator Gojack said she would like to have it cleared up in Sec-
tion 28, NRS 201.190 would repeal these statutes that Nevada has on
its books prohibiting private sexual acts?
Mr. Beatty stated that we do not have a present statute prohibit-
ing of the garden variety. We have a statute prohibiting homosexual
acts between consenting adults; that is 201.190, subsection 2 and,
otherwise, is the clause that prohibits it. That would be repealed by
this act.
Senator Ashworth said if we repeal 201.190, are we in conflict
with the rest of the bill? Mr. Beatty stated that if we do not repeal it,
then we would be in conflict.
Senator Bryan stated that his understanding was that if we repeal
this then we would affect the heterosexual relationship as well. Under
the present law, infamous crime against nature could be successfully
prosecuted presumably. Mr. Beatty stated that it could be success-
fully prosecuted per se if it is not in the marital relationship until the
State Supreme Court rules otherwise. Some previous cases handed
down indicated that they might so rule in a proper case, but that was
before the United States Supreme Court determination. In the mari-
tal relationship, no, it could not be prosecuted successfully.
Senator Gojack asked what the difference was then; wouldn't thy
[sic] have to go through the same kind of evidence for a homosexual
relationship? And, if so, why? Mr. Beatty stated that he would not
like to make a statement on that but there are a lot of people in the
State that are concerned. Some are based on ideas of religion, some
based on what is proper and what is a so-called natural act. His only
purpose here is to spell out what this bill would do. The evidenciary
[sic] procedure would be the same.
Senator Dodge stated that on the homosexual thing, my vote is
no. The committee agreed except for Senator Gojack.
Senator Close stated that then we have to decide on the hetero-
sexual sexual acts. The committees [sic] decision was that they
should have this in the law.
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Modern 6B-Nevada
NEVADA ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, MINUTES OF SB 412
DISCUSSION 1 (Apr. 29, 1977):
SB 412: Assistant District Attorney of Clark County, Tom
Beatty, was first to address this bill stating that he felt that whether or
not section 17, subsection 3, should be include [sic] in the bill was a
matter of legislative policy, but he pointed out that there was a matter
of legislative policy, but he pointed out that there are many in public
prosecution who feel that a prohibition against homosexual conduct is
necessary because they feel to raise the prohibition would raise the
inference that that type of behavior was condoned.
Mrs. Wagner stated that she had discussed this subject with
members of the Washoe Sheriff's Department and they had stated
that they do not enforce these types of laws in general. Mr. Beatty
stated that they are hard to prosecute because of the proof factor. He
also pointed out in response to a question from Mr. Coulter that if
you did not outlaw that type of behavior then it was supposed that
that behavior was proper conduct. And, he stated, for that reason,
many prosecutors believe it should be retained. He also said he did
not feel they would object to a gross misdemeanor, depending on the
gravity of the act.
Modern 7- New York
NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE SERVICE, INC., NEW YORK STATE LEGIS-
LATIVE ANNUAL, MEMORANDUM OF ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD J.
BARTLETT 51-52 (1965):
A. I. 4973, defining the crime of "consensual sodomy" (Pro-
posed P. L. § 130.38), makes a class B misdemeanor for a person to
engage in deviate sexual intercourse with another person even though
both are acquiescent, competent adults. Such conduct constitutes a
misdemeanor under the existing Penal Law, (§ 690), carrying a prison
sentence of up to one year in contrast to the three month ceiling in the
Proposed Penal Law. Although the main bill defines and penalizes
"sodomy" committed by force or intimidation, or with children,
incompetents, etc., it does not attach criminal sanctions to the consen-
sual adult conduct in question. The Commission's reasons for omit-
ting this phase of the crime of sodomy were similar to its reasons for
omitting adultery. It was of the opinion that this infrequently prose-
cuted offense involves a manifestation of illness rather than of crimi-
nal culpability and should be regarded as an illness rather than as a
crime. It may be noted that such conduct, when performed in a pub-
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lic place, is punishable under other provisions of the Proposed Penal
Law, (§§ 240.35[3]. 245.00). It would appear that the Legislature's
decision to restore the consensual sodomy offense was, as with adul-
tery, based largely upon the premise that deletion thereof might osten-
sibly be construed as legislative approval of deviate conduct.
Section 1 of this bill amends an introductory section to the "Sex
Offenses" article (Art. 130) in which "consensual sodomy" is placed,
which section declares that lack of consent of the victim is an element
of every offense defined in the Article (§ 130.05[1]). With the inser-
tion of consensual sodomy, that statement is no longer true, and the
section is therefore amended to point out the new exception.
STATES WHICH HAVE DECRIMINALIZED SODOMY
Decriminalization 1 - Alaska
CRIMINAL CODE REVISION SUBCOMMISSION, ALASKA CRIMINAL
CODE REVISION 74-76 (Tent. Draft, Part 1 1977):
In revising the sexual offenses article to cover behavior which
poses a real threat to the victim or to society, the Subcommission
broadened the coverage of several statutes to cover antisocial conduct
which is not now criminal. At the same time, the subcommission
found an absence of compelling state interest in some (but not all)
applications of a number of statutes which criminalize private sexual
activity between consenting adults - Adultery, AS 11.40.010, Cohab-
itation, AS 11.40.040 and Sodomy, AS 11.40.120. Insofar as these
statutes involve sexual activity between minors, sexual activity that is
non-consensual, or sexual activity in public, the sexual offenses article
provides greater protection than is found in existing law.
However, because these statutes go further and prohibit consen-
sual activity between adults in private, the Tentative Draft has elimi-
nated these applications from the Revised Code.
In doing so, the Subcommission recognized that any statute
prohibiting private consensual sexual activity between adults is sub-
ject to constitutional attack in light of the court's holding in Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Ak. 1975), that ".... citizens of the State of
Alaska have a basic right to privacy in their houses under Alaska's
Constitution." Indeed, in the earlier case of Harris v. State, 457 P.2d
638, 645 (Ak. 1969), though the issue was not before the court, the
Alaska Supreme Court noted that ". . . at least some of us might
perceive a right to privacy claim" if the sodomy statute was used to
prosecute cases involving consensual activity between adults.
The Subcommission recognized that large numbers of people
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share with them strong sentiment regarding the immorality of some of
the conduct which would not be criminal under the Tentative Draft.
But as justice professionals and citizens, the Subcommission also
recognized that there are limits beyond which utilization of criminal
sanctions loses its meaning and may become destructive to social
interest as a result of capricious special applications, constitutional
infringements or non-enforcement leading to general contempt for
law or misallocation of limited law-enforcement resources.
The careful line which the Subcommission has drawn is well
illustrated by the absence of any history in this state of criminal prose-
cutions in all the classes of behavior excluded from the reach of the
criminal law under the Tentative Draft.
Decriminalization 2 - California
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS, AB 489 (May 1, 1975)
(amending in relevant part CAL. PENAL CODE § 286 (West Supp.
1986):
The overall effect of this legislation is to remove criminal sanc-
tions for acts among consenting adults (those 18 and over). However,
those who prior to the effective date of this legislation had lost a
teaching credential or had been declared a mentally disordered sex
offender for acts which are "decriminalized" by this bill (sexual acts
of consenting adults) are left with the status quo.
Decriminalization 3 - Connecticut
REPORT OF THE CONNECTICUT COMMISSION TO REVISE THE CRIMI-
NAL STATUTES 128-29 (1967):
The Commission has decided to adopt the basic principle that
sexual activity in private, whether heterosexual or homosexual,
between consenting, competent adults, not involving corruption of the
young by older persons, is no business of the criminal law, and should
be left to the domestic relations court and to the concern of the spiri-
tual authorities. To put it another way, there should be excluded
from the criminal law all sexual practices not involving force, adult
corruption of the young, or public offense. This principle lies behind
the corresponding provisions on sex offenses in the Model Penal Code
(see MPC Tent. Draft No. 4, p. 277) and, to a great extent, the New
York Revised Penal Law upon which much of the draft is based. It
finds limited expression in the recent Illinois revision and has been
endorsed by church and lay officials alike.
Great Britain has recently enacted a similar statute, dealing with
homosexuality. See Time, December 30, 1966.
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The Commission emphasizes that its position should in no way
be regarded as moral condonation or approval of certain sexual activ-
ity which is now criminally prohibited; rather, its position is that for
sound reasons of public policy these questions are better dealt with by
authorities-spiritual, medical, judicial, etc.-other than those
involved in criminal law-enforcement.
The reasons which lie behind the principle adopted may be sum-
marized as follows: (1) such sexual activity presents no harm to the
interests of the community that is not adequately dealt with by other
areas of the law--e.g. divorce laws; (2) scientific studies by responsi-
ble professional people--e.g. Kinsey- demonstrate clearly that such
activity is condoned and engaged in by a significantly high percentage
of the population; (3) the present criminal sanctions are substantially
unenforced, at least in relation to what the available statistics tell us is
the high percentage of "offenders"; (4) what enforcement there is per-
mits capricious selection of very few cases for prosecution and serves
the interests of the blackmailer; (5) the threat of criminal sanction
probably deters some from obtaining needed psychiatric or other help
for their emotional problems; (6) any individual is entitled to protec-
tion against state interference in his personal affairs when he is not
hurting others; (7) in terms of the practicalities of police administra-
tion, since funds and personnel are so limited they could be put to
more effective and important work elsewhere.
Decriminalization 4 - Hawaii
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 707-730 to -742 (1976) (Part V. Sexual
Offenses Introduction):
In recent years, one of the most significant and widely-accepted
advances in the penal law has been the recognition that the social
harm, if any, from consensual sexual activity between mature persons
in private is not significant enough to warrant a penal sanction and
that other institutions of government and society are better equipped
to ameliorate any social ills which may result from such conduct.'
Nearly all recent revisions of the penal law either have omitted from
its ambit all such forms of consensual sexual activity,' or have omitted
some previously proscribed forms of consensual activity, while reduc-
ing other forms to low grade misdemeanors.3
Prohibitions against non-marital sexual intercourse (fornication)
4
and extramarital sexual intercourse (adultery)5 stem mainly from
western religious sources,6 and it was not until theocratic govern-
ments, such as Cromwell's England or the Puritan New England col-
onies, used the power of the state to reinforce religious tenets that
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these prohibitions found their place in civil, as opposed to ecclesiasti-
cal, law. Since the importation of religious standards into the penal
law, social mores toward sexual conduct have changed markedly.
The result has been the negligible enforcement of penal prohibitions
against certain types of sexual conduct, and the extremely limited
enforcement that does exist raises the specter of discriminatory
enforcement wholly unrelated to the merits of individual
prosecutions.
American penal laws against illicit intercourse are generally unen-
forced. This is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that
thousands of cases of adultery are made a matter of judicial record
in divorce proceedings, e.g., in New York, where adultery is the
sole ground for divorce. There is some indication that these laws,
like other dead letter statutes, may lend themselves to discrimina-
tory enforcement, e.g., where the parties involved are of different
races, or where a political figure is involved. The extraordinary
incursion of the federal government into the field of regulating
local morals under the Caminetti [v. United States, 242 U.S. 470
(1971)] interpretation of the Mann Act, has provided a means of
imprisoning "alleged racketeers" by showing that they take girl
friends on trips to Florida. This is a technique that could easily be
turned against other vulnerable individuals or groups.7
Moreover, available research would tend to indicate that, with
respect to fornication and adultery, at one time or another a majority
of the American population breaches the sexual standards which the
penal law purports to enforce.8 This is significant for two reasons: (1)
It demonstrates that the penal law does not reflect society's actual
conception of harmful behavior. (2) In addition to the problem of
discriminatory enforcement, the number of offenders makes anything
approaching effective enforcement impossible. The impossibility of an
even-handed enforcement tends to bring the penal law in general, not
merely the unenforced offense, into disrespect.
This Code adopts the position of the Model Penal Code that a
secular penal code should not be used to enforce purely moral or reli-
gious standards.
The Code does not attempt to use the power of the state to
enforce purely moral or religious standards. We deem it inappro-
priate for the government to attempt to control behavior that has
no substantial significance except as to the morality of the actor.
Such matters are best left to religious, educational and other social
influences. Apart from the question of constitutionality which
might be raised against legislation avowedly commanding adher-
ence to a particular religious or moral tenet, it must be recognized,
as a practical matter, that in a heterogeneous community such as
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ours, different individuals and groups have widely divergent views
of the seriousness of various moral derelictions.9
Certain secular objectives have been offered as a rationale for the
continued recognition of laws against fornication and adultery.
Among these are preservation of the institution of marriage, preserva-
tion of the peace against disturbances by outraged relatives, preven-
tion of relationships which affront the public, prevention of
illegitimacy, and prevention of disease."° The prohibitions against con-
sensual sexual conduct do not appear to bear any logical relationship
to these secular aims. The prohibition against adultery does not stem
the number of divorces granted on that ground or on the ground of
grievous mental suffering when adultery is the underlying cause. The
laws against assault and public disorder seem more directly related to
the prevention of disturbances than do laws against sexual behavior.
There is no evidence that the public is affronted by adulterous or non-
marital sexual relationships; moreover, the affront, even if it exists, is
not a social harm of a magnitude sufficient to warrant the imposition
of a criminal penalty upon the actors. Although the prevention of
illegitimacy and disease is desirable, "the laws against illicit co-habita-
tion are ill designed for these purposes. Bastardy is rare compared to
the frequency of illicit intercourse."' 1 The prohibitions against adul-
tery and fornication do not differentiate on the basis of whether the
undesired result occurs. As for the prevention of venereal disease, the
prohibitions do not differentiate between the healthy and the diseased
actor, nor between the prostitute or promiscuous participant, on the
one hand, and the single incident or continuing non-marital relation-
ship, on the other. 2
As in the case of fornication and adultery, consenual homosexual
conduct and what has been thought to be a typical heterosexual con-
duct are criminal offenses in most unrevised American penal codes. 3
In this respect, the American jurisdictions differ from most western
European countries, which do not use the criminal process to inter-
fere with private behavior between consenting adults. 4 It is generally
conceded today that "the legal provisions against heterosexual behav-
ior which violates sodomy and crimes-against-nature statutes should
be eliminated,"' 5 and that problems, if any, presented by homosexual
behavior between consenting mature persons in private are not likely
to be cured by the continued use of the criminal sanction and the
sanction ought to be eliminated in this context. 6 The Model Penal
Code adopts this position.
Our proposal to exclude from the criminal law all sexual prac-
tices not involving force, adult corruption of minors, or public
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offense is based on the following grounds. No harm to the secular
interests of the community is involved in atypical sex practice in
private between consenting adult partners. This area of private
morals is the distinctive concern of spiritual authorities....
As in the case of illicit heterosexual relations, existing law is
substantially unenforced, and there is no prospect of real enforce-
ment except against cases of violence, corruption of minors and
public solicitation. Statutes that go beyond that permit capricious
selection of a very few cases for prosecution and serve primarily
the interest of blackmailers. Existence of the criminal threat prob-
ably deters some people from seeking psychiatric or other assist-
ance for their emotional problems; certainly conviction and
imprisonment are not conducive to cures. Further, there is the
fundamental question of the protection to which every individual is
entitled against state interference in his personal affairs when he is
not hurting others. Lastly, the practicalities of police administra-
tion must be considered. Funds and personnel for police work are
limited, and it would appear to be poor policy to use them to any
extent in this area when large numbers of atrocious crimes remain
unsolved. 17
In addition to the particular objections, stated above, to dealing
with consensual sexual conduct, between competent persons in pri-
vate, as a penal offense, there is the pervasive realization that the
penal system is intended to deal only with serious and aggravated
injuries to protected social interests and that the penal process is not
equipped, nor is it intended, to protect society against every social ill,
even if significant. The civil courts, the Family Court and its counsel-
ing service, the Departments of Health and Social Services are all bet-
ter suited, than are the penal system and the criminal court, to
ameliorate any social ills which might result from consensual sexual
conduct between competent persons.
This part of Chapter 707 therefore deals only with sexual behav-
ior which involves (1) forcible compulsion, (2) imposition on a youth
or other person incapable of giving meaningful consent, or (3) offen-
sive conduct.
[Footnotes]
1. This introductory comment does not, of course, deal
with consensual sexual activity which is compounded by aggravat-
ing circumstances, such as prostitution or pornography offenses.
Those offenses are dealt with elsewhere in the Code.
2. See M.P.C., Article 213; Prop. Mich. Rev. Cr. Code,
Chapter 23; Prop. Pa. Cr. Code, Article XII.
3. See N.Y.R.P.L., Article 130 and Prop. Del. Cr. Code,
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Part VI, Subpart D, which, although generally following the trend
toward legalization of all consensual sexual activity, allow excep-
tions by making consensual sodomy and adultery low grade misde-
meanors, and Ill. Rev. Cr. Code, Article 11, which permits private
consensual homosexual behavior but makes "open and notorious"
fornication and adultery low grade misdemeanors.
4. H.R.S. § 768-17.
5. Id. §§ 768-13, 768-14.
6. Exodus, 20:14 (Seventh Commandment); Leviticus,
20:10, Deuteronomy, 22:22; I Corinthian 10:8; I Thessalonians,
4:3. For a brief discussion of the religious sources of consensual
sexual offenses, see M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 4, comments at
204 (1955).
7. M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 4, comments at 205 (1955).
8. See id. at 206-207, citing Kinsey, Pomeroy and Martin,
Sexual Behavior in the Human Male 549-552, 585 (1st ed. 1948);
Kinsey, Martin and Gebhard, Sexual Behavior in the Human
Female 416, 419-420 (1st ed. 1953); and Drummond, The Sex Par-
adox 243 (1953).
9. Id. at 207.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 209.
12. Id.
13. The prohibition against "atypical" heterosexual behavior
may even proscribe certain conduct between married persons. See
H.R.S. § 768-71.
14. Cf. M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 4, comments at 278
(1955).
15. Ploscowe, Sex and the Law 213 (1951).
16. Marmor, Sexual Inversion 17 (1965); Schofield, Socio-
logical Aspects of Homosexuality 161 (1965); Ploscowe, supra note
15 ["It might be desirable to eliminate the'legal prohibitions
against adult homosexual behavior in private altogether. Such
prohibitions benefit nobody but blackmailers at the present
time. .. "].
17. M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 4, comments at 277-279
(1955).
Decriminalization 5 - New Jersey
2 NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMISSION, FINAL
REPORT, THE NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE: COMMENTARY 196-97
(1971):
2. Consentual [sic] Sodomy Between Adults. We have arrived at
the conclusion that private homosexuality between consenting adults
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not involving force, imposition or corruption of the young should not
be an offense.
The sexual impulse finds expression in a variety of ways other
than heterosexual copulation. Substantial numbers of males and
females find themselves drawn to members of their sex. In both
homosexual and heterosexual relationships, gratification may be
sought and bestowed digitally, orally, or by the anus. There may be
no human partner, as in copulation with animals or corpses, or in
masturbation. Some individuals obtain sexual gratification from
exposing themselves indecently, from wearing clothes of the opposite
sex, or from contact with objects of symbolic sexual significance, e.g.,
a shoe or an undergarment. Heterosexual copulation must also be
considered deviate when accomplished by force or with a child, espe-
cially when these circumstances appear to be essential to the actor's
gratification. Superficially non-sexual offenses such as larceny, bur-
glary, or arson may have an avowed or unconscious sexual aspect, just
as, for that matter, approved behavior, including successful pursuit of
art, literature, money, or fame may be bound up with sexual drives. It
is generally agreed, also, that an isolated episode of deviate sexuality
may have no important significance with respect to the character of
the actor, being the result of a chance encounter, curiosity or
experiment.
Our proposal to exclude from the criminal law all sexual prac-
tices not involving force, adult corruption of minors, or public offense
is based on the grounds that no harm to the secular interests of the
community is involved in a typical sex practice in private between
consenting adult partners. This area of private morals is the distinc-
tive concern of spiritual authorities.
As in the case of illicit heterosexual relations, existing law is sub-
stantially unenforced, and there is no prospect of real enforcement
except against cases of violence, corruption of minors and public
solicitation. Statutes that go beyond that permit capricious selection
of a very few cases for prosecution and serve primarily the interest of
blackmailers. Existence of the criminal threat probably deters emo-
tional problems; certainly conviction and imprisonment are not con-
ducive to cures. Further, there is the fundamental question of the
protection to which every individual is entitled against state interfer-
ence in his personal affairs when he is not hurting others. Lastly, the
practicalities of police administration must be considered. Funds and
personnel for police work are limited, and it would appear to be poor
policy to use them to any extent in this area when large numbers of
atrocious crimes remain unsolved. Even the necessary utilization of
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police in cases involving minors or public solicitation raises special
problems of police morale, because of the entrapment practices that
enforcement seems to require, and the temptation to bribery and
extortion.
Decriminalization 6A - Ohio
Ohio State Legislature, Staff Redraft of Sections 1641-1653, Proposal
A, Minutes of Committee Meeting 12-13 (Aug. 24-25, 1972):
Mr. Wefald noted that Proposal A essentially followed the origi-
nal FCC draft, but went further to ensure that sexual intercourse or
deviate sexual intercourse between consenting adults rendered those
adults subject to criminal liability. In addition, Proposal A also
included sections covering the existing North Dakota offenses of for-
nication, adultery, and unlawful cohabitation. Mr. Wefald noted that
the definition of "sexual intercourse" in Section 1653 of Proposal A
had been expanded to include a first sentence specifically indicating
that sexual intercourse could only occur between a male and a female.
Mr. Wefald noted that Proposal B was a redraft of the FCC pro-
visions using a previously adopted definition of "sexual act," thus
allowing several FCC sections to be consolidated with each other,
and, in addition, Proposal B did not prohibit sexual activity between
consenting adults. In addition, Mr. Wefald stated that Section 1643
of Proposal B was presented in the alternative, with the second alter-
native placing emphasis on the idea of corruption of minors by offend-
ers who are at least five years older than their victims. Further, Mr.
Wefald noted that the crime of fornication, defined in Section 1646 of
Proposal B, was limited to the performance of a sexual act in a public
place.
Proposal C was designed to follow the original FCC format, but
not to prohibit sexual activity between consenting adults, and further,
contained definitions of the offenses of incest, bestiality, and bigamy,
so that those offenses could be logically grouped with the sexual
offense provisions. Mr. Wefald noted that the definitions of "deviate
sexual intercourse" had been shortened to exclude intercourse with an
animal, since Proposal C contained a particular provision dealing
with bestiality.
The Chairman said that the Committee would have to make a
choice between the drafts for the purposes of using one as the basis for
discussion. Representative Murphy inquired as to why Section 1646
in Proposal A limited potential victims of the "sexual intercourse"
portion of the offense to females. The Committee discussed the fact
that it had previously reached a conclusion that either sex could be
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the victim of illegal sexual intercourse or illegal deviate sexual
intercourse.
The Committee Counsel stated that he had discussed the three
sexual offense proposals with Judge Erickstad and that Judge Erick-
stad favored Proposal A, but wanted the Committee to note that Sec-
tion 1645, defining sodomy, reduced the potential penalty under
North Dakota law from the present 10-year maximum imprisonment
to one-year maximum imprisonment. The Committee Counsel noted
that Judge Erickstad would also like to see the definitions of incest,
bestiality, and bigamy (contained in Proposal C) included in Proposal
A.
Representative Hilleboe noted that recently a federal district
court for the District of Columbia had rendered a decision striking
down the District of Columbia sodomy statute as being unenforceably
vague. Professor Lockney noted that there were two radically differ-
ent philosophies represented in Proposals A and B, and that the com-
mittee would probably never resolve the differences. Therefore, he
suggested again that the committee present alternative proposals to
the Legislative Council and the Legislature so as to forego the possi-
bility that the main body of the Code revision could be killed on the
basis of choosing the wrong tack in regard to sexual offenses.
Mr. Wolf suggested that, should alternative proposals be submit-
ted, he would put Proposal A in the main bill and would offer Propo-
sal B as an alternative. The Chairman called on Mr. Webb and Mr.
Kelsch for their comments regarding the feeling of the prosecuting
attorneys concerning Proposal A or Proposal B.
Mr. Kelsch stated he felt that the majority of state's attorneys
would only be opposed if the sexual offense definitions represented
great change and that their opposition would probably be much less if
alternatives were offered. He felt that, as a whole, the state's attor-
neys would probably find Proposal A most acceptable.
Mr. Webb stated that speaking for himself he would favor Propo-
sal B, noting that he would require some revision of that Proposal, as
the main proposal, with Proposal A as an alternate.
Representative Stone said she felt that the Committee had defi-
nitely decided that males could be the victims of sexual offenses. The
Committee Counsel noted that this was probably the case, with the
exception that, at the last meeting, Judge Erickstad had indicated an
interest in maintaining a sharp delineation between forceful rape and
forceful sodomy, with forceful rape remaining essentially as it is
defined today, that is, with the victim being a female and the perpetra-
tor being a male.
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IT WAS MOVED BY PROFESSOR LOCKNEY, SECONDED
BY REPRESENTATIVE STONE, AND CARRIED that the Com-
mittee limit its consideration of the various sexual offense proposals to
Proposal A and Proposal B, with Proposal A to include the defini-
tions of incest, bestiality, and bigamy contained in Proposal C.
Decriminalization 6B - Ohio
OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, 109TH GENERAL ASSEM-
BLY, SUMMARY OF AM. SUB. H.B. 511, THE NEW OHIO CRIMINAL
CODE 13 (1972):
The principal on which the first group of offenses is founded is
that sexual activity of whatever kind between consenting adults in pri-
vate ought not to be a crime, but that the law ought to proscribe sex-
ual assaults, sexual activity with the young and immature, public
sexual displays, and other sexually oriented conduct which carries a
significant risk of harming or unreasonably affronting others.
Decriminalization 6C - Ohio
OHIO CRIMINAL LAW TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, MINUTES 6 (Jan. 8,
1968):
Mr. Young requested a consideration of the problem and/or the
criminality of homosexuality. Mr. Young believes that such conduct
presented a serious threat to the moral stability of our society as well
as to the participants. Such conduct is not entirely the result of
"mental disease" nor is it uncontrollable conduct. Thus, since such
conduct harms both society and the participants and is predictated
upon free will, it is a proper and necessary subject for criminal
prohibition.
While in basic agreement with Mr. Young, Judge Duffey raised
the inescapable problem of enforcement. Detection of such conduct is
difficult if not impossible. To enforce such provisions, the door is
open to countless constitutional problems of entrapment and search.
Existing statutes are rarely enforced except for motives entirely dis-
tinct from the purpose for their existence.
After a brief discussion Judge Duffey moved that consenual acts
of homosexuality should not be criminally prohibited. All concurred
except one dissent by Mr. Young.
Decriminalization 7 - Oregon
OREGON SENATE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE,
MINUTES OF SB 40, ARTICLE 13, SEXUAL OFFENSES 1-3 (Feb. 24,
1971):
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Mr. Paillette prefaced his explanation of the Article with a gen-
eral policy statement on behalf of the Commission:
The provisions in the Article have been approved by the Crimi-
nal Law Revision Commission and are based on the principle that
private consensual activity between competent adults, whether hetero-
sexual or homosexual, not involving corruption of the young or com-
mercialization, is not a proper subject for regulation by the criminal
code.
Other states that have completed or are in the process of criminal
law revision, as well as the American Law Institute, in giving careful
study to this complex and sensitive area of human behavior, have
arrived at the same conclusion.
The ALI recognized and recommended that certain types of indi-
vidual conduct are better left out of a criminal code. State legislatures
around the country, likewise, are coming to the point of trying to
distinguish between crime-that is, the type of conduct which poses a
real threat to society by presenting dangers of injury to life or health,
property loss or official corruption-and sin or immorality, which,
while frequently justifiably condemned, seems a matter best left to the
church, the family and other moral authorities, but not to the crimi-
nal courts. This general philosophy is evident in the new criminal
codes of Connecticut and Illinois and in the recommendations of
criminal law revision groups in New York and Michigan.
The Commission believes that the central issue that must be
faced in this area is the extent to which conduct that is generally con-
sidered abhorrent or immoral, but does not produce demonstrable
harm to others, should be made criminal.
As noted by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice in its report, The Challenge of Crime in
a Free Society (1967), immorality and criminality are not necessarily
identical concepts. Obviously, a state must make every possible effort
to control criminality through the force of its criminal code, but it is
patently evident that past efforts to legislate against private consen-
sual sexual activity between competent adults have been dismal fail-
ures because such laws are substantially unenforceable and have only
minimal deterrence and no rehabilitative value at all.
Police, prosecutors and the other resources that make up the
state's law enforcement machinery, in the view of the majority of the
Commission, should be concentrated against the criminal element
that poses a clear and present danger to life and property of the com-
munity and not deployed in futile attempts to be moral guardians for
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the general populace of the state. Moreover, laws (such as the laws
that are recommended for repeal) that define so-called "crimes with-
out victims" either are not or cannot be enforced and consequently
create disrespect not only for the laws in question but for the entire
body of criminal statutes.
In summary, the vital interests sought to be covered by the draft
are the protection of the individual, adult or child, against all noncon-
sensual or forcible acts, protection of the incompetent and physically
helpless, protection of the young and immature and protection of the
public from affronts to generally accepted standards of conduct.
Decriminalization 8 - Wisconsin
WIS. STAT. § 944.01 (Supp. 1985):
944.01 Intent. The state recognizes that it has a duty to
encourage high moral standards. Although the state does not regu-
late the private sexual activity of consenting adults, the state does not
condone or encourage any form of sexual conduct outside the institu-
tion of marriage. Marriage is the foundation of family and society.
Its stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to
society and this state.
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